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INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust law, many have said, is the "Magna Carta of Free Enterprise," a· 
sort of Bill of Rights protecting the liberty of businesses and consumers. 1 To 
• Associate Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. J.D., The University 
of Chicago, A.B., The College of William and Mary. The author wishes to thank partici-
pants in the John M. Olin Workshop in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago 
Law School, as well as participants in a workshop held under the auspices of the Frances 
Lewis Law Center at the Washington & Lee School of Law. Neal Devins, Richard Ep-
stein, Charles Koch, David Millon, Richard Posner, and Adrian Vermeule provided help-
ful comments. Kerry Hubers, Eric Meyer, James Scott, and Stephanie Zapata provided 
helpful research assistance. The College of William and Mary provided a generous re-
search grant in support of this project. 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws 
in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. 
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. 
And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom 
2 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
anyone familiar with the Anglo-American notion of a Constitution, this as-
sertion might sound a bit strange. The Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, 
after all, place limits on the actions of governments, not individuals. 2 
Moreover, the dominant political ideology of the nineteenth century-when 
the antitrust movement began-mirrored the Constitution's concern with state 
infringements of liberty. 3 Antitrust regulation, by contrast, applies only to 
private behavior, notably contracts, leaving states and the federal govern-
ment free to create or approve the very impediments to competition that these 
laws forbid. California can set up and enforce a cartel of all raisin growers 
in the State, but private physicians in one department of one hospital in Los 
Angeles cannot collectively agree to raise their fees. 4 How can antitrust 
Jaws, which only limit private freedom of action, be usefully characterized as 
enhancements of "liberty," analogous to, say, the First Amendment? 
Indeed, far from providing a justification for antitrust Jaw, the conception 
of liberty dominant in the nineteenth century would seem to call the legiti-
to compete .... "); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1956) ("The 
Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."); United States v. Socony 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (characterizing Sherman Act as a "charter of 
freedom"); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (same); 
see also John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277, 280 
(1986) ("The Sherman Act has aptly been characterized as a charter of freedom because it 
is designed to enhance the opportunity for independent decisionmakers. "); Louis 
Schwartz, American Antitrust Laws and Free Enterprise, 2 SWISS REV. INT'L ANTITRUST 
1, 3-5 ( 1978) (arguing that antitrust has traditionally been based on the belief that 
"concentrated economic power tends to dominate government and hence lead to authori-
tarian societies"). Even Senator Sherman, for whom the basic federal antitrust statute was 
named, used this sort of rhetoric to describe the Act. See 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890) 
(statement of Sen. Sherman); see also infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Populist approach to antitrust emphasizing liberty of traders and consumers from pri-
vate power). 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law .... "); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 17 (1883) ("[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State ag-
gression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State 
authority .... "). 
3 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 105-295 
(1994); see also infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text (describing nineteenth-century 
concern with state interference with private liberty). 
4 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (holding that state may authorize oth-
erwise .illegal cartel of raisin growers); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 
332-33 (1991) (ruling that complaint alleging group boycott of a single physician by one 
hospital's ophthalmological department states a claim under the Sherman Act); see also 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211, 228-29 (1899) (holding that 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate obstructions of commerce created by 
purely private contracts). 
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macy of such regulation into question. After all, the formative era for anti-
trust law-1890-1903-when courts were interpreting newly-enacted antitrust 
statutes, largely overlapped with the "formative era" for liberty of contract 
doctrine.5 During this period, in decisions leading up to Lochner v. New 
York,6 courts maintained that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments prevented states and the federal government from inter-
fering with private agreements. 7 Any argument that antitrust regulation was 
originally understood as an enhancement of liberty must first explain how 
such intervention in the market flourished in a constitutional regime zealous 
to protect private contracts. 
Scholars have spilled a considerable amount of ink articulating and de-
fending competing 'constructions of the original meaning of early antitrust 
statutes, particularly the Sherman Act. In so doing, these scholars have of-
fered various accounts of the caselaw produced by the formative era, ac-
counts that reinforce the competing interpretations of the statutes themselves. 
Each of these accounts, of course, necessarily rests upon an explanation, 
sometimes only implicit, of how courts squared antitrust regulation with lib-
erty of contract. The refutation of such an explanation, it seems, would call 
the associated account of formative era case law into question. 8 
' 
5 See EdwardS. Corwin, The Antitrust Acts and the Constitution, 18 VA. L. REV. 355, 
361 (1932) ("[I]t was during the very period when the Sherman Act first came under judi-
cial construction, that the term 'liberty' as used in the [Fifth] amendment came to mean 
'freedom of contract,' especially in the management of property."'). Scholars have used 
the term "formative era" to describe various periods of antitrust's early development in 
statutes and caselaw. See RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-
1992, at 1-58 (1996) (asserting that the formative era ended in 1911); James May, Anti-
trust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust 
Analysis, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 257 (1989) [hereinafter May, Antitrust in the Formative 
Era] (stating that the formative era ended in 1918); James May, Antitrust Practice and 
Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Anti-
trust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1987) [hereinafter May, Antitrust 
Practice and Procedure] (same). This article uses the term to refer to the period of 1890-
1903, during which courts dealt with constitutional challenges to antitrust legislation 
largely in cases involving horizontal cartels that involved no integration. Cf Northern 
Sees. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 325 (1904) (condemning horizontal railway 
merger under the Sherman Act). 
6 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
7 See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 592-93 (1897) (holding that Louisiana 
statute regulating contracts with out-of-state insurance companies was an unconstitutional 
limitation on the freedom to contract); infra notes 70-136 and accompanying text 
(analyzing the relationship between the Due Process Clause and the police power). 
8 See infra notes 9-32 and accompanying text (discussing competing schools of antitrust 
thought and their respective accounts of the role of liberty of contract in the formative 
era). 
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One, so-called "Populist" camp, wholeheartedly embraces the notion of 
antitrust as Magna Carta. 9 From the beginning, Populists say, courts de-
clared contracts unlawful whenever they "unduly" interfered with the 
"liberty" of customers or traders, even if the agreements did not lead to in-
creased prices. 10 Under this approach, tying contracts, vertical distribution 
restraints, and group boycotts should all be unlawful per se, without any 
showing of anticompetitive effect, because they infringe in one way or an-
other on the "freedom" of firms and consumers to participate fully in the 
marketplace.'' Indeed, many in the Populist camp have gone so far as to 
9 See STEPHEN ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 6-8 (1993); Michael S. Jacobs, An 
Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 234-40 
(1995). 
10 See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 5, at 18-26 (discussing early support for such an 
"industrial liberty" approach to antitrust); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Bal-
ance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1223-24 (1988); Eleanor M. Fox, The Moderni-
zation of Antitrust, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1147 (1981) (contending that the Sherman 
Act was designed in part to enhance liberty from the power of trusts); Robert Pitofsky, 
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 PA. L. REv. 1051, 1053-57 (1979) (arguing that 
antitrust statutes were designed to check concentrated economic power and enhance indi-
vidual freedom); Schwartz, supra note I, at 3-5 (describing antitrust's concern with con-
centrated economic power); LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST II (1977) (arguing that an-
titrust is grounded in a populist tradition emphasizing decentralized economic power and 
individual freedom); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional 
Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 422-23 (1965) (contending that antitrust is 
grounded in a populist tradition that preferred d!!centralized economic power and individ-
ual freedom); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. 
L. REV. 377, 384 (1965) (advocating antitrust policy that protects individuals against eco-
nomic power). Indeed, according to one scholar, anyone who disagrees is incompetent: 
Every competent and objective study of the legislative history of the antitrust laws in-
dicates that they were passed with a series of qualitative political, social and eco-
nomic goals or values in mind to guide their implementation. The overall goal is that 
a "competitive process" not the quantitative concept of competition, be the rule for 
big and small. 
John T. Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy and the Social "Science" of Economics, 
33 ANtiTRUST BULL. 713, 719-20 (1989). 
11 See Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the 
Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. I, 9 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Tying Meets the 
New Institutional Economics] (describing Populist objection to tying contracts as grounded 
in concerns about the "coercion" of buyers and independent sellers of the tied product); 
Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 143, 176-83 (1997) (describing Populist approach to vertical restraints); 
William Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. I, 35-
38 (1995) (describing Populist approach to tying contracts); Joseph P. Bauer, A Simplified 
Approach to Tying Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REv. 283, 297-305 (1980) (describing and ad-
vocating Populist approach to tying contracts); Fox, supra not~ 10, at 1184 ("The per se 
rule against vertical price fixing reflects the value that sellers of goods should have the 
freedom to charge the price they see fit. ... "). Some commentators have even argued 
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argue that certain contractual infringements on liberty, for instance, maxi-
mum resale price maintenance, should be unlawful even if they ultimately 
enhance the welfare of consumers by lowering prices. 12 For over a genera-
tion, the Supreme Court explicitly embraced such a Populist approach to the 
antitrust laws.t3 More recently, however, the Court has reversed course, 
narrowing or overruling many decisions premised upon a concern for the 
"liberty" of individual traders and consumers. 14 
that restraints ancillary to otherwise legitimate joint ventures should be condemned if they 
are broader than necessary to achieve their objectives, regardless whether they lead to 
higher prices. See Ross, supra note 9, at 157-58. 
12 See Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 651 ( 1993) (arguing that all vertical price fixing should be per se 
unlawful); Fox, supra note 10, at 1184 (same); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 390-
91 (approving ban on maximum resale price maintenance). These scholars echo the dicta 
of Judge Hand to the effect that certain monopolies should be unlawful even if they lead to 
lower prices: 
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but, as 
we have already implied, there are others, based on the belief that great industrial 
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In de-
bates in Congress Senator Sherman himself ... showed that among the purposes of 
Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to the great aggregati~ns of capital be-
cause of the helplessness of the individual before them .... Throughout the history of 
the statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetu-
ate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of in-
dustry in small units which can effectively compete with each other. 
Unites States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945); see also 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("Congress appreciated that 
occasional high costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented indus-
tries and markets. It resolved these considerations in favor of decentralization."); Fashion 
Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941) ("[A] 
monopoly contrary to [the policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts] can exist even 
though a combination may temporarily or even permanently reduce the price of the articles 
manufactured or sold."). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972) (declaring 
horizontal restraints ancillary to joint venture per se unlawful because they limited the 
freedom of traders); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (declaring maxi-
mum resale price maintenance per se unlawful because it interfered with the freedom of 
traders to price as they saw fit); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 
(1962) (concluding that Congress meant to sacrifice consumer welfare to ensure frag-
mented industries and markets); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hales Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 
212-13 (1959) (declaring group boycott per se unlawful because it limited the "freedom" 
of dealers); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 
457, 465-67 (1941) (finding an unlawful conspiracy despite absence of any showing of an 
effect on prices). 
14 Recent decisions inconsistent with Populists' solicitude for the liberty of traders in-
clude: State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 285 (1997) (holding that maximum resale 
price maintenance should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. 
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Many Populists have recognized that their account of antitrust, and its 
concomitant view of formative era case law, is facially inconsistent with lib-
erty of contract doctrine, as well as the economic ideology that informed it. 
These advocates readily admit that classical political economy, the dominant 
approach to regulation in the nineteenth century, defined "liberty" as the ab-
sence of state interference with a purportedly private sphere. 15 Still, they as-
sert, this paradigm collapsed toward the end of that century, as citizens, po-
litical economists, and politicians realized that private economic power can 
threaten liberty as much as any state enactment. 16 Antitrust laws in general 
USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990) (holding that competing dealer harmed by 
price-reducing effect of maximum resale price maintenance cannot maintain damage ac-
tion); Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 30-31 (1984) (stating that tying con-
tracts obtained by firms without market power are analyzed under the Rule of Reason); 
Continental T.V .• Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (holding that 
agreements creating exclusive territories should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason, 
even though they interfere with the discretion of dealers); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. 
Atlas Van Lines, Inc~. 792 F.2d 216, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bark, J.) (stating that hori-
zontal ancillary restraints are lawful absent proof of market power); Polk Bros. v. Forest 
City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (same); Brunswick 
Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (ruling that 
replacement of one monopolist by another cannot be unlawful, even if accomplished 
through unfair means); Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 
F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (ruling boycott lawful absent anticompetitive 
effect). It should be noted that adoption of the Populist emphasis on liberty from private 
power does not necessarily lead to an embrace of each of the doctrinal changes sought by 
this school. More precisely, many Populist prescriptions depend not only upon the nor-
mative premise that private coercion ought to be condemned, but also upon certain purely 
economic assumptions about the presence of coercion. Cf. Jacobs, supra note 9, at 226 
("In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic models 
to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement."). So, for 
instance, Populists would outlaw all tying contracts, because, they believe that all such 
agreements are necessarily imposed through an exercise of market power. See Meese, 
Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics, supra note II, at 5 n.22 (documenting this 
claim); Bauer, supra note II, at 285-86. However, because tying contracts need not be 
"imposed" through an exercise of market power, but may instead be examples of purely 
voluntary integration, acceptance of Populist normative premises does not require the con-
clusion that all such contracts should be unlawful. See Meese, Tying Meets the New In-
stitutional Economics, supra note II, at 10. 
15 See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 5, at 10-12; Millon, supra note 10, at 1257-63. 
16 See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 5. at 10-12, 14-18 (arguing that changed economic 
conditions led Congress to pass Sherman Act so as to enhance "freedom from undue mar-
ket power"); Millon, supra note 10, at 1234-37 (arguing that concerns about the coercive-
ness of economic power shaped the Sherman Act); William Page, Ideological Conflict and 
the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. I, 28-36 (1991) [hereinafter Page, Ideo-
logical Conflict] (describing role that concerns over private power played in the passage of 
the Sherman Act). As Professor Schwartz put it: 
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and the Sherman Act in particular were, under this view, manifestations of 
this concern and thus were meant to sweep more broadly than the scope of 
regulation implied by the classical paradigm. Of course, to the extent that 
liberty from contract supplies a sufficient justification for regulation under 
the Populist approach, very little is left of liberty of contract and the classical 
paradigm. All contracts, after all, restrain someone's liberty-that is the 
point of contracr.l 7 
According to the Populists, formative era courts were faithful to this in-
tent, abandoning the classical paradigm's concern for liberty of contract in 
favor of policies that "enhance" liberty from private contracts. 18 In so doing, 
they maintain, courts rejected liberty of contract challenges to the Sherman 
Act, holding that the commerce power overrode private contractual freedom, 
a view shared by many outside the Populist camp. 19 All this changed, Popu-
lists say, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States where the Supreme Court 
adopted the so-called "Rule of Reason," under which a contract did not 
"restrain trade" unless it led to higher prices by means of an "illegitimate" 
Expressing, therefore, a quasi-constitutional principle, the antitrust law is not inhib-
ited by any perceived conflict with freedom of contract. Not only contract law, but 
also the law of property, of freedom of association, of agency, and of patent must 
yield to the principle that legal rights may not be so massed and exercised as to 
trammel the equally respected freedom of others. 
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 5; JOHN M. BONHAM, INDUSTRIAL LIBERTY 83-84 (New York, 
G.P. Putnam's Sons 1888) (arguing that, like the State, private parties ought not be al-
lowed to interfere with liberty of contract). 
17 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is 
of their very essence."); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 14 (1981) (noting that 
contract, as promise, necessarily restricts an individual's options). 
18 See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 26-37; Millon, supra note 10, at 1271; Fox, supra note 
10, at 1148; Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, supra note 10, 
at 423-24 (contending that early caselaw was concerned with protecting trader liberty); cf 
United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, 
J.) ("In the debates in Congress, Senator Sherman himself ... showed that among the 
purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital 
because of the helplessness of the individual before them."). Indeed, some outside the 
Populist camp share this view of formative era case law. See, e.g., MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE 
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 138 (1988) (arguing that early 
interpretations of the Sherman Act were a repudiation of classica.J views on liberty of con-
tract). 
19 See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 35-37. As noted in the text, some outside the Populist 
camp share the view that Congress' Commerce Power "trumped" liberty of contract. See, 
e.g., SKLAR, supra note 18, at 132-43 (arguing that formative era caselaw constricted lib-
erty of contract in favor of an expansive view of the commerce power); infra notes 325-26 
(describing similar views held by other scholars). 
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method of competition. 20 By confining the reach of the Sherman Act to 
those instances in which contracts had demonstrated economic effects, Popu-
lists say, the Standard Oil Court improperly reversed the course set in the 
formative era, reading its own laissez-faire views into the Act, in the same 
way it had improperly read such views into the Constitution in Lochner. 21 
The Populist account of the goals of antitrust and formative era caselaw 
has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, the now-dominant approach holds that 
antitrust laws were designed to enhance allocative efficiency.22 Under this 
approach, antitrust law should cut a narrow swath, outlawing only those 
contracts that, on balance, destroy wealth, regardless whether they interfere 
with the liberty of traders or, for that matter, increase prices. 23 Tying con-
20 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 49-62 (1911); American Tobacco 
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911) (reaffirming Standard Oil's Rule of Rea-
son); see also PERITZ, supra note 5, at 50-58 (arguing that Standard Oil ushered in a new 
era of antitrust analysis driven by the Rule of Reason); Millon, supra note 10, at 1288 
n.314 (arguing that Standard Oil departed from earlier decisions that read the Sherman Act 
broadly); May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 5, at 307-08 (same). At least 
one scholar who does not fall into the Populist camp shares this view. See SKLAR, supra 
note 18, at 146-54 (arguing that Standard Oil departed from early formative era decisions 
that had sublimated liberty of contract in favor of the Commerce Power). Moreover, this 
view is not of modern origin. See Corwin, The Antitrust Acts and the Constitution, supra 
note 5, at 368-70 (contending that Standard Oil repudiated formative era precedent via a 
"strong infusion of ... the novel doctrine of 'liberty of contract"'); ALBERT H. WALKER, 
THE UNREASONABLE OBITER DICTA OF CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE IN THE STANDARD OIL CASE 1-
21 (1911) (arguing that Standard Oil departed from formative era precedent); Standard 
Oil, 221 U.S. at 85-106 (Harlan, J .• dissenting) (same). 
21 See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 56-58 ("The Standard Oil (1911) opinion's Rule of Rea-
son can be understood as closing Lochner's circle of individual liberty, its vision of a pri-
vate sphere defined in opposition to a public, majoritarian domain."); May, Antitrust in 
the Formative Era, supra note 5, at 306-09 (treating Standard Oil decision as inconsistent 
with previous formative era decisions); see also SKLAR, supra note 18, at 146-49 
(concluding that Standard Oil decision rejected earlier constructions of the Sherman Act 
and "made it explicit that freedom of contract and the right to compete ... constituted the 
controlling desideratum under the Sherman Act"). 
22 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 9, at 226-27; Ross, supra note 9, at 3; see also ROBERT 
BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the 
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 passim (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Legislative 
Intent] (arguing that legislative history of the Sherman Act requires an approach directed 
toward allocative efficiency). 
23 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 107-15 (stating that antitrust law 
should be primarily concerned with the maximization of total consumer welfare); Bork, 
Legislative Intent, supra note 22, at passim (analyzing legislative history and concluding 
that Congress intended the Sherman Act to forbid only those restraints that, on balance, 
destroy more wealth than they create); PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW, Ill (1978) (arguing that Populist goals should not be given significant considera-
tion in antitrust analysis); Frank Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. 
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tracts, vertical distribution restraints, and group boycotts should all be ana-
lyzed under the Rule of Reason, or even declared per se lawful under this 
approach. 24 Like the Populists, scholars who adhere to this view have 
claimed that formative era caselaw supports their reading of the Sherman 
Act. 25 Unlike some Populists, however, advocates of the allocative effi-
ciency approach have not attempted to explain how such regulation survived 
in a regime zealous to protect liberty of contract, choosing to ignore the ap-
parent conflict between antitrust regulation and contractual freedom. 26 Still, 
this account implies a (relatively limited) justification for interference with 
private contract, a justification that does not depend upon any collapse of the 
classical paradigm. Liberty of contract, after all, was never absolute: even 
in the heart of the Lochner era, courts sustained interference with this liberty 
whenever such interference fell within the police power, that is, was neces-
sary to eliminate externalities. 27 The contracts against which antitrust laws 
were initially directed-cartel agreements-created such externalities by dis-
torting the allocation of resources and destroying wealth. 28 Thus, proponents 
of this approach might argue, antitrust law, and the early case law that de-
clared such agreements unlawful, fit comfortably within the paradigm that 
informed the recognition and protection of liberty of contract. 
"Populism" and "allocative efficiency" do not exhaust the possible ap-
proaches to antitrust; some scholars have suggested a third "wealth transfer" 
REv. 1696, 1703 (1986) (arguing that statements in the legislative history of the Sherman 
Act evincing concern for small dealers were merely "a sideshow"). 
24 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 182 (1976) (advocating per se legality for 
tying contracts); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1981) (arguing that vertical distri-
bution restraints should be legal per se); BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 
227-31 (same); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 
ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 135 (1984) (contending that vertical restraints should be analyzed 
under the Rule of Reason); BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 330-44 (arguing 
that the per se rule against group boycotts should be abolished). 
25 See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 21-32 (characterizing im-
portant formative era opinions as consistent with allocative efficiency approach). 
26 Cf Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 22, at 31-35 (arguing that, given standards of 
the time, Congress could not have relied upon Commerce Power to further non-economic 
values). 
21 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 203-04; 
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 112 
(1985). 
28 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 107-10 (discussing "dead weight" 
loss resulting from merger that restricts output); see also Guido Calabresi, Transaction 
Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules: A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 70 
(1968) (justifying antitrust regulation as necessary to combat externality in the form of 
deadweight losses associated with monopoly prices). 
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standard. 29 According to this school of thought, the Sherman Act was de-
signed to prohibit any arrangement that drove prices above the competitive 
level, regardless whether it generated productive efficiencies. 30 Cartels, 
then, were condemned not because they reduced liberty or distorted the allo-
cation of resources, but instead because they "transferred" wealth from con-
sumers to producers. 31 Like the Populist and allocative efficiency camps, the 
wealth transfer school sees no role for liberty of contract in the development 
of early antitrust doctrine. 32 
Despite their difference on other matters, those in the Populist, allocative 
efficiency and wealth transfer camps share one piece of common ground: 
none sees any meaningful role for classical liberty of contract doctrine in 
formative era case law. This Article challenges this conventional wisdom, 
demonstrating that, since the beginning, liberty of contract has played a sub-
stantial role in shaping antitrust caselaw at both the federal and state level. 
By 1890, classical political economy had found expression in an emerging 
jurisprudence protecting liberty of contract from state regulations that did not 
fall within the police power. Within the classical paradigm, the state could 
only abridge liberty if necessary to prevent some harm to the public, and 
competitive pricing was not considered a harm. Indeed, in 1889, dissenting 
in People ex rei Annan v. Walsh33 and Budd v. New York, 34 then-Judge Rufus 
Peckham, who would author many of the Supreme Court's early Sherman 
Act opinions, argued that cartels should be immune from price regulation, 
29 See Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 ( 1982) [hereinafter 
Lande, Wealth Transfers]. 
30 See Robert Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 
33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 447-63 (1988) (tracing origin of "wealth transfer" approach as 
alternative to Populist and allocative efficiency standards). 
31 Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 29, at passim (marshaling legislative history 
supporting this interpretation); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1989) (endorsing Professor Lande's reading of the Sherman 
Act's legislative history). 
32 Professor Lande, for instance, nowhere attempts to square the "wealth transfer" ap-
proach with liberty of contract doctrine or classical political economy. Professor Hovenk-
amp concludes that courts reconciled this approach with liberty of contract by holding that 
Congress' commerce power essentially overrode private contractual liberty. See Ho-
VENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 293-95. 
33 22 N.E. 682 (N.Y. 1889) (per curiam}, aff'd, 143 U.S. 517 (1892). 
34 22 N.E. 671 (N.Y. 1889}, aff'd, 143 U.S. 517 (1892). While Peckham concurred in 
Judge Gray's Budd dissent, he did not issue his own written opinion. See 22 N.E. at 680-
82. However because Walsh and Budd were companion cases presenting identical issues 
the court chose not to issue a written opinion in the former. See 22 N.E. at 682. For rea-
sons not stated in the opinion, Peckham chose to issue a written dissent in Walsh. See id. 
To minimize confusion, this Article will treat Justice Peckham's dissent in Walsh as a dis-
sent in Budd. 
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because free entry by potential competitors would prevent incumbent firms 
from setting prices above the competitive level. 35 The one exception he ad-
mitted was for those instances in which the state had interfered with the lib-
erty of firms to enter the market, thus· allowing cartels to set supra-
competitive prices with impunity. 36 Antitrust regulation of cartels that did 
not receive such aid, it seemed, would pose a unique challenge to courts 
sympathetic to liberty of contract. 
In fact, during the formative era, defendants would lodge several liberty of 
contract challenges to the Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes, often in 
cartel cases. While courts almost always rejected these challenges, they did 
so by interpreting the statutes in question narrowly in a manner that saved 
them from constitutional infirmity. In so doing, courts rejected the assertion, 
often made by counsel supporting such statutes, that antitrust Jaws should be 
interpreted broadly so as to protect liberty from contract. Instead, courts 
held that the state could only outlaw contracts whose primary effect was to 
restrain liberty in a manner that led to prices higher than those that would 
otherwise be produced by the "natural" state of economic affairs, that is, a 
competitive market with no barriers to entry. 
Courts generally reached this result through two different formulations. 
Some simply held that high prices were a "harm" to the consuming public 
that, like other externalities, justified regulation of cartels under the police 
power. 37 Others, notably the Supreme Court when interpreting the Sherman 
Act, did not invoke the police power. Instead, these courts held that only 
"ordinary" contracts fell within the protection of liberty of contract in the 
first place, and that the state required no justification for outlawing contracts 
that were not deemed "ordinary. "38 Only .contracts that were primarily de-
signed to confer market power on the parties to them were not "ordinary" 
and accordingly outside the protection of liberty of contract. 
Admittedly, the results produced by this early caselaw-particularly the 
conclusion that the state could regulate purely private cartels-were different 
from those suggested by traditional articulations of the classical paradigm. 
On the surface, this expansion of state authority gives support to Populists 
and others who believe that formative era courts repudiated liberty of con-
tract and abandoned the classical paradigm altogether. Closer analysis, how-
ever, demonstrates that the principle applied by formative era courts was the 
very same principle that, for instance, then-Judge Peckham had announced 
and defended so forcefully in Budd. Far from evincing any collapse of the 
classical paradigm, the expansion of state authority validated by formative 
35 22 N.E. at682-95 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
36 See id. at 693. 
37 See infra notes 344-433 and accompanying text (describing liberty of contract chal-
lenges to state antitrust statutes in state and lower federal courts). 
38 See infra notes 194-343 and accompanying text (a~alyzing formative era Sherman Act 
caselaw). 
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era caselaw instead followed from an application or "translation" of that 
paradigm in light of changed circumstances, namely, the ability of private 
cartels to price above the competitive level. Far from repudiating the classi-
cal paradigm, formative era caselaw actually reinforced it, adapting it to ap-
ply in light of changed economic conditions. 
Properly understood, then, formative era caselaw provides no support for 
the Populist or "liberty from contract" approach to antitrust Jaw. To the 
contrary, formative era precedent held that a contract cannot be deemed "in 
restraint of trade" unless it produced prices above the competitive or 
"natural" JeveJ.39 The Standard Oil decision was no outlier, but instead was 
consistent with earlier decisions that had been influenced by liberty of con-
tract doctrine and the classical paradigm that informed it. 
The mere fact that formative era courts rejected a liberty from contract 
approach to antitrust did not signal an embrace of an allocative efficiency 
standard. Indeed, the apparent conclusion of formative era courts that the 
state could abridge any contract producing prices above the competitive level 
implies a broader scope for antitrust Jaw than is implied by the allocative ef-
ficiency approach. Under the latter approach, of course, a practice that leads 
to higher prices will be deemed benign if it produces offsetting efficiency 
gains. 40 Formative era caselaw, on the other hand, would seem to condemn 
any conduct leading to higher prices, regardless whether such conduct cre-
ates wealth on balance, thus lending support to a "wealth transfer" approach. 
Why, however, did the prevention of "wealth transfers" justify interfer-
ence with contractual liberty? Perhaps formative era courts viewed prices 
above the competitive level as a harm visited upon consumers and thus an 
"externality" subject to regulation under the classical paradigm. This ap-
proach, while inconsistent with the modern economist's definition of 
"externality," may have been coherent in a world that predated modern wel-
fare economics. Still, the conclusion that high prices justified interfer~nce 
with contractual freedom because of their distributional consequences does 
not fit neatly within the structure of liberty of contract jurisprudence. After 
all, courts routinely rejected as justification for interference with contracts 
the claim that such interference was necessary to redress an inequality of 
bargaining power between parties. In Lochner, for instance, the conclusion 
that a maximum hour regulation was a "labor Jaw" designed to alter the eco-
nomic balance between employer and employee was fatal to the enactment. 
If the state could not act to redistribute wealth from employer to employee, 
why could it redistribute wealth from businesses to consumers? 
Each of the formulations on which formative era courts relied to justify the 
abridgment of cartel agreements suggests its own justification for treating 
high prices as a "harm" subject to regulation. Reliance by some courts upon 
39 See infra notes 194-343 and accompanying text. 
40 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 107-10 (concluding that merger 
can both produce higher prices and create net benefits). 
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the characterization of high prices as an injury to consumers perhaps re-
flected the powerful hold that the classical model of the economy, and the 
"natural," competitive price that it produced, had on the judges involved. 
Unlike, for instance, wage bargains, which were generally negotiated in the 
context of highly competitive, employment markets, the prices produced by 
cartels attacked during the formative era were the result of a negotiating 
process that departed from the "natural" one implied by the classical model. 
Thus, these prices more readily qualified as "harms," as a purely distribu-
tional matter, subject to regulation. 
Reliance by some courts upon the distinction between "ordinary" and 
other contracts, however, suggested a non-distributional justification for 
regulating prices that departed from the competitive level. After all, the 
natural competitive process that classicists embraced did more than assure 
low prices. It also led to, for instance, a proper allocation of labor and 
capital. More precisely, these courts, particularly the Supreme Court, ap-
parently recognized that treating high prices as distributional harms subject to 
regulation proved too much as it justified regulation of any number of garden 
variety contracts, including partnerships, ancillary restraints, and exclusive 
dealing contracts, all of which might exert some stabilizing effect on price. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly stated on at least two occasions that a 
contract could be "ordinary" and thus protected by liberty of contract even if 
it incidentally led to higher prices. 41 This approach to justification of cartel 
regulation suggested a definition of "natural" or "ordinary" contracts ulti-
mately unrelated to distributional effects and instead more consistent with an 
allocative efficiency approach. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the classical ideology 
that dominated nineteenth-century thought about the appropriate limits on 
state regulation of private economic activity, as well as the liberty of contract 
jurisprudence that this ideology spawned. According to the classicists, mar-
kets naturally tended to be highly competitive, and barriers to entry were 
non-existent. Thus, the state could not infringe upon a firm's liberty to set 
prices alone or in concert with others unless it had encouraged incumbent 
firms to price above the natural level by creating some barrier to entry that 
infringed on the liberty of those wishing to enter the market. Moreover, 
common law courts often enforced price fixing agreements, but refused to 
enforce so-called "general restraints" ancillary to the sale of a business, be-
cause they threatened to make the obligor a public charge. The mere exis-
tence of a contractual infringement on liberty, then, did not ipso facto justify 
regulation. Instead, the infringement had to produce prices above the com-
petitive level or some other cognizable harm. While the classical paradigm 
and concomitant liberty of contract jurisprudence did contemplate the regula-
tion of harmful activity under the "police power," competitive prices pro-
duced by the "natural" state of affairs were not deemed harmful. 
41 See infra notes 194-343 and accompanying text. 
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Part II reviews and analyzes formative era attempts by federal courts to 
reconcile the apparent conflict between liberty of contract, on the one hand, 
and the newly-passed Sherman Act, on the other. Although courts uniformly 
rejected assertions that the Sherman Act was unconstitutional, they did so 
without invoking the police power and without relying upon the argument, 
often made by counsel, that such regulation was necessary to enhance liberty 
from contract. Moreover, courts avoided a finding that the Act was uncon-
stitutional by construing the Act narrowly, avoiding abridgment of those 
contracts deemed "ordinary" or "proper." Contracts were deemed 
"ordinary" or "proper" so long as they were not primarily designed to inter-
fere with the competitive process and lead to prices above the competitive 
level. 
Part III addresses the role that liberty of contract played in the interpreta-
tion of state antitrust laws, in the federal and state courts. Here again, advo-
cates sometimes sought to justify the interference with liberty of contract 
worked by antitrust regulation as a means of protecting the liberty of firms 
and consumers. Again, however, courts rejected this. justification, holding 
explicitly or implicitly that a contract's restraining effect on liberty did not, 
without more, place it beyond constitutional protection. Moreover, unlike 
courts interpreting the Sherman Act, which had abjured reliance on the 
"police power" as a source of regulatory authority, these courts relied heav-
ily upon this power, holding that contracts were protected unless they led to 
harm in the form of higher prices to the consuming public. Indeed, a few 
courts voided state laws outright because they purported to outlaw contracts 
that could not lead to increased prices and thus exceeded the scope of the 
police power. Others, including the Supreme Court, refrained from such 
drastic action, by construing the statutes in question narrowly so as to pro-
hibit only those agreements that led to higher prices and thus caused the sort 
of "harm" that rendered them subject to police power regulation. 
Part IV examines the implications of formative era caselaw for the modern 
controversy over how to interpret the Sherman Act. Decisions issued shortly 
after a statute is passed are, of course, important evidence of the statute's 
meaning. This Article demonstrates that the Populist, or "liberty from con-
tract," approach to the Act does not find support in formative era case law. 
The allocative efficiency approach would also appear inconsistent with the 
price-based standard adopted by formative era courts. These courts, it 
seems, assumed that consumers were somehow "entitled" to prices at the 
competitive level, an assumption consistent with the "wealth transfer" ap-
proach. To the classical mind, which viewed highly competitive markets as 
natural, even ordained by God, prices different from those produced by such 
a market may have been viewed as departures from the natural order and 
thus harmful to consumers. The allocative efficiency approach, in contrast, 
views the distributional effects of high prices with indifference, choosing 
only to condemn those contracts that both lead to higher prices and, on bal-
ance, destroy wealth. 
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Closer analysis, however, suggests that the price-based standard employed 
by formative era courts was not necessarily premised upon a belief that 
prices above the competitive norm were a "distributional" harm to consum-
ers. Other considerations, including the belief that a highly competitive 
market led to the proper allocation of labor and capital, may have been the 
dominant normative justification for treating the outcome of a competitive 
market as "natural." Indeed, as suggested above, not all courts relied upon 
the conclusion that the creation of prices above the status quo ante by itself 
justified regulation. To the contrary, in the Sherman Act context, courts 
conceded explicitly or implicitly that the mere fact that a contract raised 
prices did not, by itself, place it outside the protection of liberty of contract. 
I. THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT 
Though sometimes characterized as simply an apology for the status quo, 
the laissez-faire ideology of the nineteenth century consisted of a well-
considered system of political economy that rested upon a blend of political 
philosophy and empirical assumptions about the natural workings of the 
American economy. 42 . This system provided a coherent framework for 
evaluating the appropriateness of state interference with private economic de-
cisions. While this framework counseled a "hands off' policy in many in-
stances, it ultimately rested on the assumption that the state should, when 
necessary, enhance the rights of liberty and property by protecting each from 
private interference. By the late nineteenth century, this framework began to 
take on constitutional significance, as courts read the classical paradigm into 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
A. The Classical Approach to Regulation 
In the world portrayed by the classicists, markets were ordinarily popu-
lated by numerous small firms of roughly equal size. 43 Competition between 
such firms would lead to a "natural" price, equal to the cost of production 
plus a reasonable profit. 44 If a firm or firms sought to price above that level, 
42 See, e.g., LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 138-
66 (1971); ARNOLD M. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 4 (1969) 
(defining laissez-faire ideology as dedicated to economic freedom and the absence of leg-
islative interference); see also PERITZ, supra note 5, at 51-52 (arguing that liberty of con-
tract jurisprudence as reflected in the Standard Oil decision was a means of protecting the 
status quo and "gross inequalities of wealth"). 
43 See FRANCIS BOWEN, AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 41 (Greenwood Press, Pub-
lishers 1969) (1870); see also JULIAN M. STURTEVANT, ECONOMICS OR THE SCIENCE OF 
WEALTH 223-24 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1881). 
44 SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 55 (1956) ("As long 
as the state did not interfere with competition, demand and supply could be relied upon to 
bring wages, interest, rent and profits to their proper level."); see also George Stigler, 
Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. PoL. EcoN. I, 1-5 (1957). 
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other market participants would increase their production, driving the price 
back to the natural point. 45 Even if every firm in the market did combine to 
reduce output and increase prices, firms operating outside the market, sens-
ing the prospect of higher than average returns, would quickly enter, again 
driving prices and returns back to their natural level. 46 This model of the 
world, as well as the wages, prices, and rates of return that it produced, was 
so entrenched in the classical mind that it was associated with the laws of 
nature or even of God. 47 
45 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 129 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776) [hereinafter 
SMITH, NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS] ("In a free trade an effectual 
combination cannot be established but by the unanimous consent of every single trader."); 
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, in THE EcoNOMIST AS 
PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS 38, 40 (1982) (concluding that, for most of the nineteenth 
century "the weakness of collusion [was] a widely accepted belief of economists"). 
46 See HOYENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 282-83 ("Within 
the classical paradigm, monopoly prices could never be earned unless people were artifi-
cially restrained from entering."); Millon, supra note 10, at 1264-65 ("According to clas-
sical theory, monopoly would always be elusive if the state allowed natural processes to 
flow."); Theodore W. Dwight, The Legality of "Trusts," 3 PoL. SCI. Q. 592, 631 (1888) 
('"Trusts' as a rule are not dangerous. They cannot overcome the law of demand and 
supply nor the resistless power of unlimited competition."); George Gunton, The Eco-
nomic and Social Aspects of Trusts, 3 PoL. SCI. Q. 385, 403 (1888) ("If the gates for the 
admission of new competitive capital are always open, the economic effect is almost the 
same as if the new competitor were already there .... "); Franklin H. Giddings, The Per-
sistence of Competition, 2 PoL. SCI. Q. 62, 65 (1887) (describing the inherent instability 
of combination and the inevitable trend toward competition); SIMON NEWCOMB, PRIN· 
CIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 246 (New York, Harper & Brothers 1886) ("If the makers 
[of a product] charge too much for it, other makers will compete and lower the price."); 
FRANCIS BOWEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY APPLIED TO THE CONDITIONS, 
THE RESOURCES, AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (Boston, Little, Brown, 
and Co. 1863) ("If the gains in one department of enterprise are notoriously above the av-
erage .... more capital is at once attracted into the employment, till, by the competition 
of the capitalists with each other, the rate of Profit is reduced to the common standard in 
other enterprises."); ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 363 (R.L. Meek et al. 
eds. 1978) ("[I]f any trade is overprofitable all throng into it until they bring it to the 
naturall price, that is, the maintenance of the person and the recompense of the risque he 
runs."). 
47 See FINE, supra note 44, at 52-56; ARTHUR LATHAM PERRY, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 92 (New York, Charles Scribner and Co. 1866) (detailing God's "benevolent 
law of production"); BOWEN, AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 43, at 15 
(arguing that "the laws affecting the creation and production of wealth ... are, in truth, as 
constant and uniform as those which bind the material universe together"); see also Her-
bert Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, in THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 186 
(Liberty Classics ed. 1981) (1843) (arguing that State should not regulate trade because 
"the laws of society are of such a character," that "natural evils will rectify themselves" 
following "that beautiful self-adjusting principle"). 
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Thus, according to the classical paradigm, the exercise of market power 
was a rarity. Firms could only exercise such power if other firms were 
somehow prevented from entering the market and competing on an equal 
footing, either by government fiat or predatory conduct. 48 Indeed, the notion 
of a "private" monopoly was a contradiction in terms. 49 According to Adam 
Smith, those who feared the creation of a monopoly without state aid might 
48 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 282-83 ("Within 
the classical paradigm, monopoly prices could never be earned in an industry unless peo-
ple were artificially restrained from entering .... A mere agreement among sellers to fix 
prices was of little concern, provided that neither the price fixers nor the state forbade oth-
ers from entering the field. If the cartel members sought to charge monopoly prices, new 
competition would immediately frustrate their attempt."); FINE, supra note 44, at 12-14; 
Thomas Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, I PRINCETON REVIEW (n.s.) 
233, 259 (1878) (concluding that combinations to raise prices could only be successful if 
"accomplished through means which are no part of any regular business"); see id. at 260 
(arguing that firms could only achieve a true monopoly by means of sovereign grant, com-
bination, or violence and terror); see also Herbert Spencer, Special Administration, in 
MAN VERSUS THE STATE, supra note 47, at 456-57 (asserting that the state should confine 
itself to "negatively regulative" activities-preventing individuals only from interfering 
with the rights of others); FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
142 (New York, Sheldon & Co. 1875). As Professor Millon has put it: 
The very existence of governmental power presented the danger that selfish elements 
might capture the state machinery and use it to promote their private goals. Because 
of the central importance of property, the greatest threat of all was the coercive re-
distribution of wealth for the benefit of some faction. Therefore, governmental 
power had to be sharply limited so as to eliminate opportunities to seize one person's 
wealth in order to bestow a benefit on someone else. Strictly limiting governmental 
power to appropriate functions would result in greater general welfare as well as in-
dividual liberty. 
Millon, supra note 10, at 1237; see also JAMES WILLIAM HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 42-43 (1970) (pointing out 
that most of the concern about concentration of market power arose from government 
grants such as right-of-way monopolies, toll grants, and limited bank charters); cf. Webb 
v. Baird, 6 Ind. II, 16 (1854) (rejecting claim that state could require lawyers to render 
pro bono services because "[i]n this state, the profession of the law was never much fa-
vored by special pecuniary emoluments .... The reciprocal obligations of the profession 
to the body politic, are slender in proportion. Under our present constitution, it is reduced 
to where it always should have been, a common level with all other professions and pur-
suits .... The practitioner, therefore, owes no honorary services to any other citizen, or 
to the public."). 
49 See SMITH, NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 45, at 334. 
Indeed, in defending the Bank of the United States against charges that it was a monopoly, 
Alexander Hamilton would write: "[M]onopoly implies a legal impediment to the carrying 
on the trade by others than those to whom it is granted." M. ST. CLAIR CLARKE & D.A. 
HALL, LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THEBANK OF THE UNITED STATES 101 
(Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1967) (1832). 
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just as well fear witchcraft. 50 So long as capital was mobile, i.e., firms and 
individuals were at liberty to enter or exit the market as they pleased, labor 
and capital would flow to its best use, and prices would remain at the com-
petitive level. 51 Indeed, price regulation would be counterproductive, inter-
fering, as it would, with the natural order.52 
Unless it had banned competition altogether or advantaged some competi-
tors through a grant of the power of eminent domain, the state generally had 
no power over prices or agreements to fix them. 53 The mere fact that a con-
tract or practice limited the liberty of traders did not justify regulation, unless 
that limitation was of the sort that would likely lead to prices above the com-
petitive level. 54 So, for instance, nineteenth-century courts often enforced 
cartel agreements, so long as they did not involve coercion against strangers 
to the agreement that undermined free entry. 55 The "liberty" protected by 
the classical paradigm from state or private interference consisted solely of 
that freedom of action necessary to ensure prices at the natural level. 
50 See SMITH, NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 45, at 334. 
51 See SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 46, at 365-66 (contending that 
policies that caused departures from the competitive price led labor and capital into the 
wrong industries and "overturned the natural balance of industry"). 
52 See FINE, supra note 44, at 54-55; BOWEN, AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra 
note 43, at 18 ("The attempts of legislators to ... establish a maximum of price ... are 
almost invariably productive of harm. Laissezfaire; 'these things regulate themselves,' in 
common phrase; which means, of course, that God regulates them by his general laws, 
which always, in the long run, work to good."). 
53 See Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, supra note 48, at 249-54; see 
also HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 282-83. 
54 Cf May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 5, at 299 ("Classical economic 
theory centrally and strongly asserted that the various economic, social, and political ele-
ments now conceived of as largely independent and inevitably conflicting were in fact 
naturally in harmony and crucially interdependent. ... "). 
55 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 282-83 
(discussing reluctance of classical jurists to interfere with cartels); Central Shade-Roller 
Co. v. Cushman, 9 N.E. 629, 631 (Mass. 1887) (enforcing an agreement whereby manu-
facturers pooled patents and other assets so as to control production because the parties to 
the arrangement "did not look to affecting competition from outside ... but only to restrict 
competition in price between themselves"); Dolph v. Troy Laundry, 28 F. 553, 555 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886) (enforcing market division agreement because it did not contem-
plate suppression of output by third parties); Skrainka v. Scharringhuasen, 8 Mo. App. 
522, 527 (1880) (same); Kellog v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 143-48 (Wis. 1851) (enforcing 
horizontal arrangement because it did not attempt to control entire market, which remained 
"open to the fiercest competition of all the world, except those obligors"); Diamond 
Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422-23 (N.Y. 1887) (suggesting that even general re-
straints of trade could be reasonable given absence of barriers to entry); see also Cooley, 
Limits to State Control of Private Business, supra note 48, at 268 (concluding that, absent 
grant of special privilege, the state could not interfere with price fixing so long as firms 
"limit[ed] their actions to fixing prices by peaceable means"). 
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The classical paradigm applied beyond the field of price regulation. In-
deed, the maintenance of liberty and property cherished by the classicists re-
quired at least the threat of state intervention in the form of enforcement of 
the common law baseline. This, according to the classicists, was the purpose 
of government, viz., to protect liberty and property from interference by oth-
ers.56 That enforcement, of course, ensured that these rights were as mean-
ingful as p6ssible.57 
Against this background, all firms were subject to two forms of regula-
tion, regardless whether they received any special aid from the state. First, 
like anyone else's liberty, the liberty of firms was circumscribed by the duty 
not to interfere with someone else's rights, summed up by the ancient maxim 
"sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, "-one ought not use one's property to 
harm another. 58 This duty, in turn, gave rise to the police power, which 
authorized the state to prevent such harms. 59 Chancellor Kent, writing in 
1827, summarized the scope of the police power in this way: 
56 See Simon Newcomb, The Let-Alone Principle, 110 N. AM. REV. 3-5 (1870) (opining 
that an individual's rights could be curtailed insofar as to prevent him from interfering 
with the rights of others); Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, supra note 47, at 
185-87 (arguing that the necessary role of government is to preserve the natural rights of 
man); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 1 124 (Gateway Editions, 
Ltd. 1955) (contending that the purpose of government is to preserve property). 
57 See BONHAM, supra note 16, at 28 ("Industrial liberty consists in the freedom of each 
individual citizen, guarded by such delegated authority, contributed by each, as is neces-
sary to preserve this individual freedom equally to each; and this liberty includes the free-
dom of each individual citizen to contract, and sanctity of contract."); Baker v. City of 
Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 183 (1831) (justifying nuisance law because "[t]he law pre-
sumes that [the property owner] is compensated by sharing in the advantages of such bene-
ficial regulations"). · 
58 See Newcomb, The Let-Alone Principle, supra note 56, at 3; Spencer, The Proper 
Sphere of Government, supra note 47, at 187; Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private 
Business, supra note 48, at 237. As Chief Justice Shaw put it: 
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil soci-
ety, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, 
holds it under the implied liability that his use may be so regulated, that it shall not be 
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of 
their property, not injurious to the rights of the community. 
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1853). 
59 See III WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 216-19 (Garland Publishers, Inc. 
1978) (1783). But cf. LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE SHAW 250-52 (1957) (arguing that police power as conceived by Chief Justice 
Shaw extended beyond the authority to regulate harms that would constitute nuisances at 
common law): Levy does not, so far as it appears, suggest that Shaw's conception of the 
police power extended beyond the authority to eliminate market failure. See infra notes 
60-67 and accompanying text (arguing that police power consisted of the authority to 
regulate externalities). 
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Though property be protected, it is still to be understood that the law-
giver has the right to prescribe the mode and manner of using it, so far 
as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right to the injury or 
annoyance of others, or of the public. The government may, by gen-
eral regulations, interdict such uses of property as would create nui-
sances and become dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or com-
fort of the citizens. Unwholesome trades, slaughterhouses, operations 
offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam 
power to propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and the 
burial of the dead, may be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense 
masses of population, on the general and rational principle that every 
person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and 
that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests 
of the community. 60 
This, of course, is classic externality-based regulation, later associated with 
the Pigouvian tradition. 61 Thus, the state could not confiscate an individual's 
property and give it to someone else, and could not prevent individuals from 
exercising their liberty to pursue an otherwise lawful calling by, for instance, 
entering a market. It could, however, ensure that one did not use one's 
property or exercise one's calling in a way that interfered with another's en-
joyment of property or exercise of liberty. Each man had an "equal free-
dom" to employ his faculties, freedom that was enhanced by such regula-
tion. 62 
60 II JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 441 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 12th ed. 1873); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 595 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1927) (1868) 
(hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS) (giving as an example of appropriate 
police power regulation laws prohibiting "[t]he keeping of gunpowder in unsafe quantities 
in cities and villages, the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labeled, allowing unmuzzled dogs 
to be at large wht;n danger of hydrophobia is apprehended; or the keeping for sale un-
wholesome provisions"); BOWEN, AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 43, at 19 
("An individual may not erect a powder-manufactory in the midst of a populous village, 
nor carry on any operations there which would poison the air with noxious exhalations."). 
A similar approach was suggested by Herbert Spencer's so-called "law of equal freedom," 
which held that "every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided that he infringes 
not on the freedom of any other man." HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 77-103 (New 
York, D. Appleton and Co. 1865). 
61 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE ANI;> AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 200 (discussing 
judicial reliance upon a theory of externalities much like Arthur Pigou's). See generally 
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912) (introducing and discussing concept of 
regulation in response to market externalities). 
62 See BONHAM, supra note 16, at 23-28 (recognizing that limited government regula-
tion may enhance individual liberty); SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supra note 60, at 77-103; 
see also Newcomb, The Let-Alone Principle, supra note 56, at 3 (stating that permissible 
government regulation did not involve any surrender of natural rights). 
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Second, and again like everyone else, firms were regulated indirectly by 
contract law. Firms that entered contracts were expected to perform them, 
and the state would provide a remedy against those who failed to perform. 63 
Not all contracts were enforceable, however. In particular, like modern 
courts, nineteenth-century courts refused to enforce contracts that were "in 
restraint of trade." So-called general restraints, that is, contracts that pre-
vented an individual from carrying on a trade anywhere in the jurisdiction, 
were per se void, while partial restraints were enforced if reasonably neces-
sary to accomplish a legitimate objective.64 
Courts gave various justifications for voiding general restraints, including 
the claim that they prevented competition, enhanced prices and exposed the 
public to the evils of monopoly. 65 This statement of policies, however, did 
not fit comfortably within the classical paradigm. After all, absent any state-
conferred advantages, or predatory conduct, it is not clear how such con-
tracts could create a monopoly or lead to higher prices. Not surprisingly, 
then, by the middle of the nineteenth century, some courts were abandoning 
this rationale, recognizing that the concern that general restraints would lead 
to higher prices was an anachronism, arising as it did in an era when state 
grants of monopoly or other impediments to entry were frequent. 66 Chang-
63 See BONHAM, supra note 16, at 28 ("Industrial liberty ... includes the freedom of 
each individual citizen to contract, and the sanctity of contract."); see also id. at 37 
(arguing that true liberty required that all contracts entered for a "lawful purpose" "shall 
be binding"); Newcomb, The Let-Alone Principle, supra note 56, at 4-5 ("The enforce-
ment of contracts in no way violates the let alone principle ... the act of binding himself 
by contract is the work of the individual himself, and not of society"); see also id. at 7 
(arguing that enforcement of contracts actually enhances liberty, so long as the contract 
causes no injury to a third person). 
64 See Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 54 (1837). The rule, it should be 
mentioned, survived into the early twentieth century in some jurisdictions. See Union 
Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ill. 1901) (invalidating contract which 
prohibited company from doing business in state for twenty-five years on grounds that it 
was a general restraint of trade). 
65 The classic and oft-quoted American statement is found in Alger v. Thacher. 
The unreasonableness of contracts in restraint of trade and business, is very apparent 
from several obvious considerations. (l) Such contracts injure parties making them, 
because they diminish their means of procuring livelihoods and a competency for 
their families. They tempt improvident persons, for the sake of present gain, to de-
prive themselves of the power to make future acquisitions. And they expose such 
person to imposition and oppression. (2) They tend to deprive the public of services 
of men in the employments and capacities in which they may be most useful to the 
community as well as themselves. (3) They discourage industry and enterprise, and 
diminish the products of ingenuity and skill. (4) They prevent competition and en-
hance prices. (5) They expose the public to all the evils of monopoly. 
36 Mass (19 Pick.) at 54. 
66 See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421 (N.Y. 1887) ("The laws no 
longer favor the granting of special privileges, and, to a great extent, business corpora-
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ing economic conditions, then, required a different rationale for the rule 
against general restraints. 
What emerged was a rationale for the prohibition of general restraints that 
was simply an application of the police power to contracts ancillary to the 
sale of a business. By refusing to enforce such restraints, courts ensured that 
individuals who sold their businesses could continue to practice their voca-
tion within the jurisdiction.67 Otherwise, sellers bound by general restraints 
would be forced to exit the jurisdiction, taking their labor and skills with 
them; if they remained, they might support themselves through a life of 
crime or become public charges, thus burdening the public purse. 68 As with 
tions are practically partnerships and may be organized by any persons who desire to unite 
their capital and skill in business, leaving a free field to all others, who desire for the' same 
or similar purposes to clothe themselves with a corporate character."). Indeed, by 1870, 
the Supreme Court could state the policy behind the doctrine without reference to any con-
cern about high prices or monopoly. See Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Windsor, 87 
U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873) ("There are two principle grounds on which the doctrine 
[voiding general restraints] is founded, that a contract in restraint of trade is void as 
against public policy. One is, the injury to the public by being deprived of the restricted 
party's industry; the other is, the injury to the party himself by being precluded from pur-
suing his occupation and thus prevented from supporting himself and his family. It is evi-
dent that both these evils occur when the contract is general, not to pursue one's trade at 
all."); accord Kellog v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-41 (Wis. 1851). 
67 Union Strawboard, 61 N.E. at 1040 ("[l]t is against the policy of the state that the 
people of the whole state should be deprived of the industry and skill of a party in an em-
ployment useful to the public, and he should be compelled either to engage in other busi-
ness or abandon his citizenship of the state and remove elsewhere in order to support him-
self and family."); see also Kellog, 3 Pin. at 140-41 (concluding that "one good reason 
still remains to uphold the rule" against general restraints, i.e., they destroy the "right to 
pursue that calling by which [one] can produce the most and add the most to the public 
wealth, and compel [one] to a life of supineness and inaction, or to labor in some depart-
ment Jess profitable to the state"). 
68 Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ill. 1901); Skrainka v. 
Scharringhuasen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525-26 (1880); CHARLES BEACH SR., A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF MONOPOLIES AND INDUSTRIAL TRUSTS 108 (St. Louis, Central Law Journal 
Co. 1898) (concluding that the law of trade restraints "takes account of the interest of the 
community in providing that it shall not be deprived of the benefits of [an individual's] 
business, or exposed to the burden of [an individual's] support, as a result of his lack of 
employment"). One nineteenth-century commentator suggested that the doctrine con-
demning general restraints owed its origins to the fifteenth-century English Guild system: 
We cannot but think that much reason will be found for believing that the law in rela-
tion to these contracts grew out of the English law of Apprenticeship ... By this Jaw 
in its original severity, no person could exercise any regular trade or handicraft ex-
cept after a long apprenticeship and, generally, a formal admission to the proper guild 
or company. If he had a trade, he must continue in that trade, or have none. To re-
linquish it, therefore, was to throw himself out of employment; to fall as a burden 
upon the community; to become a pauper. 
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the classical approach to price regulation, the mere existence of a contractual 
restraint did not justify intervention. Only contracts that restrained liberty in 
a manner that injured the public were deemed void. 69 
B. Constitutionalizing the Classical Paradigm 
For most of the nineteenth century, laissez-faire ideology remained only 
an ideology. While the 'classical approach to regulation dominated the minds 
of politicians and judges, it did so largely within the realm of policy, without 
any pretense of constitutional status.7° The Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
THEOPHILUS PARSONS, 2 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 872-73 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 
8th ed. 1893); see also ELISHA GREENHOOD, THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 684 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1886) ("The capacity of an individual to 
produce constitutes his value to the public .... The actual product belongs to him who 
employs him, but mediately to the State, and goes to swell the aggregate of public 
wealth."); Kellog, 3 Pin, at 140-41 ("The capacity of an individual to produce (using that 
word in its broadest sense) constitutes his value to the public, That branch of industry in 
which a man has been educated, and to which he is accustomed, and for the abandonment 
of which he demands compensation, is supposed to be the one in which he can render the 
greatest profit. The value of what he produces belongs to himself. The actual product 
belongs immediately to him who employs him, but mediately to the state, and goes to 
swell the aggregate of public wealth."). 
69 The reduction in wealth that might attend an overbroad restraint was not a harm in 
the same sense as the storage of gunpowder in a crowded area. See Commonwealth v. 
Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (ll Met.) 55, 57 (1846) (employing this example of an activity that 
the state could regulate via the police power); KENT, supra note 60, at 276 (same). Still, 
it did constitute the sort of foregone benefit that would justify state intervention under the 
classical paradigm, The most devoted advocates of the classical paradigm believed that 
lighthouses, for instance, were a proper subject for state expenditure precisely because the 
benefits of their construction and operation would not be internalized by a private firm. 
See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JOHN STUART MILL 968 (1965) ("[I]t is a proper office of government to build and main-
tain lighthouses, establish buoys, &c. for the security of navigation: for since it is impos-
sible that ships at sea which are benefited by a lighthouse, should be made to pay a toll on 
the occasion of its use, no one would build lighthouses from motives of personal interest, 
unless indemnified and rewarded from a compulsory levy made by the state."); see also 
HENRY SIOGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 442-84 (London, Macmillan 
and Co. 1883) (listing situations of acceptable government interference in the economy). 
Similarly, the common law's hostility toward general restraints was implicitly premised on 
the view that an individual's labor is a collective good. 
70 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 1-7 (describing 
importance of classical political economy to nineteenth century legal thought); II JAMES 
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 421 (London, Macmillan and Co. 2d ed. 1891) 
("[Laissez-faire] is the orthodox and accepted doctrine in the sphere both of Federal and of 
State Legislation"); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT !58 
(1985) (noting that, by 1825, the Supreme Court had refused the invitation to engage in 
natural law constitutionalism). There were, of course, outliers. See People v. Wyne-
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Process Clause changed all that. Though the "plain language" of the clause 
seemed only to govern the procedures by which liberty or property could be 
deprived, scholars and advocates worked hard to impress classical political 
economy upon it. 71 Perhaps the most important such influence was the pub-
lication of Thomas Cooley's treatise on American constitutional Jaw. 72 Ac-
cording to Cooley, "liberty" ought to be defined to include not only the ab-
sence of physical restraint, but also, for instance, the right to pursue a calling 
or vocation. 73 Any Jaw not within the police power that abridged such lib-
erty, he concluded, would be unconstitutional.74 
Although advocates began relying upon Cooley almost immediately, the 
Supreme Court initially declined to adopt his brand of substantive due proc-
ess. 75 In the Slaughterhouse Cases, litigated just four years after the 
amendment was ratified, the Court refused to nullify a monopoly that Louisi-
ana had granted over the business of conducting slaughterhouse operations in 
hammer, 13 N.Y. 378, 382-406 (1856) (Comstock, J.) (asserting that the state cannot con-
fiscate and destroy property lawfully acquired by the citizen); see also BERNARD SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 41-46 (1980) (describing antebellum devel-
opment of substantive due process doctrine in New York and similar, but less certain, de-
velopments in North Carolina); Edwin Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Be-
fore the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 460, 474-75 (1911) ("[T]he Wynehamer decision 
found no place in the constitutional law that was generally recognized throughout the 
United States in the year 1856. "). 
71 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 60, at 572-97 (arguing for a 
view of the police power governed by classical political economy); see also FINE, supra 
note 44, at 30 ("The ideas of laissez faire propounded after the Civil War were dressed up 
in constitutional garb by bench and bar and made an integral part of the fundamental 
law."); EDWIN CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 116-18 (1948) (describing influ-
ence of Thomas Cooley's treatise); CLYDE JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS; THE 
INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON 
UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 27-32 (1954) (same); BENJAMIN R. TWISS, 
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 18-
41 (1942) (same). 
72 See CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra note 71, at 116 (calling 
Cooley's treatise "the most influential ever published on American constitutional law"). 
73 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 60, at 393 (defining individ-
ual liberty to include right to occupational self determination); see also Newcomb, The 
Let-Alone Principle, supra note 56, at 3 (detailing the individual's right to "exclusive and 
unrestricted use of his own faculties for what he considers to be own his good"). 
74 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 60, at 393; see also id. at 
357 (framing the limits of police power in the takings context). 
75 See Brief for the Live Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Association of New Orleans at 
30, The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (No. 477) (citing Cooley's · 
substantive due process arguments). 
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New Orleans.76 In powerful dissents, however, Justices Field and Bradley, 
without citing Cooley, echoed his conclusions. 77 
Just five years later, in Munn v. lllinois,78 the Court had occasion to con-
front more directly the extent to which the Due Process Clause might void 
legislation inconsistent with the classical paradigm. There Ira Munn and 
George Scott, partners who owned a grain elevator in Chicago, argued that 
Illinois' regulation of charges for the storage of grain violated the Due Proc-
ess Clause by preventing the partners from charging whatever the market 
would bear. 79 They emphasized that their customers consented to the prices 
they charged and that they had received no special advantage from the state, 
with the result that the traditional justification for price regulation under the 
classical paradigm was absent. so 
The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the constitutional challenge, hold-
ing that Munn and Scott had no property interest in the prices charged be-
76 See 83 U.S. 36, 57-83 (1873) (rejecting the butchers' claim that state grant of mo-
nopoly contravened the Fourteenth Amendment). 
77 See id. at 110 & n.39 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, bk. I, ch. 10, pt. 2., for the proposition that an individual maintains a substan-
tial liberty interest in his labor); id. at 110 ("The State may prescribe such regulations for 
every pursuit and calling of life as will promote the public health, secure the good order 
and advance the general prosperity of society, but when once prescribed the pursuit or 
calling must be free to be followed by every citizen who is within the conditions desig-
nated, and will conform to the regulations."); see also id. at 114-17 (Bradley, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that citizens possessed fundamental right to choose their own calling); id. at 
119-20 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (detailing where police power regulation is appropriate, 
and conducting that law preventing butchers from performing their trade is not within this 
sphere of acceptable regulation). It should be noted that these Justices did not relent. Six 
years later, when the Court sustained legislation repealing the grant of the slaughterhouse 
monopoly, each issued a concurring opinion reiterating his position that such monopolies 
were inconsistent with the due process ciause. See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & 
Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., Ill 
U.S. 746, 754-60 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); see also id. at 760-66 (Bradley, J., con-
curring); see also Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 138 (1874) (Field, J., 
concurring) (invoking Slaughterhouse dissent). 
78 94 u.s. 113 (1876). 
79 See Brief for Plaintiffs in Error (Goudy) at 31-32, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 
(1876) (No. 99) ("The legislature have fixed a price less than the price before, which was 
satisfactory to the warehousemen and their customers, and it is evident there is a differ-
ence of opinion as to what is a fair compensation."). 
80 See id. at 46 ("The right of control [over ferries and mills] is incidental to the right to 
create the franchise; and in the making of the grant, it is entirely competent to affix to it 
such conditions as the grantor may deem proper. But there is no such origin or history in 
respect of the right to keep a warehouse .... The business is in its nature a private busi-
ness. There are not and never were any exciusive privileges associated with it."); see also 
supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing traditional justification for price regula-
tion). 
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cause they were part of a cartel: "an organized combination of monopo-
lists ... with but one heart, and that palpitating for excessive gains. "81 Be-
cause of this conspiracy, "it [was] idle to talk about the consent of their cus-
tomers, [who] ... had no protection against the monopolists and no consent 
to give. "82 Thus, it was appropriate for the legislature to provide protection 
against such "oppression and extortion. "83 Without relying explicitly upon 
the police power, the court concluded that the legislature, who were 
"familiar with the course of trade" had the authority to counteract such ex-
tortion, thus achieving "the greatest good of the greatest number. "84 There 
was no suggestion that the restraining effect of the cartel agreement itself 
justified regulation. 
The Supreme Court affirmed. Unlike the Illinois Supreme Court, which 
had emphasized the absence of a property right to charge prices above the 
competitive level, Chief Justice Waite relied explicitly upon the police 
power. All property, he said, was held subject to the limitation that it not be 
used to injure another, a limitation which gave rise to the police power. 85 
Relying in part upon the work of Lord Chief Justice Hale, the Court claimed 
that this authority had been understood since time immemorial to include the 
power to regulate prices charged by those firms "affected with a public inter-
est," even if no special advantage had been conferred by the State. 86 The 
business of shipping and storing grain, the Court held, was so affected be-
cause it had a large effect on the community, and the fourteen elevators in 
Chicago had formed and maintained a cartel among themselves creating a 
"virtual monopoly. "87 Accordingly, the Court left open the possibility that 
regulation of firms not imbued with such characteristics would be subject to 
due process challenge. 88 Moreover, like the Supreme Court of Illinois, the 
81 Munn v. Illinois, 69 Ill. 80, 93 (1873); see also id. at 89 (referring to elevators as 
"an organized body of monopolists, possessing sufficient strength in their combination, 
and by their connection with the railroads of the State, to impose their own terms upon the 
producers and the shippers of these cereals. 0 0 0 "). 
82 /d. at 90. 
83 /d. at 89. 
84 /d. at 88, 92. 
85 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876) ("[The state may require] each 
citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his property, as not unnecessarily to injure an-
other. This is the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic 
utere tuo ut alienum laedas. "). 
86 See id. at 124-29. 
87 See id. at 131·; see also Edmund Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts ofMunn v. 
Illinois, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 314, 316 (noting that rates for storage were set collectively). 
88 Thus, according to Professor Currie: 
[T]he majority nowhere took issue with Field's crucial assumption [i.e., that the due 
process clause protected substantive rights of property]. By stressing the public inter-
est in grain elevators, the Court seemed to imply that they were extraordinary, and 
that similar regulation of other businesses might not pass muster. By employing the 
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Court did not even suggest that the regulation could be justified as an attempt 
to enhance "liberty of contract." 
Justice Field issued a long and vigorous dissent based squarely upon the 
classical paradigm. 89 The police power, he said, only empowered the State 
to regulate uses of property that interfered with the rights of others.90 Thus, 
while the State could-and should-act to ensure that each person could 
equally enjoy his property without interference, it could not regulate the 
prices charged and thus the "compensation" that an individual might receive 
for use of that property, unless it had conferred some special advantage on 
the owner. 91 Because the elevator operators had not received such an ad-
vantage from the State, Field concluded that Illinois had no right to interfere 
with prices defendants charged for the storage of grain. 92 
Invoking the traditional articulation of the classical paradigm, treatise 
writers condemned Munn as wrongly decided, and the fight to constitution-
alize the classical paradigm soon shifted from the field of property to that of 
liberty. 93 Influenced by these writers, and the dissenting opinions of Justices 
Field and Bradley, state courts, without questioning Munn directly, began to 
find that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause included the right to 
"pursue happiness" by exercising one's faculties, an exercise that included 
the right to contract and dispose of property. 94 This right was not absolute, 
rhetoric of substantive due process without ever having justified its acceptance, 
moreover, [the Court] made it easy for [its] successors to argue that the principle had 
already been established-and thus to invalidate laws on the basis of the purely factual 
and always arguable judgment that the subject was not "affected with a public inter-
est." 
CURRIE, supra note 70, at 373; see also Kitch & Bowler, supra note 87, at 340-43 
(suggesting limited reading of Munn); Munn, 69 Ill. at 89 (noting that elevators were able 
to exercise their power partly due their to connection with the railroads). 
89 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 136-54 (Field, J., dissenting). 
90 See id. at 145-48. 
91 See id. at 139-40. 
92 See id. at 149. 
93 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 60, at 742-46 (criticizing 
Munn and arguing that price regulation should only be sustained where the regulated enti-
ties possess state granted privileges or are operated on public property); 2 J.I. CLARK 
HARE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 771 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1889) 
(criticizing Munn); CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 233-38 (De Capo Press 1971) (1886) (applauding Field's 
dissent regarding the limits of the state's power to fix prices for purely private corpora-
tions). 
94 See In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 106-07 (1885); see also id. at 107 (citing Justice 
Field's concurrence in Butchers' Union Co.); id. at 106-07 (voiding prohibition of cigar 
manufacture in tenement houses); Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (Mass. 
1891) (voiding Jaw prohibiting imposition of fines on employees); Ex parte Kubach, 24 P. 
731 (Cal. 1890) (voiding mandate of eight hour day on public works projects); State v. 
Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 288 (W. Va. 1889) (voiding law forbidding payment in script); 
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but was, instead, subject to the police power.95 However, regulation de-
signed simply to transfer wealth from one class to another fell outside this 
power and was deemed illegitimate.96 
Emboldened by these precedents, property owners renewed their chal-
lenges against state authority to regulate the prices _charged by cartels. In 
Budd v. New York, 91 for instance, the New York Court of Appeals evaluated 
a state statute "fixing the maximum charge for elevating grain. "98 Defen-
dants, the owners of so-called "floating elevators" that had formed a cartel, 
conceded that Munn was binding as a matter of federal constitutional law, 
but argued that a different meaning should be placed on New York's own 
due process clause. 99 
The court rejected the defendants' constitutional challenge, painting a 
much clearer picture of the limits of state authority over prices than the Su-
preme Court had painted in Munn. The court began with the assumption that 
the state could not regulate the prices charged by those engaged in "common 
pursuits," that is, occupations that involved neither special state aid nor fran-
chise.100 This general rule, however, contained an exception for "special 
People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29, 33-34 (N.Y. 1885) (voiding law forbidding the sale of marga-
rine); Jones v. People, 110 Ill. 590, 594 (1884) (construing statute regulating miners' 
wages narrowly so as not to offend liberty of contract). See generally JACOBS, supra note 
71, at 42-46 (describing development of liberty of contract jurisprudence in the state 
courts); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 470 (1910) (arguing that 
Justice Field's concurring opinion in Butchers' Union Co. "although it did not represent 
the views of the Federal Supreme Court ... had a far reaching influence in the state 
courts"); id. at 470 n.83 (noting that, in the Supreme Court of Illinois, at least, the dissent 
in the Slaughterhouse Cases was treated as persuasive authority). 
95 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 138-40 (1874) (Field, J., concurring) 
("No one has ever pretended, that I am aware of, that the fourteenth amendment interferes 
in any respect with the police power of the state."). 
96 See, e.g., Marx, 2 N.E. at 33 (ruling that the state cannot forbid manufacture of 
margarine simply to protect dairy industry, absent showing that public has been deceived 
about the quality of the margarine). 
97 22 N.E. 670 (N.Y. 1889). 
98 See Laws of 1888, §I, 188 N.Y. Laws (repealed 1949). 
99 See Budd, 22 N.E. at 672 (noting that challenge to the New York statute was only on 
state constitutional grounds). 
100 According to the Court: 
In determining whether the legislature can lawfully regulate and fix the charge for 
elevating grain by private elevators, it must be conceded that the uses to which a man 
may devote his property. the price which he may charge for such use, how much he 
shall demand or receive for his labor, and the methods of conducting his business are, 
as a general rule, not the subject of legislative regulation. These are a part of our lib-
erty, of which, under the constitutional guaranty, we cannot be deprived .... That no 
general power resides in the legislature to regulate private business, prescribe the 
conditions under which it may be conducted, fix the price of commodities or services, 
or interfere with freedom of contract, we do not doubt. The merchant and manufac-
turer, the artisan and laborer, under our system of government, are left to pursue and 
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conditions and circumstances" that rendered private firms analogous to those 
that were recipients of state protection and thus subject to price regulation 
under the police power. 101 Such circumstances were present with respect to 
floating grain elevators, the court said.102 The elevators in question stood 
astride the Erie Canal, New York's great artery of commerce. 103 Moreover, 
in light of the limited area suitable for the construction of elevators, incum-
bent firms were readily able to collude so as to form a "virtual monopoly" 
which could not be undermined by new entry, raising prices for a necessary 
of life well above the competitive level. 104 Thus, they were able to exact 
what amounted to a tax on all commerce passing through the canal, a tax that 
"forced the trade in grain into channels outside the state. "105 
Dissenting in a companion case, People ex rei Annan v. Walsh, Judge 
Rufus Peckham rejected Munn outright, finding the decision inconsistent 
with the classical paradigm. 106 While the police power was necessary to 
protect the right of property, Peckham contended that it did not include the 
"far greater and more dangerous power" to determine the compensation or 
price that one received for the use of property .107 He flatly rejected Munn 's 
assertion, as well as that of the majority, that there was a "virtual monopoly" 
in either case of the sort that could justify price regulation. 108 "Virtual mo-
nopoly," he said, rested upon the State's infringement of the liberty of others 
to compete on an equal footing with the putative monopolist. 109 "So long as 
provide for their interests in their own way, untrammeled by burdensome and restric-
tive regulations which, however common in rude and irregular times, are inconsistent 
with constitutional liberty. 
22 N.E. at 675. 
101 See id. at 675-78. 
102 See id. at 677-79. 
103 See id. at 677·78. 
104 See id. at 678. 
105 /d. ("The result of such a combination would necessarily be to subject the lake ves-
sels and canal boats to any exaction which the elevator owners might see fit to impose for 
the service of the elevator, and the elevator owners would be able to levy a tribute on the 
community, the extent of which would be limited only by their discretion."). 
106 People ex ret Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 682-95 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dis-
senting). As noted earlier, the court itself issued no opinion in Walsh. See supra note 34. 
107 See Walsh, 22 N.E. at 683 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
108 See id. at 684. It should be noted that Peckham did not explicitly state that the pres-
ence of a price above cost ipso facto established the authority to regulate such prices under 
the police power. While he did admit that the State could regulate prices where it had 
granted a privilege, he suggested that this ability was purely a matter of contract between 
the State and the grantee. See id. at 692 (noting that the elevator owners had not received 
a grant or privilege from the state, and accordingly could not be regulated). 
109 See id. at 684 (denying that a virtual monopoly exists without a grant of state power 
"merely because ·the property is conveniently situated for the business, and it would cost a 
large amount of money to duplicate it"); see also id. at 689 ("[The cases relied upon in 
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every one is free to go into the same business, and invest his capital therein 
with the same rights and privileges as those who are already engaged in it, 
there can be no monopoly in legal acceptance of the term, virtual or other-
wise. " 110 While Peckham respected the views of Lord Hale, he emphasized 
that the learned jurist had presided over trials in which "old women" were 
convicted of witchcraft and sentenced to death. 111 Changing times and cir-
cumstances, Peckham argued, required different conceptions of the scope of 
state authority. 112 
This distinction between state-maintained monopolies, on the one hand, 
and purely private "monopolies," on the other, Peckham maintained, was 
not simply a formal one: it was based on economic fact. 113 Absent state im-
pediments to entry, the liberty of individuals to deploy their capital into any 
market they pleased would defeat an attempt to maintain prices above the 
natural level, as such prices would attract capital from industries where the 
return on investment was at or below average. 
If it be said that the effect is the same, the answer is that it is not the 
same. In the one case the monopoly exists by reason of the action of 
the government, and no other citizen can come in and devote his capital 
and energy to such use. In the other the monopoly exists only so long 
as other citizens choose to keep out of the business, and just as soon as 
it is seen that the least degree over the ordinary profit can be realized 
by an investment in elevator property just that moment capital will flow 
Munn] in which they made use of the term 'virtual monopoly,' and where they held the 
owners had devoted their property to a public use, were cases where such owners were 
receiving from the government some special privilege or franchise, by accepting which 
they did thereby so devote their property."). 
110 /d. at 684. Later in the opinion he would write: 
A monopoly in a business where the persons engaged in it have no exclusive privi-
leges, and into which business the whole world is at liberty to enter, and upon which 
they will be possessed of precisely the same rights and privileges, as the others en-
gaged in it, is a contradiction in terms. 
/d. at 693. 
111 See id. at 686; see also id. at 686-87 ("The habits, customs and general intelligence 
of the people of those days were far different from those of today; and laws which might 
possibly be pardoned on account of ignorance, sparseness of population, difficulties of 
communication and rural and unsettled habits of life, can have no such justification in our 
times."); cf. SMITH, NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 45, at 
334 (comparing fear of monopoly to fear of witchcraft). 
112 See Walsh, 22 N.E. at 686 (Peckham, J., dissenting) (rejecting the use of eighteenth-
century paternalistic principles in an age that has a greater understanding of political econ-
omy, and the proper, more limited, role of government). 
113 See id. at 693-95 (distinguishing between a state maintained monopoly, which shuls 
out new market entrants, and a private monopoly, which essentially invites new entrants). 
1999] LIBERTY AND ANTITRUST IN THE FORMATIVE ERA 
into that channel, and probably away from some industry where the av-
erage rate of profit has ceased to be made.11 4 
31 
Although a firm could, "loosely speaking," become a monopolist by be-
coming more efficient than its competitors, Peckham echoed Thomas Cooley 
in his assertion that the State could not regulate a monopolist or any other 
firm because of its size. 115 Any attempt, even by a natural monopolist, to 
charge prices yielding more than "an ordinary profit" would immediately at-
tract new entry. 116 Thus, while true virtual monopolies could not be defeated 
"excepting by action of the sovereign," purely private monopolies would be 
defeated "by the action of the ordinary laws of trade." 117 
At any rate, Peckham noted, there was no monopolist of any sort in the 
present case. Instead, as the majority had emphasized, several elevators 
were engaged in a conspiracy to stabilize prices, a conspiracy that certainly 
limited the "liberty" of the participants. 118 Peckham conceded that this sort 
of conspiracy might be illegal if it set unreasonable prices, but he dismissed 
the possibility of this eventuality. 119 For, if the cartel price did generate 
above average returns, 
[ e ]very one having the same right to build an elevator or warehouse that 
these defendants have . . . if allowed absolute freedom and legal pro-
tection, will flow into the business until there is enough invested to do 
all or more than all the work offered, and then, by the competition of 
capital, the rate of compensation will come down to the average. 120 
114 /d. at 693. 
115 Peckham remarked: 
Loosely speaking, a person or corporation is said to have a virtual monopoly of a 
business when, on account of its great extent and the facilities it has for transacting it, 
arising from its large proportions, the article it manufactures or sells substantially 
takes possession of the market. Such, for instance, is the case with the manufacture 
and sale of matches. One company does an enormous business, and has almost what 
is called a 'monopoly' in some parts of the country, arising not from any special 
privilege or right granted to or exercised by it, but because of its facilities, and it is 
therefore enabled to make the article cheaper and sell it cheaper than its competitors. 
But would any one suggest that the state has therefore a right to limit the price which 
the company shall charge for matches? 
/d. at 693; cf. People v. Gilson, 17 N.E. 343, 345-46 (N.Y. 1888) (Peckham, J.) (holding 
that law prohibiting price discounts unduly interfered with liberty of occupation); Cooley, 
Limits to State Control of Private Business, supra note 48, at 268-69 (concluding that the 
State cannot regulate prices charged by a firm that has acquired a monopoly by "superior 
industry, enterprise, skill and thrift"). 
116 See Walsh, 22 N.E. at 693 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
117 /d. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. (citing Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (NY Sup. Ct. 1847) and Stanton 
v. Allen, 5 Denio 435 (NY Sup. Ct. 1848)). 
120 Walsh, 22 N.E. at 695 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
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It made no real difference to Peckham that grain elevators were expensive to 
build and maintain, or that the incumbent firms had advantageous locations: 
these facts simply "tend[ed] to make the inevitable result a trifle more slow 
in its approach than in other cases requiring a smaller outlay." 121 
The state's attempt to set prices below the market rate, then, prevented 
firms from obtaining reasonable returns sufficient to justify investment in the 
business and altered the normal allocation of capital. 122 For, without the 
agreements in question to maintain a reasonable, remunerative rate, the 
"general laws of trade" would lead capital to flee from the elevator business 
to markets where returns were reasonable. 123 At best, Peckham concluded, 
the regulation could replicate the price that would have occurred in an unre-
strained market; at worst, it would eventually drive firms out of the market, 
confiscating their wealth in the process. 124 Such a regulation of price was 
"vicious in its nature, communistic in it tendency." 125 Importantly, Peck-
ham's lengthy and passionate dissent masked his agreement with the majority 
over several fundamental issues regarding the constitutional status of price 
regulation. Both Peckham and the majority, for instance, made it plain that 
the Due Process Clause generally prevented price regulation. Additionally, 
they agreed that such regulation could be justified where a seller had a· state-
conferred monopoly, and thus could drive price above its natural level. 
What mattered to both majority and dissent, then, was not the extent to 
which the cartel limited the liberty of its participants, but instead whether 
that limitation allowed the participants to obtain power over price. 126 Both 
Peckham and the majority began with the same legal premises: only eco-
nomic facts, or, more precisely, the perception of them, divided them. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, in an unilluminating opinion by 
Justice Blatchford. 127 Justice Brewer, joined by Justices Field and Brown, 
121 /d. 
122 See id. (spurning government interference because "it may ruin or greatly impair the 
value of the property of wholly innocent persons"). 
123 See id.; cf SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 46, at 365 (contending 
that interference with natural price would "overturn [] the natural! balance of industry"). 
124 See Walsh, 22 N.E. at 695 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
125 /d. 
126 Indeed, four years later, in an opinion issued by Judge Andrews (author of the Budd 
majority), the New York Court of Appeals enforced a state statute that banned price fixing 
but unanimously opined that price fixing designed to maintain a reasonable price was to be 
applauded. See People v. Sheldon, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (N.Y. 1893) ("The obtaining by 
dealers of a fair price for what they sell does not seem to contravene public policy, or to 
work an injury to individuals. On the contrary, the general interests are promoted by ac-
tivity in trade, which cannot permanently exist without reasonable encouragement to those 
engaged in it."). It appears that no liberty of contract challenge was made in the case. 
127 See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 528-48 (1892). 
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dissented, proceeding along the lines suggested by Judge Peckham. 128 Un-
doubtedly, Justice Brewer wrote for the dissent, the State could ensure that 
an individual did "not use [property] to his neighbor's injury. " 129 This did 
not mean, however, that an individual "must use it for his neighbor's bene-
fit. " 130 By setting a price lower than that which obtained in the marketplace, 
the State had attempted to require the latter. 131 The purported presence of a 
monopoly, he said, did not justify "legislative interference" under this prin-
ciple, because the "monopoly" in question was not one "of law," created by 
the sovereign, but was instead one "of fact. " 132 The time was not distant, he 
said, when courts would recognize "the evils resulting from this assumption 
of a power on the part of the government to determine the compensation a 
man may receive for the use of his property. " 133 At that time, he said courts 
would "hasten to declare that government can prescribe compensation only 
when it grants a special privilege." 134 
To anyone following the composition of the Supreme Court, Brewer's 
prediction would have appeared prophetic. Within four years of Budd, the 
composition of the Court had changed significantly with the addition of 
Peckham and Edward White. By 1895, then, the holding of Munn appeared 
to be on shaky ground: Brewer and Peckham had a working majority for the 
position they had each expressed in Budd, and Peckham would lead the way 
as the Court gave protection to liberty of contract in other arenas. 135 At the 
128 See id. at 548-49 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's decision as a reaf-
firmation of Munn). 
129 /d. at 550 (listing the permissible limitations on individual use of property); see also 
David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack 11, Address Delivered 
Before the Graduating Classes, Yale Law School (June 23, 1891) (describing limits on the 
police power). 
130 Budd, 143 U.S. at 550 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
131 See id. at 551. 
132 /d. at 550. Echoing Peckham, he explained the difference: 
There are two kinds of monopoly; one of law, the other of fact. The one exists when 
exclusive privileges are granted. Such a monopoly, the law which creates alone can 
break; and being the creation of law justifies legislative control. A monopoly of fact 
any one can break, and there is no necessity for legislative interference. It exists 
where any one by his money and labor furnishes facilities for business which no one 
else has. A man puts up in a city the only building suitable for offices. He has there-
fore a monopoly of that business; but it is a monopoly of fact, which any one can 
break who, with like business courage puts his means into a similar building. Be-
cause of the monopoly feature, subject thus easily to be broken, may the legislature 
regulate the price at which he will lease his offices? 
/d. at 550-51. 
133 !d. at 552. 
134 /d. 
135 That majority consisted of Justices Peckham, Brewer, Field, Brown and White. 
Peckham, of course, would author the Court's opinions in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 
578 (1897) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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same time, states and the federal government were busily drafting and pass-
ing antitrust legislation designed to prohibit cartels of the sort involved in 
Munn and Budd. 136 A collision seemed imminent between the proverbial ir-
resistible force-antitrust regulation-and the immovable object-liberty of 
contract. How the courts would reconcile these competing impulses is the 
subject of the balance of this article. 
II. THE COLLISION: LIBERTY OF CONTRACT MEETS THE SHERMAN ACT 
While opinions about the original meaning and purposes of the Sherman 
Act ("the Act") vary widely, all scholars agree that Congress meant to out-
law purely private cartels regardless whether they have received special 
competitive advantages from the state. 137 Such an expansion of regulatory 
authority beyond that countenanced by the classical paradigm raises an im-
portant question: how could antitrust laws survive the jurisprudence of lib-
erty of contract that was emerging in the 1880s-1890s? As noted earlier, re-
gardless of their views on the purposes of antitrust and the proper 
interpretation of formative era caselaw, scholars have concluded-implicitly 
or explicitly-that liberty of contract played no role in shaping early antitrust 
doctrine. 138 Moreover, the current approaches to antitrust suggest three pos-
sible-but distinctly different-bases for concluding that antitrust regulation 
did not offend liberty of contract. According to one, "Populist" position, the 
antitrust laws were designed to enhance the liberty of traders from private 
agreements, even where the restraining contract produced no public harm in 
the form of higher prices. 139 Formative era caselaw, it is said, was consis-
tent with this approach, repudiating the classical paradigm's requirement that 
some economic harm be present in order to justify regulation of private con-
136 See infra notes 137-42, 344-48 and accompanying text (describing origins of the 
Sherman Act and its state law counterparts). 
137 Judge Bork, for instance, concluded that Judge Taft's opinion for the Sixth Circuit in 
United States v. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), which suggested that price 
fixing was per se unlawful, "must rank as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust 
opinions of all time." BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 26. Other scholars 
who agree that the Act was designed to outlaw cartels include Millon, supra note 10, at 
1282-87 (describing congressional intent to prohibit private cartels); Thomas C. Arthur, 
Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. 
REV. 266, 284-89 (1986) (same) and; Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 29, at 93-96 
(same). 
138 See supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text. 
139 See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 5, at 15 ("This strong sentiment in favor of protecting 
industrial liberty, of assuring a person's right to work, surpassed even the abhorrence of 
higher prices."); Millon, supra note 10, at 1276-87 (characterizing the Sherman Act fram-
ers as driven primarily by a desire to reduce economic concentration); see also supra notes 
11-31 and accompanying text. 
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tract. 140 The allocative efficiency approach, in contrast, holds that these 
laws, particularly the Sherman Act, were designed to prevent only those 
contracts that imposed harm on society by reducing output and distorting the 
allocation of resources. 141 A third, "wealth transfer" approach, contends 
that antitrust was designed to assure consumers competitive prices. 142 
A careful consideration of formative era decisions arising under the Sher-
man Act demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, liberty of con-
tract played an important role in shaping early Sherman Act doctrine. More 
precisely, courts ad9pted a narrowing construction of the Act in response to 
claims that a broad interpretation of the statute would interfere with contrac-
tual freedom. In so doing, courts-particularly the Supreme Court-made it 
clear that interference with the liberty of sellers to contract could not be justi-
fied simply because such interference enhanced the liberty from contract of 
those bound or injured by contractual restrictions. Instead, courts concluded 
that the state could only abridge liberty of contract when the primary effect 
of the agreement was to produce prices above the natural level. This result 
was consistent with that suggested by the classical paradigm and the common 
law of trade restraints, each of which deemed some economic harm a neces-
sary predicate to interference with liberty of contract. 
Courts interpreting the Sherman Act, however, did not invoke the police 
power; nor did they suggest that high prices were a "harm" that the state 
could redress. Instead, these courts bottomed their narrow interpretation of 
the Act on the distinction between "ordinary" contracts and those that were 
not deemed ordinary. 143 Contracts were ordinary if they served a purpose 
other than the acquisition of power over prices, even if they might 
'~indirectly" increase prices. 144 
The conclusion that the state could abridge liberty for the purpose of pre-
venting cartel-imposed prices did not signal an abandonment of the classical 
paradigm as applied by then-Judge Peckham in Budd. Instead, the repudia-
tion of the result urged in that dissent flowed from an application of the clas-
140 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (summarizing the Populist contention that 
formative era case law countenanced regulation that was not justified· by the classical para-
digm). 
141 This theory was first propounded in Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 22, at pas-
sim. Bork subsequently expanded on his ideas. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra 
note 22, at 107-10. Others echoed his ideas. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying 
text; Douglas Ginsburg, Rationalizing Antitrust, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 329, 331 (1990) 
(stating that the "core case for antirust regulation rests upon the control of an external-
ity"); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, RESTRAINT OF TRADE 37-38 (1986) (describing the primary 
goals of antitrust as allocative efficiency); KENNETH ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE 
ANTITRUST PENALTIES 3 (1976) (characterizing antitrust law as externality regulation); 
Calabresi, supra note 28, at 70-71 (same). 
142 See, e.g., Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 29, at passim. 
143 See infra notes 144-343 and accompanying text. 
144 See infra notes 145-343 and accompanying text. 
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sica! paradigm in light of a changed perception of the economic facts that had 
driven particular applications of it. More precisely, as judges began to real-
ize that purely private cartels could raise prices well above the competitive 
level, regulation of such arrangements fell comfortably within the classical 
paradigm. 
A. Early Lower Court Decisions 
The earliest Sherman Act cases, of course arose in the lower federal 
courts. Scholars who have analyzed these cases have generally downplayed 
the role played by liberty of contract. 145 Others have concluded that, what-
ever role liberty of contract did play, these decisions were inconsistent with 
the approach soon to be taken by the Supreme Court. 146 Close consideration 
of several early cases filed under the Act reveals that concerns over liberty of 
contract played an important role in early caselaw. Even before the Supreme 
Court first had occasion to interpret the Sherman Act, these early cases set 
the stage for limiting the reach of the statute so as not to offend liberty of 
contract. 
The lack of scholarly attention to the role of liberty of contract in this era 
is perhaps attributable to the fact that some early decisions either did not in-
volve facts conducive to liberty of contract challenges or presented alternate 
grounds for decision. For instance, one early decision, United States v. 
Patterson, 141 did not involve a contract at all, but instead a claim that defen-
dants had monopolized the cash register market by, among other things, as-
saulting and injuring their competitors. 148 Of course, even the most doctri-
145 Professor Peritz, for instance, argues that "for the most part," lower federal courts 
did not take account of liberty of contract in interpreting the Sherman Act. See PERITZ, 
supra note 5, at 30. Similarly, Hans Thorelli, deemed by some the most complete histo-
rian of the antitrust laws, in a chapter entitled Judicial Interpretations Under the Sherman 
Act from 189D-1905, does not discuss the role that liberty of contract played, either in de-
cisions, or in arguments to the various courts in question. See HANS B. THORELL!, THE 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 432-500 (1955). Professor Thorelli only briefly mentions the 
Supreme Court's treatment of liberty contract in a couple of cases. See id. at 600. 
146 See SKLAR, supra note 18, at 168-69 (arguing that the Supreme Court subordinated 
liberty of contract to Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce); WILLIAM LETWIN, 
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 147-55, 167-72 (1965) (highlighting the differ-
ences between Supreme Court's early antitrust decisions and lower court decisions em-
ploying freedom of contract analysis). 
147 55 F. 605 (D. Mass. 1893). 
148 See id. at 638. More precisely, the defendants had allegedly monopolized the mar-
ket for cash registers by, inter alia, "preventing others from engaging in business by 
means of harassing and intimidating competitors, by threatening them, by causing them or 
their agents to be assaulted and injured ... by harassing and intimidating purchasers, by 
inducing purchasers to break their contracts and refusing to pay sums owed to competi-
tors .... " /d. at 606-07. The defendants went to great lengths to argue that the Sherman 
Act applied only to contracts, and thus not to their alleged behavior. See id. at 622 ("The 
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naire classical conception of liberty admitted that the state could regulate 
such tortious conduct. 149 Additionally, in United States v. Greenhut, 150 the 
court declined to consider a constitutional challenge to indictments issued 
against the defendants who had formed the so-called whiskey trust and in-
duced dealers to maintain certain resale prices. 151 The court held that the in-
dictment did not properly charge an offense of monopolization as recognized 
by the Act with the result that it was unnecessary to reach certain "important 
questions" such as "whether congress has the constitutional authority to de-
clare such acts to be unlawful and criminal. " 152 
Other decisions, however, plainly rested upon liberty of contract or the 
classical paradigm. In In re Greene;153 for in~tance, the court dismissed an-
other indictment of the whiskey trust, applying a standard derived from the 
classical paradigm. The trust had unified by purchase seventy previously in-
dependent firms and gained a 7 5% share of the distilling market. 154 Yet, the 
court said, this conduct did not even constitute "attempted monopolization" 
under the Act, because "all other persons who chose to engage (in the whis-
key business) were at liberty to so," and the defendants had made no effort, 
act of 1890 was aimed at the growing tendency to combination by voluntary contract, in 
derogation of public right and public safety. It was at this, only, that the legislation was 
aimed; and it is this, only, which its words are to be construed to cover. Attacks upon 
commerce by mere fraud and violence, it is thus far left to the states to punish."). 
149 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (explaining that police power author-
izes state to prevent harmful uses of property); see also COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS, supra note 60, at 572 (defining the police power to include the ability to 
"preserve public order"); BOWEN, AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 43, at 19 
(opining that prevention of crime was legitimate function of the state); Spencer, Special 
Administration, supra note 48, at 187 (acknowledging that government should protect an 
individual and his property from aggression); HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 3, at 280-81 (stating that the Patterson court held that the mere attempt to 
control the cash register business did not violate the Act); Cooley, Limits to State Control 
of Private Business, supra note 48, at 267 (concluding that the State can regulate monopo-
lies created by threats and violence because such acts are independently illegal). While the 
defendants did lodge constitutional challenges, they centered almost exclusively upon a 
claim that the conduct involved did not constitute interstate commerce. See Patterson, 55 
F. at 630-32. While the defendants did suggest (vaguely) that the Act improperly inter-
fered with vested rights of property in the form of trademarks and patents, they did not 
refer to liberty of contract or even claim that they had suffered such interference. See id. 
at 630. 
150 50 F. 469 (D. Mass. 1892). 
151 See id. at 470-71. 
152 /d.; see also THORELLI, supra note 145, at 438 (calling the opinion in Greenhut "a 
magnificent example of judicial sophistry"). 
153 52 F. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892). 
154 See id. at 116. 
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by contract or otherwise, to limit the production of other firms. 155 Although 
it did not say so explicitly, the court may have believed that the unrestrained 
"liberty" of other whiskey makers would counteract any tendency of the de-
fendants to price above the competitive level. 156 Or, the court may have be-
lieved that market power achieved by tactics equally available to others was 
not, ipso facto, justification for governmental interference with the contracts 
in question. 157 There was no need to invoke liberty of contract explicitly; the 
court had given the statute a construction derived directly from the classical 
paradigm reminiscent of Peckham's Budd dissent. 158 
Greene was not the first decision to construe the act to avoid interfering 
with the liberty implied by the classical paradigm. In United States v. Nel-
son, 159 the United States indicted several Minneapolis lumber dealers for 
agreeing to increase prices by 50 cents per thousand foot. 160 The district 
court dismissed the indictment, however, because it did not allege that every 
dealer serving the market was party to the agreement. 161 Without such uni-
versal participation, "competition in the commodity would soon bring the 
price down, unless there were fraudulent or coercive means resorted to for 
the purpose of restraining other dealers, and preventing them from exercising 
their own judgment as to prices. " 162 Again, without actually invoking liberty 
of contract, a court had read the Act so as not to infringe it. 
In another early case, liberty of contract was squarely presented and ex-
plicitly shaped the scope of the Act. In Dueber Watch-Case Manufacturing 
Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock, 163 plaintiff, a watch manufacturer, alleged 
that several competitors had conspired to raise prices and attempted to induce 
the plaintiff to go along. 164 When plaintiff refused, defendants attempted to 
drive it out of business by, inter alia, entering exclusive arrangements that 
155 /d. 
156 See LETWIN, supra note 146, at 150 (arguing that the court believed that, even in 
light of the trust's tactics "enough competitors, actual or potential, would always be avail-
able to destroy the monopoly or limit its power to set prices"); People ex ret Annan v. 
Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (same). 
157 Cf Walsh, 22 N.E. at 693 (Peckham, J., dissenting) (asserting that the state had no 
authority to regulate prices charged by efficient monopolist); Cooley, Limits to State Con-
trol of Private Business, supra note 48, at 268-69 (same). 
158 See also In re Corning, 51 F. 205, 211 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1892) (finding no violation 
of the Act because defendants' distillery combinations were intended to increase trade, and 
did not limit the customer's freedom to deal with others). 
159 52 F. 646 (C.C.D. Minn. 1892). 
160 See id. 
161 See id. at 647. 
162 /d.; cf. supra notes 43-45, 55 and accompanying text (describing similar approach 
suggested by the classical paradigm and taken by various common Jaw courts). 
163 55 F. 851 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 66 F. 637 (2d Cir. 1895). 
164 See id. at 851-52. 
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obliged watch dealers not to deal with the plaintiff. 165 The lower court dis-
missed the complaint without mentioning liberty of contract. 166 
In the Second Circuit, the plaintiff offered a liberty-based rationale for 
construing the statute to outlaw defendants' price fixing and the exclusive 
dealing designed to enforce it. According to the plaintiff, the statute was de-
signed to enhance liberty, including its own liberty and that of its employees 
to "pursue that avocation and calling which seems best to him to promote his 
happiness and prosperity. " 167 This freedom, "secured to them by the Decla-
ration of Independence and by the Constitution of the United States," plain-
tiff argued "ha[d] been interfered with by the contracts in question," which 
limited plaintiffs freedom to sell its wares to certain dealers. 168 
In response, the lead defendant deployed its own liberty-based arguments. 
The challenged conduct, it said, was "a mere case of ordinary business com-
petition," and the defendants did not "constitute the whole, or even the major 
part of the manufacturers of the goods concerned." 169 Though admitting that 
it wanted to gain a larger share of the market, defendant argued that any at-
tempt to prohibit such "ordinary" commercial methods would make the stat-
ute a "means of controlling and directing the private concern of individuals, 
and of depriving them of their legal right to management of their own busi-
ness." 170 Such an interpretation of the Act would, the defendant said, be be-
yond the statute's "constitutional scope. "171 
The Second Circuit affirmed, narrowing the Act so as not to abridge lib-
erty of contract. Announcing the judgment of the court, Judge Lacombe 
largely adopted the defendants' reasoning, implicitly rejecting plaintiffs lib-
erty from contract argument. 172 Any agreement to fix watch prices, he said, 
was beyond the scope of the Act: " [ e ]ach one of the defendants had an un-
doubted right to determine for himself the price at which he would sell the 
goods he made, and he certainly does not lose that right by deciding to sell 
165 See id. at 852-53. 
166 See id. at 853 (holding that the complaint did not properly allege that defendants 
were engaged in interstate commerce or, in any event, that they had "intended to absorb 
the entire trade" or "that the rights of the general public had been invaded"). 
167 Brief for Plaintiff at 30. 
168 /d. at 30-31. 
169 Brief for Defendant in Error at 24-25. 
170 /d. at 26. 
171 /d. at 26. 
172 Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock, 66 F. 637, 641-46 (2d 
Cir. 1895) (concluding that plaintiffs allegations did not state a claim under the Act). La-
combe, it should be noted, spoke only for himself. While Judge Shipman concurred in the 
result, he did so because the complaint did not properly allege that defendants' conduct 
injured the plaintiff or restrained interstate commerce. See id. at 646-48 (Shipman, J., 
concurring). Unless otherwise indicated, citation of this decision will be to Judge La-
combe's opinion. 
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them at the same price at which a dozen or so of his competitors sell the 
goods which they make. " 173 If the agreement produced unreasonable prices, 
Lacombe said, "the public will buy the goods it wants, not from them but 
from their competitors. " 174 Moreover, the exclusive dealing arrangements, 
which purportedly interfered with the dealers' and plaintiff's liberty, did not 
involve items of prime necessity and thus, despite Munn and its progeny, 
were constitutionally protected and beyond the reach of state regulation. 
An individual manufacturer or trader may surely buy from or sell to 
whom he pleases, and he may equally refuse to buy from one or sell to 
any one with whom he thinks it will promote his business interests to 
refuse to trade. This is entirely a matter of his private concern, with 
which government paternalism has not as yet sought to interfere, except 
when the property he owns is 'devoted to a use in which the public has 
an interest;' and such public interest in the use has as yet been found to 
exist only in staple commodities of prime necessity. 175 
While Lacombe did not explain just how far this private liberty extended, 
some language in his opinion did suggest some possible limits. For instance, 
he pointed out that the exclusive dealing arrangements amounted to only a 
partial restraint. 176 Although the restraint limited the plaintiff's trade, it in-
creased the defendants' by a corresponding amount; in other words, the re-
straint did not reduce output. 177 Thus, the scheme could not be "injurious to 
the public, which has all the rest of the trade to deal with. " 178 Moreover, 
echoing the lead defendant's assertion that the exclusive arrangements were 
"ordinary" business practices designed to increase business in a legitimate 
way, Lacombe asserted that the conduct appeared to be "a reasonable busi-
ness device to increase the trade of one set of competitors at the expense, no 
doubt, of their business rivals. " 179 Why was it reasonable? Just as the dis-
trict court had emphasized in Greef}e, and Peckham had emphasized in Budd, 
Lacombe stressed that the defendants' competitors were "equally free to 
avail themselves of similar devices to secure their own trade. " 180 The con-
tracts certainly restrained the "liberty" of dealers to purchase from the plain-
173 /d. at 644. 
174 /d. 
175 See id. at 645 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) and Budd v. New 
York, 143 U.S. 517 (1893)). 
176 See id. at 645; cf. Brief for Defendant in Error at 25 ("There was no aim, so far as 
appears, to engross all the trade .... "). 
177 See Dueber Watch-Case, 66 F. at 645. 
178 /d. at 645-46. 
179 /d. at 646. 
180 /d.; cf. Brief for Defendants in Error at 25 ("Defendants concluded, exactly as 
plaintiff might have concluded, that if they could induce their customers to deal exclu-
sively with them it would be to their profit. ... This policy of exclusive dealing might as 
well have been beneficial to plaintiff as to defendants."). 
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tiff and interfered with the plaintiffs liberty to sell, but Lacombe neverthe-
less concluded that the defendants had a right to enter them, so long as they 
did not restrain liberty in a way that reduced output and led to higher 
prices. 181 While he did not say so explicitly, Lacombe apparently believed 
that the defendants could not obtain market power unless they interfered with 
the ability of others to adopt similar contracts. 
Judge Wallace dissented. 182 Unlike Lacombe, he did not believe that the 
conduct before the court found shelter within liberty of contract. Instead, he 
concluded that, taken together with the scheme to fix prices, the exclusive 
dealing arrangements violated the Act because they "tended to coerce a com-
peting manufacturer to join [defendants] and sell his goods at a price to be 
fixed by them. " 183 This coercion, he continued, necessarily had the effect of 
interfering with the liberty of dealers to purchase from the plaintiff. 184 Lib-
erty from contract, it seemed, was the touchstone of his analysis. 
Closer examination, however, suggests that, in fact, Wallace actually re-
jected a liberty from contract standard. Wallace did not argue that all exclu-
sive dealing or price fixing agreements were "coercive" and thus illegal. In-
stead, he agreed with Judge Lacombe that the Act was to be interpreted so as 
not to disturb defendants' liberty of contract. 185 This liberty, he said, ordi-
narily included the right to fix prices and enter exclusive dealing arrange-
ments that by their nature abridged the "liberty" of others: 
I do not question the right of the defendants to combine for their own 
protection against unfair competition, and in that behalf, their commod-
ity not being one of prime necessity, to agree not to sell to those who 
do not buy exclusively of them, or who buy of the complainant or some 
other obnoxious competitor .... 186 
The defendants, however, were not acting out of "motives of self-
protection, but oppressively. " 187 Apparently Wallace drew a distinction be-
tween conduct designed to protect defendants from destructive competition, 
and that aimed at driving prices above the natural level. The conduct of de-
fendants was "oppressive" because they had attempted to induce the plaintiff 
181 See Dueber Watch-Case, 66 F. at 646. 
182 See id. at 648-52. 
183 /d. at 651 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
184 See id. at 650. 
185 See id. at 652 (recognizing the right of the defendants to combine for their own pro-
tection); cf. THORELL!, supra note 145, at 482 (asserting-falsely in light of the analysis 
offered here-that "Judge Wallace disagreed with the majority on all points"). 
186 Dueber Watch-Case, 66 F. at 652 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
187 /d. 
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to "sell his goods at their prices," not the natural ones. 188 This, of course, 
was exactly the distinction Peckham had drawn in Budd.189 
Wallace's apparent embrace of the classical paradigm was consistent with 
his opinion, less than a decade earlier, in Dolph v. Troy Laundry & Machine 
Co. 190 There he enforced a market division agreement between two manu-
facturers of washing machines, an agreement that plainly deprived the parties 
of their "freedom" to sell where they wished.l 91 Anticipating Peckham's ap-
proach in Budd, he concluded that such a contract could not prejudice the 
public: 
Those who might be unwilling to pay the prices asked by the parties 
could find plenty of mechanics to make such machines, and the law of 
demand and supply would effectually counteract any serious mischief 
likely to arise from the attempt of the parties to get exorbitant prices for 
their machines.t92 
The only exception, he suggested, was where the agreement in question 
"contemplate[ d] suppressing the manufacture or sale of machines by others," 
thus leading to higher prices.t93 
According to Judge Wallace, then, the mere fact that a contract restrained 
parties' freedom of action, or interfered with the freedom of sellers such as 
the plaintiff, did not place it beyond constitutional protection. Like Judge 
Lacombe, Judge Wallace apparently would have allowed abridgment of con-
tracts only where they were found to be attempts to obtain market power. 
He merely disagreed with Lacombe about the proper explanation of the con-
tracts in question. 
Thus, just five years after Congress passed the Sherman Act, and ten 
years before Lochner v. New York, the Second Circuit believed that the 
Sherman Act had to be interpreted in light of liberty of contract. This liberty 
included the right to engage in "ordinary" commercial practices, even those 
that interfered with the opportunities of others. A contract was "ordinary" 
if, despite such interference and its restraining effect on the parties to it, it 
did not lead to prices above the competitive level. Like the majority and dis-
sent in Budd, Lacombe and Wallace agreed about the principle to be applied. 
188 'fd. 
189 See supra notes 106-25. 
190 28 F. 553 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886). 
191 See id. at 554-55. 
192 !d.; see also id. ("It is quite legitimate for any trader to obtain the highest price he 
can for any commodity in which he deals. It is equally legitimate for two rival manufac-
turers or traders to agree upon a scale of selling prices for their goods, and a division of 
their profits."); cf. Dueber Watch-Case, 66 F. at 645 ("An individual manufacturer or 
trader may surely buy from or sell to whom he pleases, and he may equally refuse to buy 
from or sell to any one with whom he thinks it will promote his business interest to refuse 
to trade."). 
193 Dolph, 28 F. at 555. 
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Disagreement over the proper result in the particular case before them, then, . 
simply followed from their different appraisals of the likely effects of the 
conduct involved. 
B. The Supreme Court 
Conventional wisdom has characterized decisions such as Dueber Watch-
Case, Nelson and Greene as outliers-stubborn exemplars of the classical 
paradigm. 194 Under this view, these courts ignored the original meaning of 
the Sherman Act, reading their own economic philosophy into the statute. 
Only the Supreme Court, the story continues, resisted this temptation, read-
ing the Act to effectuate Congress's actual intent to abandon the classical 
paradigm. As shown below, conventional wisdom has mischaracterized the 
relationship between decisions such as Dueber Watch-Case, on the one hand, 
and subsequent Supreme Court precedent, on the other. Far from repudiat-
ing the framework employed by lower courts, the Supreme Court actually 
embraced it, holding that some impact on price was necessary before a con-
tract could be deemed a direct restraint, contrary to the Act. 
1. Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Hopkins 
One of the first Sherman Act cases to reach the Supreme Court provided 
an apparently excellent vehicle for a consideration of the statute's implica-
tions for liberty of contract. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight As-
sociation,195 the Court faced a straight-forward cartel agreement among rail-
roads serving St. Louis, memorialized in a written contract that was 
administered by a board appointed by the cartel's membership. 196 Unlike the 
conduct at issue in Patterson, the agreement did not involve any tortious acts 
clearly within the police power. 197 Moreover, because railroads had received 
no franchise from the state, it seemed that they were beyond regulation under 
the pure formulation of the classical paradigm. 198 Finally, because the rail-
roads admitted that the Interstate Commerce Act applied to their conduct, 
there could be no serious claim-as there was in Greene and Greenhut-that 
194 See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also THORELL!, supra note 145, at 
480-82 (arguing that Judge Lacombe's opinion in Dueber Watch-Case exemplified a 
"common law" approach to the Sherman Act); id. at 456-57 (arguing that, during the for-
mative era, the Supreme Court rejected this common law approach). 
195 166 u.s. 290 (1897). 
196 See id. at 310. 
197 See id.; cf. United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605, 606 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) 
(detailing the conspiracy's methods of enforcement). 
198 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 154 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting); People ex rei 
Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting); COOLEY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 60, at 575-77. 
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the Sherman Act as applied to these defendants was outside the scope of 
Congress' commerce power. 199 
Surprisingly, however, the defendants lodged no constitutional attack. 200 
Instead, they pressed two arguments: first, that the Act did not apply to rail-
roads, who were instead regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act and sec-
ond, that even if the Act-did apply to railroads, it was not meant to forbid the 
sort of contracts they had entered, which merely set reasonable rates and 
prevented the type of destructive competition endemic to the industry. 2°1 No 
monopoly of rail traffic existed or was possible, defendants claimed, because 
they had received no exclusive privileges, and had made no attempt to 
"absorb" their competitors. 202 Such contracts to fix reasonable prices were 
legal at common law, defendants asserted, and thus were not "in restraint of 
trade" within the meaning of the statute. 203 
The Court rejected the railroads' arguments in an opinion drafted by Jus-
tice Peckham. 204 According to the conventional account embraced by schol-
ars of all stripes, Justice Peckham held that every contract "in restraint of 
trade," no matter how reasonable, violated the Act. 205 The only possible ex-
199 See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 314-20; cf United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894) (finding that creation of a monopoly in sugar did not restrain inter~ 
state commerce and thus was beyond the scope of the Act). 
200 According to one scholar, "[t]he argument against the constitutionality of the Anti-
Trust Law had hardly been pressed in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association [c]ase, for 
an adverse decision [on the meaning of the statute] had not been expected." TWISS, supra 
note 71, at 195; see also Brief for the New York Central and Hudson River R.R, Co. at 
38, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) ("This [constitutional] point 
was not made on the argument of the Trans-Missouri case, because no such construction of 
the act was anticipated by counsel."). 
201 See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 311-48; see also, e.g., Brief for the New 
York Central and Hudson River R.R. Co. at 25-27, Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. 290 
(1897) (defending the agreement because it merely suppressed unlawful and destructive 
competition); see also id. at 37 (summarizing the likely destructive effects of unrestrained 
competition). 
202 See Brief for the Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Company in Nebraska at 21-
22. 
203 See id. This argument found significant support in the common law. See Dolph v. 
Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 28 F. 553 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886); Skrainka v. Scharringhuasen, 
8 Mo. App. 522 (1880); Kellog v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123 (Wise. 1851). 
204 See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 312-27 (rejecting argument that the Act was 
not intended to apply to railroads); see id. at 327-42 (rejecting argument that arrangement 
in question was not "in restraint of trade" within the meaning of the Act). 
205 See, e.g., SKLAR, supra note 18 at 128-29 (concluding that the Trans-Missouri 
opinion declared all "restraints of trade" unlawful); Arthur, supra note 137, at 294-95 
(noting Peckham's rejection of a reasonableness inquiry); BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, 
supra note 22, at 23 (arguing that Peckham "framed a rule of per se illegality for cartel 
price fixing"); SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 168 (stating Justice Peckham's view that the 
Act condemned every restraint of trade without regard to reasonableness); LETWIN, supra 
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ception was for covenants ancillary to the sale of a business of the sort that 
would be valid at common law. 206 At a minimum, scholars argue, Peckham 
meant to outlaw all naked horizontal restraints, regardless whether the firms 
in question had received any special benefits from the state.207 Moreover, 
scholars sympathetic to the Populist approach contend that such a construc-
tion was driven, at least in part, by Justice Peckham's concern, expressed in 
obiter dicta, about the fate of "small dealers and worthy men" at the hands of 
large trusts. 20s It was not "for the real prosperity of the country," Peckham 
said, that a once independent man should become "a mere servant or agent 
of a corporation ... having no voice in shaping the business policy of the 
country and bound to obey orders issued by others. "209 None of these schol-
ars, however, has attempted to reconcile this result with Justice Peckham's 
opinion in Budd, which deemed private cartels and natural monopolies be-
yond the scope of permissible regulation. 21° Closer analysis suggests a much 
narrower holding, and one consistent with Peckham's Budd dissent. 
After concluding that the Act did apply to railroads, Peckham rejected the 
argument that it was meant to outlaw only those restraints that were 
note 146, at 167-68 (same); THORELL!, supra note 145, at 456-57 (same); see also id at 
455 (concluding that identical approach taken by the dissent in lower court was "plainly 
nothing but a restatement of the old idea that price fixing is unlawful per se"); May, Anti-
trust in the Formative Era, supra note 5, at 307 (arguing that Peckham believed every 
"direct" restraint violated the Act). 
206 See LETWIN, supra note 146, at 168-69; BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, 
at 23; Arthur, supra note 137, at 294-95. 
207 See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 5, at 30; HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 3, at 293; BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 22-23; LETWIN, 
supra note 146, at 169. 
208 See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 5, at 31-32; May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, su-
pra note 5, at 304-05; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897); 
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966) (quoting Trans-Missouri 
Freight for proposition that Sherman Act was designed to protect smaller businessmen 
from industrial concentration); see also William F. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham: 
The Police Power and the Individual in a Changing World, 1980 BYU L. REV. 47, 60-61. 
209 Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 324. This language, of course, touched upon a 
question not before the Court, namely, whether a combination that aggrandized the market 
by "driving out of business" smaller firms would be deemed a "combination in restraint of 
trade" if it drove prices below the previously prevailing level. /d. at 322-24. There was, 
however, no assertion. that the railroads had employed such ta.ctics, or that their association 
had accomplished any reduction in prices. To the contrary, the United States asserted, and 
the Court assumed, that the purpose and effect of the Association was to increase prices. 
See id. at 331-39. 
210 Professor May, it should be noted, does discuss Peckham's Budd dissent. However, 
he treats the approach articulated there as consistent with Peckham's dicta in Trans-
Missouri Freight regarding small dealers and worthy men, even though that dicta would 
apparently condemn private cartels and monopolists of the sort Peckham defended in 
Budd. See May, Allfitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 5, at 303-04. 
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"unreasonable" at common law. 211 Instead, he suggested, the "plain mean-
ing" of the statute indicated that the intent was to outlaw all contracts that 
"restrained trade," regardless how reasonable. 212 He conceded, without ex-
planation, that covenants ancillary to the sale of a business might not be 
"within the letter or the spirit of the [Sherman Act.]. "213 Peckham seemed to 
suggest two possible readings of the statute: one that outlawed all contracts 
that restrained trade, and another that left ancillary restraints outside its 
scope. Both readings, of course, would doom horizontal price fixing, re-
gardless whether defendants had received special benefits from the state. 
Ultimately, however, Peckham· did not rely upon either reading of the Act 
in holding that the contracts before him restrained trade. Instead, he care-
fully distinguished the activities of the Association from agreements entered 
by truly private business. Unlike private businesses, he argued, the railroads 
were "public corporations organized for public purposes, granted valuable 
franchises and privileges. "2 14 The most important such privileges, he said, 
were the right to take the property of private citizens by eminent domain, 
and the special gifts of land and money that defendants had received from 
states and municipalities. 215 Without these privileges, he said, the defendants 
could not conduct business. 216 Moreover unless the state granted similar 
privileges to others, members of the Association were immune from compe-
tition. 217 Finally, and again unlike "private" corporations, the business of 
the railroads, he emphasized "is of a public nature, closely affecting almost 
all classes in the community-the farmer, the artisan, the manufacturer and 
the trader. "218 
[There is a] difference which exists between a private and a public cor-
poration-that kind of a public corporation which, while doing business 
for remuneration, is yet so connected in interest with the public as to 
give a public character to its business-and it is seen that while, in the 
211 See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 327-28. 
212 Set id. 
213 /d. at 329. 
214 /d. at 332. 
215 See id. at 332-33 (describing privileges conferred on the railroads); cf. Cooley, 
Limits to State Control of Private Business, supra note 48, at 249-55 (concluding that, 
when state granted a business a subsidy or the power of eminent domain, it obtained the 
power to regulate the firm's prices). . . 
216 See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 335 (noting that railroads had received 
"privileges and franchises ... in order that they might transact business .... "). 
217 Cf. Thomas Cooley, State Regulation of Corporate Profits, 137 N. AM. REV. 205, 
209 (1883) (asserting that "legislative permission to build and operate a railroad is cqm-
monly a necessary prerequisite" to entry). \ 
218 Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 333; see also id. at 333-34 (citing Gibbs, v. 
Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 408 (1888), for the proposition that even partial re-
straints by public utilities contravene public policy). 
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absence of a statute prohibiting them, contracts of private individuals or 
corporations touching upon restraints of trade must be unreasonable in 
their nature to be held void, different considerations obtain in the case 
of public corporations like those of railroads where it may be that any 
restraint upon a business of that character as affecting its rates of trans-
portation must thereby be prejudicial to the public interests. 219 
47 
According to Peckham, this distinction between truly private businesses, 
on the one hand, and railroads, on the other, confirmed that Congress must 
have meant the Sherman Act to outlaw every· restraint between competing 
railroads, without investigation into the reasonableness of the resulting 
price.220 This language suggested a much narrower reading of the opinion 
than commonly advanced by antitrust scholars, and a reading that gave no 
doctrinal effect .to concerns regarding the fate of "small dealers and worthy 
men. "221 Indeed, without even mentioning the Constitution, Peckham had 
drawn a distinction between horizontal restraints by purely private busi-
nesses, which would be sustained if the resulting price was reasonable, and 
similar restraints by firms that had received state aid and conducted busi-
nesses affected with a public interest. This was exactly the distinction he ad-
vanced in his Budd dissent. 222 
Though susceptible to a narrow construction, many in the private bar 
chose to characterize the Trans-Missouri decision very broadly, using such a 
construction as a springboard for a constitutional attack on the Sherman 
Act.223 In so doing, of course, they would not have to rely simply upon 
219 /d. at 334. 
220 See id. at 335. 
221 /d. at 323 (observing that combinations might drive "small dealers and worthy men" 
out of business) (dicta). 
222 See People ex ref. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., 
dissenting) (limiting permissible state regulation of business to those who received state 
aid). 
223 See, e.g., ALBERT STICKNEY, STATE CONTROL OF TRADE AND COMMERCE 177-78 
(New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1897) (characterizing the opinion as fundamentally in-
consistent with American and English law); WILLIAM ROYALL, THE "POOL" AND THE 
"TRUST" 45-47 (Richmond, VA, George M. West 1897) (arguing that the decision was 
overbroad and infringed on contractual liberty); P.C. Knox, The Law of Labor and Trade, 
45 AM. L. REG. & REV. 417, 434-35 (1897) (arguing that Trans-Missouri formulation 
would interfere with the constitutional freedom to make contracts in partial restraint of 
trade); William Guthrie, Constitutionality of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 11 HARV. L. REV. 
80, 80 (1897) (contending that the Trans-Missouri formulation would outlaw "[n]early 
every commercial contract"). Other authors employed similar arguments against state 
statutes with apparently broad prohibitions. See WILLIAM COLLIER, THE TRUSTS 314-16 
(1900) (arguing that prohibition of reasonable restraints by "sweeping" state statutes in-
fringed on liberty of contract); David Wilcox, Unconstitutionality of Recent Antitrust Leg-
islation, 23 FORUM 107, 107-18 (Sept. 1897) (questioning the constitutionality of New 
York legislation prohibiting all contracts that "may" restrain trade); S.C.T. Dodd, The 
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treatise writers and state decisions for the proposition that the Constitution 
protected liberty of contract. 224 In addition, there was Justice Peckham's 
opinion three weeks before Trans-Missouri in Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 225 
There the Court had unanimously voided, as violative of liberty of contract, 
a Louisiana statute that forbade citizens of the state from making contracts 
with insurance companies outside the state, unless those companies had met 
various regulatory requirements.226 The statute, Peckham said, infringed 
upon the liberty to enter a "proper" contract and did not fall within the po-
lice power. 227 
Led by William Guthrie, who had served as lead counsel for the Trans-
Missouri defendants, these critics set up a useful straw man. Ignoring the 
distinction Peckham had drawn between "private" and "public" corpora-
tions, these esteemed members of the bar construed the Trans-Missouri 
opinion to prohibit all contracts that "restrain trade," no matter "how rea-
sonable such a contract may be, how necessary for the protection of the 
property rights of the contracting parties, how beneficial to the community at 
large. "228 Under this formulation, Guthrie asserted, "the people may be ar-
bitrarily and unreasonably deprived of liberty to trade and freedom of con-
tract in the pursuit of their ordinary avocations by what were heretofore en-
tirely legitimate business methods. "229 The mere fact that an agreement 
restrained the freedom of action of the parties to it could not-as the Trans-
Missouri formulation purportedly suggested-justify its abridgment: "nearly 
every commercial contract to some extent restrains and limits trading on the 
Present Legal Status of Trusts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 157, 164-65 (1893) (arguing that, if 
given a literal construction, various state antitrust statutes would render business impossi-
ble and violate the Constitution). 
224 See supra notes 71-74, 93-96 and accompanying text (describing role of treatise 
writers and state courts in developing liberty of contract doctrine). 
225 165 u.s. 578 (1897). 
226 See id. at 593. 
227 See id. at 589 (declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to enter 
into all proper contracts in order to pursue any lawful calling); see also id. at 589~90 
(quoting Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 762 (1883) (Bradley, 
J., concurring), for the proposition that all citizens have a right to pursue a calling of th,eir 
choice). 
228 Guthrie, supra note 223, at 80; see also Knox, supra note 223, at 431-32 ("All con-
tracts, reasonable or unreasonable, upon good consideration or upon none, necessary or 
unnecessary for the interests of the parties, all alike are forbidden if they in any way or to 
any extent restrain trade or have that tendency.';); ROYALL, supra note 223, at 45-46 
(criticizing the opinion because it prohibited even the most "ordinary" business contracts); 
Dodd, supra note 223, at 165 (wondering whether Sherman Act would be interpreted to 
outlaw even reasonable, partial "restraints of trade"). 
229 Guthrie, supra note 223, at 80; see also Knox, supra note 223, at 434 ("The innocu-
ous [contract] cannot be made [invalid] without infringing liberty of contract."). 
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part of the contracting parties. "230 Other writers also argued that the Trans-
Missouri formulation proved too much: according to one, it would outlaw the 
"ordinary contract· of partnership ... which fetters a man's freedom, and 
prevents competition between the partners. "231 Another pointed out that it 
would criminalize partial restraints ancillary to the sale of a business. 232 
Ironically, Guthrie conceded that Congress had the authority to regulate 
the rates of "railroads and other quasi-public corporations or monopolies. "233 
Still, he said, the Act, as construed by the Trans-Missouri court, did not dis-
tinguish between such firms and "private trading companies," but instead 
purported to outlaw "every restraint" by every firm, no matter how reason-
able.234 Because these potential applications of the statute clearly deprived 
individuals of liberty of contract by preventing them "from entering into rea-
sonable contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to carrying 
on a legitimate business," Guthrie concluded that the Supreme Court should 
void the statute in its entirety, even in a case involving a railroad 9r other 
firm that had received a special advantage from the state. 235 
230 Guthrie, supra note 223, at 80. Indeed, according to Guthrie, this "despotic and 
arbitrary measure," was akin to socialism or even communism. See id. at 81; cf. People 
ex rei Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 680, 695 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the regulation of elevator charges was "communistic in its tendency"). 
231 STICKNEY, supra note 223, at 159; see also.ROYALL, supra note 223, at 45 ("It does 
not follow because an agreement between men may put restrictions upon some sort of traf-
fic somewhere that such agreements necessarily operate as 'restraints upon trade'. . . . It 
is not possible to have trade without restrictions of some sort upon some sort of trade. 
Trade is nothing but a vast aggregation of contracts, and contracts necessarily involve re-
strictions. The very life of a contract is that the contractor shall do nothing that is incon-
sistent with that which he agrees to do."). Similar arguments were made against state an-
titrust legislation in New York and Texas. See Wilcox, supra note 223, at ll0-11 
(arguing that, under interpretations of New York law "the most ordinary and customary 
contracts or arrangements may incidentally restrain trade or prevent competition [and thus 
be deemed unlawful]"); COLLIER, supra note 223, at 314-15 (arguing that state antitrust 
statutes were "almost always" overbroad). Similarly, other authors argued that antitrust 
regulation was constitutional so long as it only outlawed those contracts that were unen-
forceable at common law. See THOMAS C. SPELLING, A TREATISE ON TRUSTS AND 
MONOPOLIES 74-75 (Fred Rothman & Co. 1981) (1893); TIEDEMAN, supra note 93, at 245-
48. Finally, other members of the bar deemed the Sherman Act constitutional precisely 
because they read the Trans-Missouri opinion to incorporate a "rule of reason." See Ed-
ward B. Whitney, Constitutional Questions Under the Federal Anti-Trust Law, 7 YALE 
L.J. 285, 289-90 (1898); Wilcox, supra note 223, at 112, n.6 (noting that a court must 
examine an agreement for effect to determine its legality under the statute). 
232 See Knox, supra note 223, at 430. 
233 Guthrie, supra note 223, ·at 90 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)). 
234 See id. at 91. 
235 /d. Guthrie further stated; 
The test of constitutionality is not what may be legitimate as to the particular indi-
viduals or corporations before the court, but what may be done within the scope and 
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The railroads did not have to wait long to test these constitutional theories. 
Just two years later, the Court addressed a case almost identical to Trans-
Missouri: United States v. Joint Traffic Association. 236 Thirty-one railroads, 
forming "most (but not all)" of the companies engaged in rail transportation 
between Chicago and the East Coast, formed the "Joint Traffic Association," 
which had jurisdiction over the rates charged by its members over certain 
designated lines.237 The Association exercised that "jurisdiction" by dividing 
competitive traffic among members, setting rates, and punishing deviations 
from its edicts.238 
The defendants fervently pressed their liberty of contract argument. They 
conceded that the state could abridge this liberty if acting pursuant to the po-
lice power. Relying upon the work of Christopher Tiedeman, however, they 
contended that such authority did not include the ability to "abolish rights the 
exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the rights of others, or 
to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the 
public welfare. "239 The application of the Act sought by the government, 
they said, did not fall within the police power so defined, but simply redis-
tributed income from railroads to customers through price regulation. 240 
Such redistribution did not protect any "right" of the public, but instead was 
an attempt by one part of the community to obtain a benefit at the expense of 
another. 241 Outlawing the activities of the Association, then, would ensure 
that one class (consumers) was "entitled to be protected in the opportunity to 
rob another. "242 
The railroads were not, it should be emphasized, arguing for a constitu-
tional right to charge cartel prices above the "natural" level. Echoing Justice 
intention of the statute, or be asserted under its authority. If unconstitutional as to 
one, the lowliest or the richest, it is unconstitutional as to all. We must judge the law 
by what it purports to ordain as to individuals engaged in private business pursuits. 
/d. But cf Dodd, supra note 223, at 164 (arguing that "[i]t is possible that a construction 
can be put upon [state antitrust statutes] which will render them compatible with ordinary 
transactions of bargain and sale, and with the existence of partnerships, corporations, and 
other business combinations"). 
236 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
237 See id. at 505-06. 
238 See id. at 506-08. 
239 Brief for the New York Central and Hudson River R.R. Co. at 51, Joint Traffic 
Ass'n (No. 341) (quoting TIEDEMAN, supra note 93, at 4); see also id. at 47-50 (invoking 
various decisions, including Allgeyer, protecting liberty of contract); cf. Guthrie, supra 
note 223, at 81-87. 
240 See Brief for the New York Central and Hudson R.R. Co. at 51-55. 
241 See id at 52; see also Guthrie, supra note 223, at 93 ("The pretence of public policy 
[as embodied in the Court's Trans-Missouri decision] is ever the mask of the reckless 
politician competing for the unthinking vote. It is the deadly weapon of socialism and 
communism."). 
242 Brief for the New York Central and Hudson R.R. Co. at 53; see also id. at 54. 
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Peckham's opinion in Budd, they maintained that competitive conditions 
made such supra-competitive pricing impossible, and that the Association 
was needed to guarantee its members a competitive price and thus a 
"natural" rate of return. 243 Absent such collective action, they contended, 
destructive competition would drive rates below cost, and thus below the 
price that would obtain in a competitive market, giving consumers an unjust 
windfalP44 Thus, the "unjust loss" that would follow application of the 
Trims-Missouri standard was not foregone ·monopoly profits, but simply a 
normal, reasonable rate of return. 
The defendants did not rest solely upon the claim that their own conduct-
horizontal price fixing-was a constitutionally protected liberty. They also 
raised what in modem parlance is an overbreadth challenge, an assertion that 
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to others. 245 Echoing the argu-
ment that had been made by William Guthrie and others, they contended that 
the Trans-Missouri formulation was unconstitutional in that it outlawed all 
sorts of everyday contracts not hitherto thought to be unenforceable, let alone 
criminal. 246 David Willcox, Counsel for the Central Railroad ·company of 
New Jersey, repeated nearly verbatim an argument he had recently made 
against a broad construction of New York's Antitrust Act: 
243 See id. at 52 (rejecting the assertion that "'the public' is entitled to have maintained 
by law, by a prohibition of the only agreements that could prevent it, a competition which, 
however destructive to the carriers, is likely to result in affording to shippers of freight, 
rates of transportation that are less than reasonable and just"); id. at 59 ("If there were no 
legislation whatever in restraint of rates of transportation, it still would be impossible, un-
der the conditions that prevail that unreasonable rates could be exacted by the railroad 
companies."): 
244 See id. at 52-53; see also id. at 54-57 (describing financial harm to railroads and the 
public that would result from destructive competition); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 
550 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (arguing that police power did not empower State to 
force one person to use his property so as to benefit another). 
245 See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981) (sustaining 
challenge by nude dancers to prohibition of "live entertainment" because the law swept 
within its ambit constitutionally-protected expression such as "plays, concerts, musicals, 
and dances," regardless whether nudity was involved). 
246 See Brief for The Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey at 9; Brief for the Pennsylvania 
R.'R. Co. at 17-18; see also Guthrie, supra note 223, at 80 ("In view of [the Trans-
Missouri formulation], it is now the legal presumption that it was the intention of Congress 
to prohibit and render criminal every contract in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States or with foreign nations. It matters not how reasonable such a contract may 
be;' how necessary for the protection of the property rights of the contracting parties, how 
beneficial to the community at large,-all alike are prohibited."); Knox, supra note 223, at 
430 (arguing that reasonable restraints ancillary to the sale of a business were protected by 
the Due Process Clause); ROYALL, supra note 223, at 45-46 (arguing that the Trans-
Missouri decision construed the Act too broadly in prohibiting a wide range of contracts). 
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The extent to which [the Trans-Missouri formulation] limits the freedom 
and destroys the property of the individual can scarcely be exaggerated. 
For it needs no argument to show that contracts and combinations 
which are most ordinary and indispensable have the effect of restraining 
trade. As examples may be suggested all organizations of mechanics 
engaged in the same business for the purpose of limiting the number of 
persons employed in the business, or of maintaining wages; the forma-
tion of a corporation to carry on any particular line of business by those 
already engaged therein; a contract of partnership or of employment 
between two persons previously engaged in the same line of business; 
the appointment by two producers of the same person to sell their goods 
on commission; the purchase by one wholesale merchant of the product 
of two producers; the lease or purchase by a farmer, manufacturer or 
merchant of an additional farm, manufactory or shop; the withdrawal 
from business of any farmer, merchant or manufacturer; a sale of the 
good-will of a business with an agreement not to destroy its value by 
engaging in similar business; a covenant in a deed restricting the use of 
real estate. The effect of most business contracts or combinations is to 
restrain trade in some degree. 247 
Because the statute outlawed such reasonable contracts, defendants con-
cluded, it was void and should be struck down in its entirety, even if Con-
gress had the authority to outlaw the sort of agreements they had entered. 248 
The government responded at some length. Initially, the government sug-
gested that, regardless of its effect on prices, the agreement in ·question 
should be forbidden, "in order to preserve competition, and thereby, as far 
as possible, freedom of action in industrial and commercial life. "249 The 
government quickly changed course, however, contending that the mainte-
nance of competition was necessary because it would "lower the cost of pro-
duction of the commodity to the benefit of the public. "250 The agreement be-
247 Brief for The Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey at 18-19; cf. Willcox, supra note 
223, at 110-11 (emphasizing the broad sweep of the New York Act to include any agree-
ment which might restrain trade); STICKNEY, supra note 223, at 159 (arguing that, by its 
terms, Trans-Missouri formulation would outlaw ordinary contracts). 
248 See Brief for The Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey at 19-20; see also Guthrie, supra 
note 223, at 91 (arguing that the Act was unconstitutional because of its broad prohibition 
of ordinary contracts). 
249 Brief for the United States of America at 2; see also PERITZ, supra note 5, at 35 
(noting Solicitor General's purported reliance upon republican concerns for independent 
traders). 
250 Brief for the United States of America at 5; see also id. at 8 ("The interest of the 
public lies not in maintaining but in reducing rates, and to effect such reduction competi-
tion is essential."). 
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fore the Court would have the opposite effect: "The natural result of pre-
venting competition is to keep up rates. "251 
In the portion of the brief devoted to the constitutionality of the Act, the 
United States made no mention of the necessity to protect the liberty of citi-
zens or traders. Instead, in a mere two pages, the government emphasized 
that the railroads were essentially operating as public highways and per-
forming a governmental function. 252 Their facilities, therefore, were devoted 
to a public use, and thus subject to regulation under the rule of Munn. 253 
Justice Peckham again delivered the opinion of the Court. Dealing first 
with the overbreadth challenge, Peckham responded directly to the assertion 
that the Trans-Missouri standard would criminalize what he called "ordinary 
contracts and combinations" such as the formation of a partnership or a 
covenant not to compete. 254 Conceding that the Fifth Amendment placed 
limits on Congress's commerce power, Peckham asserted that the statute did 
not exceed those limits. 255 Most of the ordinary contracts and combinations 
cited by the defendants had never been deemed "in the nature of a contract in 
restraint of trade or commerce. "256 While these agreements "might restrain 
trade" in some sense, Peckham asserted that the statute had to be given "a 
reasonable construction. "257 Otherwise, "there would scarcely be an agre\!-
ment or contract among business men that could not be said to have, indi-
rectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to 
restrain it. "258 Despite any language to the contrary in Trans-Missouri, he 
explained that only "direct" restraints violated the Act, and that the sort of 
"ordinary contracts and combinations" posited by the defendants were 
251 /d. at 6; see also id. at 8 ("[F]or natural [the arrangement] substitutes arbitrary 
change. The [railroads'] protest against any change in rates is a protest against progress. 
The history of railroads shows a constant tendency toward cheaper rates. This has re-
sulted from improvements forced by competition. The interest of the public lies not in 
maintaining but in reducing rates, and to effect such reduction competition is essential."). 
252 See id. at 24. 
25 j See id. at 25. 
254 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) ("To suppose ... 
that the effect of the decision in the Trans-Missouri case is to render illegal most business 
contracts or combinations ... is to make a most violent assumption and one not called for 
or justified by the decision .... "). 
255 See id. at 571; see also id. at 572 (concluding that application of the Act did not in-
fringe defendants' liberty of contract). 
256 /d. at 567-68. 
257 /d. at 568 (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898)); cf. Dodd, 
supra note 223, at 164 (arguing that courts should construe antitrust statutes narrowly so 
as to avoid charge that they would outlaw "ordinary" business transactions); Whitney, su-
pra note 231, at 289-90 (expressing doubt that the Supreme Court would interpret the Act 
to prohibit restraints of trade which were merely ancillary to some other lawful purpose). 
258 Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568 (quoting Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 568). 
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merely "indirect. "259 Importantly, Peckham emphasized that, even if such a 
contract increased "the cost of conducting an interstate commercial busi-
ness," it did not violate the Act unless it also directly restrained trade. 260 
Confronted with the overbreadth challenge issued by the Bar and repeated by 
the defendants, Peckham construed the Act narrowly, so as not to abridge 
those "ordinary" contracts that were "necessary and indispensable. "261 
Peckham next addressed the critical question of whether the activities of 
the Freight Association were direct restraints of trade and thus fell outside 
the shelter of liberty of contract. 262 The contract before the Court, Peckham 
said, was not an ordinary one that only interfered with commerce indirectly, 
but was instead a restraint that "directly affects and of course is intended to 
affect the cost of transportation of commodities. "263 True to its intent, the 
agreement did "affect interstate commerce by destroying competition and by 
maintaining rates above what competition might produce. "264 Congress cer-
tainly had the authority "in the case of railroad corporations" to declare un-
lawful contracts or combinations which so restrained commerce "by shutting 
out the operation of the genera/law of competition. "265 The railroads' fears 
of destructive competition were overstated: the "natural, direct and immedi-
ate effect" of competition was "to lower rates, and to thereby increase de-
mand for commodities, the supplying of which increases commerce. "266 
In concluding that Congress had the authority to so regulate "in the case of 
railroad corporations," Peckham did not accept the government's invitation 
to interpret the Act broadly so as to maximize "the freedom of action in in-
dustrial and commercial life. "267 Nor did he, as many scholars have sug-
gested, rely solely upon the horizontal character of the agreement in ques:.. 
259 /d. 
260 /d. (emphasis added). 
261 See id.; see also Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (construing statute 
narrowly so as to avoid constitutional difficulties); John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & 
Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1495-97 (1997) (arguing that in the 
nineteenth century, courts routinely interpreted statutes to avoid holding them unconstitu-
tional). 
262 See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568-69. 
263 /d. at 569. 
264 /d. 
265 /d. (emphasis added). 
266 /d. at 577; see also id. at 576 ("There can be no doubt that the general tendency of 
competition among competing railroads is towards lower rates for transportation, and the 
result of lower rates is generally a greater demand for the articles so transported, and this 
demand can only be gratified by a larger supply, the furnishing of which increases com-
merce."). 
267 Brief for the United States at 2-3 (arguing that Congress outlawed monopolies and 
trusts to preserve this freedom). 
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tion. 268 Instead, picking up on the distinction he had drawn in the Trans-
Missouri decision, he (re)emphasized that, unlike ordinary private individuals 
or corporations, railroads had received special advantages from the state, 
particularly the power of eminent domain, which rendered them public fran-
chisees. 269 These advantages, he suggested, conferred upon the companies 
enhanced power over competition and thus the ability to exercise market 
power.21° In so doing, he refused the government's invitation to rely upon 
Munn. Instead, in giving the statute a "reasonable construction," he relied 
upon reasoning more reminiscent of Cooley, Tiedeman, or his own dissent in 
Budd. The agreements were "direct restraints" of interstate commerce, and 
thus subject to regulation under the Act, precisely because they fell outside 
the "liberty of contract" protected under the classical paradigm. 
We do not think, when the grantees of this public franchise are com-
peting railroads seeking the business of transportation of men and goods 
from one State to another, that ordinary freedom of contract in the use 
of and management of their property requires the right to combine as 
one consolidated and powerful association for the purpose of stifling 
competition among themselves, and of thus keeping their rates and 
charges higher than they might otherwise be under the laws of competi-
tion. And this is so, even though the rates provided for in the agree-
ment may for the time be not more than are reasonable. They may eas-
ily and at any time be increased. 271 
The ability of the railroads to set prices higher than those that would ob-
tain under "the laws of competition," an ability derived from special advan-
tages conferred by the State, distinguished the contracts before the Court 
268 See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 30; BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 23-
24; SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 169; LETWIN, supra note 146, at 179-81. 
269 See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 569-70 (describing extent and necessity of government 
involvement in establishing railroads). 
270 See id. at 570-71. Although he did not say so explicitly, Peckham presumably be-
lieved that, without such a state grant of eminent domain power, a firm could not enter the 
railroad business. See Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 16, at 46-47 (noting that 
franchises granted defendants in Joint Traffic "effectively precluded new entry"); Cooley, 
State Regulation of Corporate Profits, supra note 217, at 210 (noting that legislative per-
mission was a prerequisite to railroad construction and operation). 
271 Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 570-71 (emphases added); see also id. at 570 ("Where the 
grantees of this public franchise are competing railroad companies for interstate com-
merce, we think Congress is competent. to forbid any agreement or combination among 
them by means of which competition is smothered."); cf. Cooley, State Regulation of Cor-
porate Profits, supra note 217, at 209-11 (arguing that special privileges received by rail-
roads rende~ed them subject to price regulation); Cooley, Limits to State Control of Pri-
vate Business, supra note 48, at 249-55 (same); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL CouRT 143-44 (1998) (contending that, during the late nineteenth century, the 
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence was infused with concepts developed in the lib-
erty of contract context). 
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from those indirect restraints that would find shelter in "ordinary freedom of 
contract." While liberty of contract did place limits on Congress's authority 
to regulate commerce, those limits had not been passed in this case.272 
On the very same day, the Court released another decision-not often dis-
cussed by antitrust scholars-that shed even more light on the Court's think-
ing regarding the interrelation between liberty of contract doctrine and the 
Sherman Act: Hopkins v. United States. 273 The United States challenged 
bylaws of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange which prevented its mem-
bers from sending telegrams to cattle farmers in other states, and limited the · 
numbers and salaries of agents that could be employed to solicit consignment 
sales from those farmers. 274 Similar limits on freedom of action imposed by 
the State, the United States argued, would infringe liberty of contract. 275 By 
parity of reasoning, the government contended, the bylaws, though creatures 
of contract, deprived members of their liberty to conduct business as they 
saw fit, burdened the flow of cattle from state to state, and thus were direct 
restraints of interstate commerce in violation of the Act. 276 
272 See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 571. It should be noted that other scholars have of-
fered differing interpretations of the holding in Joint Traffic. Professor Hovenkamp, for 
instance, argues that Peckham concluded that the terms of the railroads' franchises and 
corporate charters did not "entitle them to behave anticompetitively." HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 294. Such an approach would have 
been consistent with Peckham's suggestion in Budd that the State could condition the 
privilege of incorporation upon a firm's agreement to subject itself to price regulation. 
See People ex ret Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissent-
ing) (implying that the state could condition such privileges upon agreement to regulation); 
see also Cooley, State Regulation of Corporate Profits, supra note 217, at 210-12 
(recognizing that state could regulate railroads because state involvement was a prerequi-
site to their establishment). However, nowhere in the Joint Traffic opinion does Peckham 
quote or refer to the charters in question, or otherwise suggest that the application of the 
Sherman Act depended upon the terms of state corporate charters. Cf Northern Sees. Co. 
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332-33 (1904) (state cannot immunize merger from Sher-
man Act scrutiny). Professor Page, on the other hand, contends that Peckham adopted a 
"liberty from contract" approach. See Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 16, at 47 
("The coercive elements of the restraints themselves inhibited liberty of contract and the 
application of the statute preserved it."). As shown herein, however, Peckham rejected 
such an approach in Addyston Pipe and Hopkins. 
273 171 U.S. 578 (1898). 
274 See id. at 578. 
275 See Brief for the United States of America at 128-29, Hopkins, 171 U.S. 578 
(1898). 
276 See id. at 132, 180-89; see also id. at 190 ("It is the right and privilege of any man 
to engage in the commission business at the Kansas City stock yards, or, having engaged 
in that business, it is his right to continue. A combination whose efforts are directed to 
prevent him from transacting such business is one which the law will not tolerate.") (citing 
The Slaughterhouse Cases; 83 U.S. 36 (1873)). 
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The Court, per Justice Peckham, disagreed, rejecting this "liberty from 
contract" approach to interpreting and justifying the Sherman Act. Peckham 
acknowledged that statutes that prevented the transmission of telegrams be-
tween states or placed limits on the number of solicitors a member could em-
ploy may well violate liberty of contract and impermissibly restrain interstate 
commerce. 277 Nonetheless, contracts faCially identical to such statutes did 
not necessarily restrain the "liberty" of the parties to them, even if they 
"greatly restrained and limited" the freedom of action of parties. 278 While a 
citizen possessed the "right" to send telegrams or employ solicitors, he also 
had the right "for what he thinks good reason [to] contract to curtail that 
right. "279 So long as "voluntary" such an agreement found shelter in liberty 
of contract, even if it "greatly restrained" the contracting parties' freedom of 
action with respect to interstate commercial activity. 280 Only contracts that 
had the effect of directly restraining such commerce, he said, fell outside lib-
erty of contract and offended the Act. 281 Those before the Court were 
merely indirect. 282 As in Joint Traffic, then, the definition of direct restraint 
was derived from the scope of liberty implied by the classical paradigm. 283 
277 See Hopkins, 171 U.S. (It 602-03. 
278 /d. at 603 (emphasis added). Justice Peckham further remarked: 
We say nothing against the constitutional right of each one of the defendants and 
each person doing business at the Kansas City stock yards to send into distant States 
and Territories as many solicitors as the business of each will warrant. This original 
right is not denied or questioned. But cannot the citizen, for what he thinks good rea-
son, contract to curtail that right? To say that a State would not have the right to 
prohibit a defehdant from employing as many solicitors as he might choose, proves 
nothing in regard to the right of individuals to 'agree upon that subject in a way which 
they may think the most conducive to their own interests. What a State may do is one 
thing, and what parties may contract voluntarily among themselves is quite another 
thing. 
The liberty of contract, as referred to in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, is 
the liberty of the individual to be free, under certain circumstances, from the restraint 
of legislative control with regard to all his contracts, but the case has no reference to 
the right of individuals to sometimes enter into those voluntary contracts by which 
their rights and duties may properly be measured and defined and in many cases 
greatly restrained and limited. 
/d. at 602-03; see also id. at 599 ("The [hypothetical] statute might be illegal as an im-
proper attempt to interfere with the liberty of transacting legitimate business enjoyed by 
the citizen, while the agreement among business men for the better conduct of their own 
business, as they think is protected ... There is no similarity between the two cases, and 
the principle existing in the one is wholly absent in the other. The private agreement does 
not, as we have said, regulate commerce or impose any impediment or tax upon it."). 
279 /d. at 603 (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). 
280 See id. 
281 See id. 
282 See id. at 590-604. 
283 Indeed, in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), the Supreme Court 
unanimously suggested that the outcome in Hopkins would have been different if "the 
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Thus, by 1898, the reach of the Sherman Act was far narrower than most 
have supposed, reflecting as it did, the influence of the classical paradigm 
and liberty of contract. In Dueber Watch-Case, the Second Circuit read the 
Act only to prohibit the sort of illegitimate methods of competition that 
would lead to prices above the competitive norm, regardless of their re-
straining effect. 284 A stout devotee of liberty of contract, Justice Peckham 
had written the Trans-Missouri Freight opinion quite narrowly, justifying ap-
plication of the Sherman Act in a manner consistent with the classical para-
digm. 285 Responding to the overbreadth challenge in Joint Traffic, he had 
made it clear that the Act would not prevent so-called "indirect" restraints of 
interstate commerce.286 The line between "direct" and "indirect" restraints 
was derived from the distinction between ordinary contracts, on the one 
hand, which found shelter within liberty of contract, and other agreements, 
on the other. 287 Contracts might be indirect, it should be emphasized, even 
if they increased the "cost of conducting an interstate commercial busi-
ness. "288 Moreover, while Peckham made it clear that Congress had the 
authority to prevent horizontal restraints by firms that received special state 
aid, he had left open the question whether, in fact, horizontal price fixing by 
businesses that had received no such aid-seemingly a "direct restraint" in 
common parlance-was protected by "ordinary freedom of contract. "289 Not 
only had Justice Peckham refused the government's invitation to rely upon 
Munn, but he had drafted the opinion in a way that called the continuing va-
lidity of that decision into question. 
Finally, in Hopkins Justice Peckham had confirmed the Second Circuit 
holding in Dueber Watch-Case and what was implicit in Joint Traffic: the 
mere fact that a contract restrained the "liberty" of private parties did not 
thereby render it a direct restraint beyond constitutional protection. 290 While 
contracts might appear to have the same restraining effect as statutes, they 
combination had resulted in exorbitant charges" for beef. /d. at 394; see also Stafford v. 
Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 524-25 (1922), quoted in CUSHMAN, supra note 271, at 145-46 
("If the result of the combination of commission men in the Hopkins Case had been to im-
pose exorbitant charges on the passage of the live stock through the stockyards from one 
State to another, the case would have been different .... The effect on interstate com-
merce in such a case would have been direct."); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 271, at 
144-48 (concluding that conduct imposing supra-competitive prices on interstate commerce 
was deemed a "direct" restraint on such commerce during this period). 
284 See Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 66 F. 637, 
646 (2d Cir. 1895). 
285 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 332-35 (1897). 
286 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898). 
287 See id. at 568-72. 
288 /d. at 568. 
289 See id. at 569-71. 
290 See Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 603 (1898). 
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were fundamentally different when entered "voluntarily. "291 Contracts were 
"voluntary" so long as they did not have the effect of directly restraining 
trade. Some justification beyond "liberty from contract" was needed before 
a contract lost constitutional protection. 
2. Addyston Pipe 
Just one year later, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,292 the 
Court faced the question it had left open in Joint Traffic: whether the Due 
Process Clause deprived Congress of the authority to prohibit horizontal 
price fixing by firms that were not protected by state-created barriers to en-
try.293 In Addyston Pipe, the United States challenged a naked cartel of cast 
iron pipe producers who regularly rigged bids for, among other things, pipe 
used in municipal water projects in numerous states. Reversing the district 
court's dismissal of the action, the Sixth Circuit, in im opinion by William 
Howard Taft, suggested that the Act outlawed all horizontal price fixing 
contracts, even those that set reasonable prices. 294 At any rate, he said, evi-
dence submitted at trial indicated that the prices fixed by the cartel in ques-
tion were well above the cost of producing the pipe plus a reasonable rate of 
return and thus were not reasonabie.295 
In the Supreme Court, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the applica-
tion of the Act sought by the government was unconstitutional, relying upon 
two interrelated arguments suggested by Hopkins and Joint Traffic. First, 
they claimed that the Commerce Clause did not confer on Congress the 
authority to regulate purely private contracts, but instead merely empowered 
Congress to preempt state statutes that interfered with liberty of contract and 
thus obstructed such con;tmerce.2% Unlike statutes that Congress could pre-
empt, defendants argued, purely private contracts could not be characterized 
as "regulations of commerce. "297 In so doing, the defendants relied upon 
291 See id. 
292 175 u.s. 211 (1899). 
293 See id. at 226-27. 
294 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898). Judge Taft stated: 
We can have no doubt that the association of the defendants, however reasonable the 
prices they fixed, however great the competition they had to encounter ... was v'oid 
at common law, because in restraint of trade, and tending to create a monopoly. But 
the facts of this case do not require us to go so far as this, for they show that the at-
tempted justification of this association on the grounds stated is without foundation. 
/d. at 291. 
295 See id. 
296 See Brief and Argument for Appellants at 48, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (No. 269). 
297 See id. at 47-48 ("It is substantially a different thing whether a state prohibits a per-
son from making a contract or whether the person by his own contract restrains himself. 
In the one case there is prohibited the freedom of contract, and if the subject matter is in-
terstate commerce the legislation is avoided by the commerce clause of the constitution; in . 
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Hopkins, and the distinction it recognized between contractual restraints on 
liberty and those imposed by statute.298 
Second, the defendants argued that, even if the Commerce Clause author-
ized Congress to regulate private contracts, that authority could not be em-
ployed to abridge the sort of contracts they had entered, in light of the prin-
ciple of liberty of contract articulated in Allgeyer and similar cases. 299 While 
acknowledging Joint Traffic's holding that Congress had the authority to 
regulate price fixing agreements by certain firms, defendants contended that 
such authority did not extend to agreements, such as their own, by purely 
private businesses to set reasonable prices. 3oo 
The result is that the anti-trust act should be construed as not intended 
to include private contracts. True, the act was held to be constitutional 
in the Joint Traffic case. But the contract in that case was between 
quasi-public agencies concerning quasi-public property which was ac-
quired and held and used to transport interstate commerce .... The 
reason for the anti-trust act is to be found in the need for constant 
regulation of the great public instruments of commerce among the 
states, but there is no need for the act to regulate purely private con-
tracts; and to construe it as designed for that purpose is to ascribe to 
congress an intent to invade the citizen's freedom of contract. ... 301 
Unable to. rely on any claims that the defendants were public franchisees, 
the government directly confronted the assertion that liberty of contract in-
cluded the right of a purely private business to fix prices. Conceding the 
existence of the freedom to trade, the government argued that the interpreta-
tion of the Act it sought did not abridge liberty but, in fact, enhanced it. 302 
Indeed, as it had done in Hopkins, the government asserted that the Act en-
hanced liberty from contract, analogizing the restraint in question to a similar 
restraint imposed by a state.303 The Constitution, the government continued, 
empowered Congress to remove restraints on commerce, whether they were 
imposed by states, or individuals; the antitrust laws were an exercise of this 
the other there is exercised the liberty of contracting, even though by the terms of the 
contract th~ right of buying or selling is in a measure restrained or regulated."). 
298 See id. at 48-50; see also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 599-600 (1898) 
(distinguishing private contractual agreements from restraints on liberty imposed by a stat-
ute). 
299 See Supplemental and Reply Brief for Appellants at 16-25. 
300 See id. at 26 (arguing that the quasi-public nature of the railroads justified regulation 
in Joint Traffic); see also id. 31, 33-37 (distinguishing the permissible regulation of com-
mon carriers from impermissible regulation of purely private parties). 
301 /d. at 26. 
302 See Brief for the United States at 50-51 ("Congress intended to preserve the freedom 
of trade and commerce among the several states."). 
303 See id. at 50-51. 
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power vis a vis private contracts, an exercise that promoted liberty. 304 Re-
gardless of the source of the restraint, it concluded, liberty was equally in-
fringed: "Congress, by the antitrust law, sought to take care of restraints put 
there by persons and corporations, through combination and conspiracy. If 
you suppress competition, you no longer have freedom, but restraint. "3°5 
The Government conceded that the Due Process Clause did protect liberty 
of contract, but, it asserted, the "liberty contended for [by the defendants], is 
the liberty to destroy liberty. "306 Indeed, the government likened the defen-
dants to those who had trumpeted the "liberty" to purchase and own slaves: 
[The defendants' argument] suggests the sacred right of self govern-
ment, contended for by Senator Douglas and described by Mr. Lincoln: 
'This sacred right of self government amounts to this, that when two 
men agree to enslave another no third man shall interfere.' So with 
[defendants'] sacred liberty of contract. It means that when six shops 
agree with one another to destroy their individual freedom of contract 
and of competition, and to put themselves in slavery to the pool, the 
[g]overnment cannot interfere. 307 
In a unanimous opinion, again by Justice Peckham, the Court rejected the 
defendants' challenge and affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. 308 
Citing Joint Traffic and Allgeyer, Peckham conceded that liberty of contract 
placed limits on Congress's power over interstate commerce.3°9 This liberty, 
however, was not absolute. Defendants were forced to concede, he said, 
that Congress could nullify those state enactments that directly restrained and 
hence regulated commerce. 310 If so, there was no reason why private liberty 
should shield contracts that produced the very same effects as an unconstitu-
tional statute. 
If certain kinds of private contracts do directly, as already stated, limit 
or restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the 
304 See id. at 50. The government argued: 
/d. 
The right to trade among the several States, without restriction or imposition, is guar-
anteed by the Constitution. This right includes, indeed is primarily based on, the 
right to sell goods for delivery from one State to another. The antitrust law was 
passed to preserve this freedom to persons and corporations and strike down all re-
straints put upon it by combinations or conspiracies. The right of persons and corpo-
rations to sell their goods in other States and to ship them there, freely and without 
restraint, is one in which not only the seller but the public is interested. 
305 /d. at 51. 
306 Points for the United States in Reply at 8. 
307 /d. 
308 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,226 (1899) (relying 
upon Judge Taft's opinion). 
309 See id. at 228-29. 
310 See id. at 229-30. 
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power of Congress reach those contracts just the same as if legislation 
of some State had enacted the provisions contained in them? The pri-
vate contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their effect upon inter-
state commerce as would the legislation of a single [s]tate of the same 
character. 311 
As a result, such an arrangement could not find shelter in liberty of contract: 
citizens did not have the liberty to impose direct restraints that had the same 
effect as those that states could not impose by statute. 312 
Having reiterated that "direct" restraints of interstate commerce were out-
side the protection of liberty of contract, Peckham next turned to provide a 
definition of "direct restraint." He quickly dismissed defendants' assertion 
that the prices produced by the restraint in question were reasonable, relying 
upon Judge Taft's conclusion that the prices charged by the association well 
exceeded the cost of production plus a reasonable return on investment. 313 In 
some cases, he noted, the pipe in question had been sold at over a 25% mark 
up.3 14 Implicitly adopting as a benchmark the "natural" price that would 
have been produced by a competitive market, he found that the defendants' 
prices were unreasonable.315 
Mere rejection of defendants' "reasonable price" defense did not make re-
straints "direct," however. And, in fact, defendants asserted that there was 
no direct restraint, because, despite any price increase, the restraint in ques-
tion had not reduced the quantity of pipe sold. 316 Responding to this asser-
tion, Peckham noted that the locations of the bidders made it difficult for 
non-members to compete in the market in question due to the costs of trans-
portation.317 Additionally, it was not simply the "volume" of trade that 
mattered, but the fact that the combination restricted the right of the mem-
bers to engage in business in the ordinary way. 318 
311 /d. 
312 See id. at 230-31. 
313 See id. at 238. 
314 See id. (emphasizing that the cost of producing and delivering pipe to Atlanta, in-
cluding a reasonable profit, was $17 or $18 per ton, while the agreement required a mini-
mum bid of $24.25). · . 
315 See id.; see also People ex rei Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) 
(Peckham, J., dissenting) (stating that "ordinary laws of trade" would produce natural 
price); cf. supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing classical belief that competi-
tive market produced "natural" price equal to cost of production plus a risk-adjusted rea-
sonable rate of return). 
316 See Brief for the Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. at 2. 
317 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. at 243. 
318 /d. at 245. According to Peckham: 
Total suppression of the trade in the commodity is not necessary in order to render 
the combination one in restraint of trade. It is the effect of the combination in limiting 
and restricting the right of each of the members to do business in the ordinary way, as 
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By invoking the "right" of firms to conduct business in the "ordinary" 
way, Peckham seemed to echo the government's claim that the contracts in 
question infringed personal liberty and thus should be deemed restraints of 
trade.3 19 On its face, this approach seems inconsistent with the Justice's ap-
proach in Budd, which involved similar restrictions on liberty. Closer in-
spection, however, suggests that Peckham gave no independent weight to 
liberty from contract in concluding that the restraints before him were 
"direct." For instance, early in the opinion, he concluded that private con-
tracts were subject to congressional regulation because they "may in truth be 
as far reaching in their effect upon interstate commerce" -not in their effect 
on personal liberty-as "state statutes of the same character. "320 Moreover, 
he later made it clear that his approach to defining "direct restraint" followed 
from Hopkins, where he held that a contract did not qualify as a "direct" re-
straint simply because it placed a "great" restraint upon the parties to it. 321 
Thus, Peckham adopted a standard for defining direct restraints that excluded 
any inquiry into an agreement's effect on individual liberty. 
While Peckham did not attempt an explicit and comprehensive definition 
of "ordinary," he did suggest that "directness" and, by implication, its oppo-
site "ordinariness," were to be defined according to the effect that the re-
straint had upon prices. The only purpose of the contracts in question, he 
had already noted, was to reduce competition between the parties: this was 
their "immediate" (not incidental) effect. 322 Thus, in determining whether 
the scheme took away the "right" to do business in the "ordinary way," 
Peckham emphasized that "[t]he question is as to the effect of such combina-
tion upon the trade in the article, and if that effect be to destroy competition 
and thus advance the price, the combination is one in restraint of trade. "323 
well as its effect upon the volume or extent of the dealing in the commodity, that is 
regarded. 
/d. at 244-45 (emphasis added). 
319 At least two scholars have explicitly argued as much. See PERITZ, supra note 
5, at 43 ("In the price fixing cases, [Peckham held that] the liberty to conduct one's 
business must be protected."); Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 16, at 47-49 
("Peckham's approach to cartel cases thus emphasized the coercive mechanisms di-
rected toward both members of the cartel and their competitors"). As argued herein, 
however, the "coercion" directed at the members in Addyston Pipe was no different 
from that directed at the cartelists in Budd. What had changed, in Peckham's mind at 
least, was the ability of the "ordinary laws of trade" -the free flow of capital-to 
counteract the effects that such coercion had upon prices. 
320 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. at 229-30 (emphasis added). 
321 See id. at 244. 
322 See id. at 243-44. 
323 /d. at 245 (emphases added). Peckham added: 
We have no doubt that where the direct and immediate effect of a contract or combi-
nation among particular dealers in a commodity is to destroy competition between 
them and others, so that the parties to the contract or combination may obtain in-
creased prices for themselves, such contract or combination amounts to a restraint of 
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As suggested in Joint Traffic and Hopkins (and, for that matter, Peckham's 
dissent in Budd), then, not all restrictions on the "liberty" of the contracting 
parties were deemed direct restraints of trade. Instead, only those contracts 
that limited the right to do business in the "ordinary" way were deemed 
"direct" restraints. Whether or not a method of doing business was 
"ordinary," in turn, depended not on the extent to which the agreement lim-
ited private freedom of action, but instead upon the effect the contract had on 
prices. Contracts that had the immediate and necessary effect of producing 
prices higher than those that would be produced by "the general law of com-
petition," were deemed direct restraints. Those that were "ordinary" had no 
effect, or only an incidental effect, on the natural price, and were deemed 
"indirect" restraints, regardless of their restraining effect on individual free-
dom of action. The effect on commerce (price)-not on "liberty"-was dis-
positive. 324 
Admittedly, the interpretation of Addyston Pipe offered here is different 
from that uniformly adopted by scholars who have considered the question. 
These scholars have all asserted that Peckham rejected any independent role 
for liberty of contract in giving meaning to the Sherman. Act, and held in-
stead that an agreement otherwise protected by liberty of contract found no 
shelter in the Due Process Clause, so long as it fell within Congress's com-
merce power.325 Thus, they conclude that Peckham abandoned his commit-
ment to liberty of contract in favor of Congress's authority over the national 
market, giving the federal government more authority to regulate purely pri-
vate contracts than possessed by individual states. 326 
trade in the commodity, even though contracts to buy such commodity at the en-
hanced price are continually being made. 
/d. at 244. 
324 Cf. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569-71 (1898) 
(characterizing restraints as direct because they led to higher prices and reduced trade). 
325 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 295 
(arguing that, under Addyston Pipe, "the Constitution's commerce clause itself defined the 
limits of liberty of contract"); SKLAR, supra note 18, at 132-33 (concluding that Peckham 
found liberty of contract limited by the Commerce Clause); Page, Ideological Conflict, 
supra note 16, at 47 (arguing that, in Addyston Pipe, "Peckham again resorted to his anal-
ogy to governmental restrictions on commerce to find the agreement illegal"); LETWIN, 
supra note 146, ·at 179-80 (concluding that Peckham employed a "constitutional criterion-
the limits of the commerce power-to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
restraints"); PERITZ, supra note 5, at 36-37 (emphasizing Justice Peckham's remarks that 
freedom of contract was limited by the commerce power; if private contracts regulated 
interstate commerce, then they were subject to regulation); Duker, supra note 208, at 62-
64; see also May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 5, at 305 (concluding that 
holding in Joint Traffic rested upon a determination that the Commerce Clause trumped 
liberty of contract). 
326 See sources collected supra note 325. 
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Ultimately, this reading of Addyston Pipe is off the mark, particularly if 
one considers the decision in light of Joint Traffic. In Joint Traffic, after all, 
the defendants had conceded that Congress had authority under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the activities of the Association, going so far as to 
claim that Congress had authorized the agreements in question under the In-
terstate Commerce Act. 327 Despite this (necessary) concession that Congress 
had the authority to regulate price fixing of rates for interstate transportation, 
Peckham nevertheless separately entertained the liberty of contract chal-
lenge.328 In so doing, he did not hold that liberty of contract was subordinate 
to the scope of the commerce power. To the contrary, he stated that liberty 
of contract did place limits on the commerce power, protecting "ordinary 
contracts and combinations" but not "direct restraints." Finally, his conclu-
sion that the activities of the Joint Traffic Association were a "direct" re-
straint, beyond the protection of liberty of contract, did not in the end depend 
upon any independent theory about the scope of the Commerce power, but 
instead upon his conclusion that "ordinary freedom of contract" did not ex-
tend to the activities of the Association. 329 This conclusion, in turn, de-
pended upon an application of the classical paradigm and a determination 
that the railroads received special benefits from the state, benefits that gave 
them power to price above the competitive level. 330 
There is no indication that Peckham meant, in Addyston Pipe, to jettison 
the approach he had taken in Joint Traffic. To the contrary, in Addyston 
Pipe, Peckham cited Joint Traffic for the proposition that the "liberty" pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause included liberty of contract.331 Further, in 
holding that "direct restraints" fell within the Commerce Clause and "thus" 
outside the scope of liberty of contract, Peckham borrowed a term-direct 
restraint-the meaning of which depended upon liberty of contract doctrine 
and the classical paradigm that informed it. Contracts were "direct" re-
straints if they were not "ordinary;" the Addyston Pipe bid-rigging scheme 
was inconsistent with the "ordinary" right of contract and thus a "direct" re-
straint because it drove prices above the natural, competitive level.332 Put 
another way, the very same factual conclusion that subjected defendants' 
scheme to regulation under the classical paradigm also produced the holding 
327 See Brief for The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. at 19-21, 29-
33. 
328 See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568-69. 
329 See id. at 570-71; see also supra notes 262-72 and accompanying text (describing 
link between liberty of contract and the definition of "direct restraint" in Joint Traffic). 
330 See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 569-72 (discussing governmental intervention· in sup-
port of railroads). 
331 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,228 (1899). 
332 See id. at 238. 
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that the scheme was a "direct restraint" and within the commerce power. 333 
In a sense, it seems, scholars have things exactly backwards: the scope of the 
commerce power did not control liberty of contract, rather, liberty of con-
tract seemed to control the scope of the commerce power. Finally, it should 
be noted that, within two years of Addyston Pipe, two state supreme courts 
relied upon that decision and Joint Traffic for the proposition that state anti-
trust statutes did not infringe liberty of contract.334 In so doing, these courts 
rejected, implicitly or explicitly, the assertion that the commerce power gave 
Congress special authority to nullify private contracts. 335 Moreover, these 
courts relied upon Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe to draw the very same line 
between permissible and impermissible state regulation of private contract 
that had been drawn under the Sherman Act. Enhancing liberty from con-
tract was not a justification for abridging private contract, only contracts that 
directly led to higher prices fell outside the protection of contractual lib-
erty. 336 The Supreme Court would soon agree: the Commerce Clause con-
ferred no authority over interstate commerce that states did not possess with 
respect to their internal commerce. 337 
By validating the regulation of purely private cartels, Peckham exposed 
himself to the charge that he abandoned the classical paradigm in favor of a 
more expansive conception of the scope of state authority. 338 Closer exami-
nation, however, suggests that the principle applied in Addyston Pipe, for in-
stance, was entirely consistent with the approach taken by the Budd dissent-
ers, as well as lower federal courts that first had occasion to interpret the 
Sherman Act. In Budd, after all, Peckham and Brewer had assumed that, 
even in the presence of horizontal price fixing, the "ordinary laws of trade," 
i.e., the propensity of capital to move quickly into markets characterized by 
333 The approach taken in Hopkins confirms the argument in the text. There, it will be 
recalled, the bylaws of the Kansas City Livestock Association were merely "indirect" re-
straints because the ·parties had a "right" to enter such voluntary agreements. Thus, it 
seems, liberty of contract, and the classical paradigm that informed it, informed the 
meaning of "direct restraint" and thus the scope of congressional authority over private 
contracts. See Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 601-02 (1898). 
334 State v. Smiley, 69 P. 199, 206 (Kan. 1902); State ex rei Crow v. Firemen's Fund 
Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595, 608-09 (Mo. 1899). 
335 See Smiley, 69 P. at 205-06 (recounting and rejecting defendant's attempt to distin-
guish Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe on these grounds). 
336 See infra notes 395-433 and accompanying text (analyzing state court responses to 
liberty of contract challenges to state antitrust statutes). 
337 See Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 410 (1905) (rejecting assertion 
that Commerce Clause conferred on Congress special authority over private contracts); see 
also Smiley, 69 P. at 206 ("The grant to Congress was not of anything different in nature 
from what the states possessed. It was a grant of the same thing; no more; only to be ex-
ercised in a different sphere."). 
338 See, e.g., SKLAR, supra note 18, at 169-70 (suggesting that decisions in Joint Traffic 
and Addyston Pipe were inconsistent with the classical paradigm). 
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supra-competitive prices, would prevent firms from pricing above the natu-
ral, competitive level, provided the state did not interfere with those laws by 
erecting barriers to entry.339 Similarly, in Dueber Watch-Case, Nelson, and 
Greene, the. courts had assumed that, absent any attempt to interfere with the 
ability of others to adopt similar tactics, the contracts at issue could not lead 
to market power. 340 The facts in Addyston Pipe, however, illustrated what 
economists were beginning to understand: that purely private cartels could 
drive prices above the competitive level without state assistance or private 
restraints on the behavior of third parties. 341 In light of these facts, Peckham 
could no longer cling to the result he had advocated so forcefully in Budd. 342 
The principle was the same, but changing times required changing applica-
tions of it. 343 Far from suffering any collapse, the classical paradigm was 
alive and well and had been read into the Act. 
339 See People ex rei. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., 
dissenting) (highlighting competitive market response to price increase); Budd v. New 
York, 143 U.S. 517, 550-51 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
340 See supra notes 148-187 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Nelson, 
52 F. 646, 647 (C.C.D. Minn. 1892) ("An agreement between a number of dealers and 
manufacturers to raise prices, unless they practically controlled the entire commodity, 
cannot operate as a restraint upon trade, nor does it tend to injuriously affect the public."). 
341 See Millon, supra note 10, at 1271-75 (detailing these developments in the econom-
ics profession in the late nineteenth century); HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 3, at 276-93. 
342 See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395, 441 (1995) ("As an institution, a court cannot resist 'reality' as it ap-
pears to ali-or what is the same thing, a court cannot resist the facts of uncontested dis-
course. Fidelity is pursued by courts subject to the constraints of an uncontested dis-
course."). By 1899, the "fact" that purely private cartels could price above the "natural" 
or competitive level had become uncontested. See Millon, supra note 10, at 1275. 
343 See Walsh, 22 N .E. at 687 (Peckham, J., dissenting) (arguing that changing condi-
tions demanded changing conceptions of the scope of state authority); Lawrence Lessig, 
Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1166-1240 (1993) (sketching "two step" 
originalist approach to interpretation under which judges may legitimately apply original 
constitutional principles in new ways in light of changing circumstances). This approach, 
it should be noted, was consistent with that taken by the Court in other economic due 
process contexts. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923) 
("[T]he line·beyond which the power of interference [with liberty of contract] may not be 
pressed is neither definite nor unalterable but may be made to move, within limits not well 
defined, with changing need and circumstance."); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE AN· 
TITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 47-48 (1914) (arguing that "changes of social and 
business conditions" should lead the Court to "qualify" rights of property and contract in 
light of the Sherman Act). 
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III. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS 
The Sherman Act was not the only regulation of trade restraints that courts 
interpreted during the formative era. Even before the Act was passed, at 
least thirteen states enacted antitrust legislation, and fourteen more would do 
so by 1900.344 Some of these statutes closely mirrored the Sherman Act, but 
others bore little resemblance.345 Indeed, while modern scholars often view 
state antitrust regulation as a backwater, it was, in some respects, more im-
portant than the Sherman Act. 346 
While federal courts were wrestling with the constitutionality of the Sher-
man Act, state supreme courts, lower federal courts, and ultimately the Su-
preme Court grappled with liberty of contract challenges to state antitrust 
regulation. Although states could not rely upon the commerce power to jus-
tify interference with private agreements, these courts reached the same ac-
commodation between antitrust regulation and liberty of contract as had the 
Second Circuit in Dueber Watch-Case and Justice Peckham in Joint Traffic, 
Hopkins, and Addyston Pipe. Thus, these courts held that contracts were 
protected from abridgment so long as they were not designed simply to pro-
duce prices above the "natural" or "ordinary" leveJ.347 Importantly, how-
ever, courts justified these results with a rationale that was different, at least 
rhetorically, from that employed in Joint Traffic, Hopkins, and Addyston 
Pipe. Whereas Peckham's opinions in these cases did not rely upon the po-
lice power in sustaining regulation, opinions scrutinizing state statutes did, in 
fact, rest their decisions upon an interpretation of the scope of this power, 
most notably, the conclusion that prices above the natural level constituted a 
"harm" that could be redressed by the State.348 
A. Federal Decisions Voiding State Statutes 
One of the earliest challenges to a state antitrust statute predated the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Trans-Missouri, Addyston Pipe, Hopkins, and 
Joint Traffic. In 1894, the State of Texas charged John D. Rockefeller and 
others with "creating a trust, by combination of their capital, skill and, 
acts . . . for the purpose, design, and effect to carry out restrictions of 
344 See HENRY SEAGER & CHARLES GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 341-
43 (1929) (outlining early state antitrust statutes). 
345 See id. 
346 See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 5, at 500-01 (noting that, 
between 1890 and 1902, twelve states brought a total of twenty-eight antitrust suits, while 
the United States Department of Justice brought nineteen); see also id. at 501-02 (showing 
that, between 1890 and 1919, states collected several times more in antitrust fines than did 
the federal government). 
347 See, e.g., infra notes 362-64, 371-77, 383-84 and accompanying text. 
348 See, e.g., infra notes 402, 411-12 and accompanying text. 
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trade," in violation of the Texas Antitrust Act of 1889.349 One Grice, anal-
leged co-conspirator in jail awaiting trial, sought a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court, alleging that the Texas Act violated, among other things, his 
liberty of contract. 350 
Writing just eight days before the Supreme Court announced Allgeyer, the 
court declared the Texas statute unconstitutional. 351 The Due Process 
Clause, it said, protected the "liberty" of the citizen to make, buy or sell 
"articles of general use," to determine the prices at which such articles were 
sold, and to make "usual and necessary" contracts for such purposes. 352 
This liberty to pursue by contract "ordinary business affairs," included the 
right of forming business relations between man and man, which included 
the right of two or more individuals to combine their capitai.353 "Neither the 
state nor the national legislature" the court said, "possesses any right to limit 
these natural privileges of contracting or conducting business. "354 
Texas could, however, prohibit "oppressive or unreasonable combina-
tions," including contracts that "infringed upon the rights of others" or 
threatened the "public welfare and general security. "355 Anticipating the 
overbreadth argument deployed by the corporate bar after Trans-Missouri, 
the court held that statutes regulating such conduct would be unconstitutional 
if they "extend[ed] beyond the threatened evil, and prohibit[ed] that which 
349 In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 628 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1897) (recounting allegations), rev'd 
sub nom. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898). 
350 See id. at 639. The petitioner also alleged that the Act denied him equal protection 
of the laws, because it exempted from its operation several industries in the state, includ-
ing agriculture. See generally May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 5, at 
521-34 (discussing fate of equal protection challenge to state antitrust laws during the for-
mative era). 
35I See Grice, 79 F. at 644-45. 
352 See id. at 640. According to the court, the Due Process Clause protected the right 
to: 
raise, produce, and manufacture articles of general use; buy and sell; to fix and limit 
the amount of any article which he will produce or manufacture; to increase or reduce 
the amount so produced or manufactured at his own will, within the limits of his abil-
ity; to fix and limit the price at which he will buy and sell; to bargain and agree with 
others upon prices, so far as it may be necessary in the business of buying and sell-
ing; in fact, to do anything and enter into all contracts usual and necessary in the or-
dinary avocations of production, manufacture, and trade. 
ld; see also id. ("All of the rights of contract which are necessary for the carrying on of 
ordinary business affairs are protected by the [c]onstitution, and are not capable of being 
restrained by legislative action."). 
353 See id. at 641 (citing TIEDEMAN, supra note 93, at 233). 
354 /d. at 640. 
355 /d. at 640-41. 
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involves no threatened danger to the public. "356 "Ordinary," or "usual" 
contracts, the court implied, could not threaten such danger. 357 
According to the court, the Texas Act was overbroad because it prohibited 
any combination between two businessmen which eliminated competition 
between them. 358 Again anticipating the bar's attack on the Trans-Missouri 
formulation, the court emphasized that, as written, the Texas statute would 
criminalize the "ordinary business partnership" and necessarily deprive the 
partners of their freedom to price separately. 359 The right to form and 
maintain such arrangements, however, was an essential part of liberty: 
The right to combine, to form partnerships and joint-stock associations; 
the right to agree as to prices and productions; the right to fix prices, to 
356 /d. at 641; cf. supra note 223 and accompanying text (detailing overbreadth chal-
lenge to the Trans-Missouri formulation). 
357 See Grice, 79 F. at 640-41 (detailing the constitutiomil right to freedom of contract 
and limiting restriction of this right to situations where the contract threatened public wel-
fare, infringed on the rights of others, or produced unreasonable combinations). 
358 See id. at 641-44 (arguing that the statute could not be limited to oppressive combi-
nations and thus applied, on its face, to all ordinary business contracts). The court was 
apparently referring to the language in the statute that forbade any "combination of capital 
or skill by two or more persons . . . to prevent competition in manufacture, making, 
transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or commodities." /d. at 637. 
359 See id. at 642-43; cf. STICKNEY, supra note 223, at 153-54 (arguing that state could 
only ban unreasonable combinations); ROYALL, supra note 223, at 28-29, 45-47; Wilcox, 
supra note 223, at 110-11 (asserting that New York antitrust legislation was unconstitu-
tional because it prohibited ordinary business contracts); Dodd, supra note 223, at 163-65 
(arguing that various state statutes, including the Texas Act, were unconstitutionally over-
broad). Dodd, it should be noted, represented Grice, at least on appeal. See Grice, 169 
U.S. at 290. The court explained in excruciating detail how the creation and maintenance 
of a partnership would violate the plain language of the statute: 
We will assume that A. and B. agree to combine their capital, skill, and acts, or, in 
other words, enter into partnership, for the purpose of manufacturing and dealing in 
certain commodities. They must first necessarily determine the extent of their pro-
duction, and the price at which they can sell their commodities. Having determined 
as near as possible the costs of their manufactured products, and the minimum profit 
necessary to justify the carrying on of the business, they agree that they will not sell 
their commodities below this common standard figure. They fix a figure on which 
they commence their sales, agreeing to graduate the price up or down as the cost of 
production may vary. Finding, after a time, their prices too high, and that competi-
tors are underselling their commodities, they lower their prices, and this they may do 
solely for the purpose of holding their market against competitors. There may be, 
after a time, an increase in wages, and they agree to increase their prices. There 
comes an era of hard times. Their stock accumulates and is unsalable, and they agree 
to limit or reduce the production of their commodities. All this they must be able to 
do, or they cannot carry on their business as partners, yet every one of these agree-
ments, arrangements, undertakings, or acts are made criminal by this act. It is abso-
lutely impossible to carry on a partnership business without violating it. 
Grice, 79 F. at 642-43. 
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raise and lower them as business men may require,-is not oppressive 
to the public, nor unjust to the individual, nor contrary to public policy. 
It is an essential right, as part of the liberty of the citizen, of which no 
legislature can deprive him. 360 
71 
Because it outlawed these ordinary arrangements, the court concluded, the 
statute was void.361 
The court did not hold that the formation of a partnership or corporation 
was ipso facto immune from regulation. Some such combinations were op-
pressive and unreasonable and thus subject to regulation. 362 Any arrange-
ment that either did not increase prices or had the effect of reducing them, 
however, was constitutionally protected. The vice of the Texas Act was that 
it did not distinguish between contracts that increased prices, and those that 
did not. 
[The Act] not only prevents persons from using their capital, skill, and 
acts for the purpose of increasing prices; it reaches the very acme of ab-
surdity, in preventing persons from uniting their capital, skill, and acts 
for the purpose of reducing prices. 363 
As in Joint Traffic, Hopkins, and Addyston Pipe, then, antitrust regulation 
was constitutional only to the extent that it prevented contracts that directly 
increased prices. 364 Though the Supreme Court would reverse the decision, 
it did so only on the grounds that the court should have abstained from issu-
ing the writ as the state courts had not yet passed on the constitutional ques-
tion. 365 
360 Grice, 79 F. at 643. 
361 See id. at 650. 
362 See id. at 641 ("Combinations are beneficial as well as injurious, according to the 
motives and aims with which they. are formed. It is therefore impossible to prohibit all 
combinations. The prohibition must rest upon the objectionable character of the object of 
the combination.'') (quoting TIEDEMAN, supra note 93, at 244). 
363 !d. at 645 (emphasis added); see also id. at 644-45 ("[The Act] not only prevents 
competitors from oppressing the public by unreasonable agreements as to production and 
prices; it also prevents persons associated in interest, joint owners and co-partners, from 
making any agreement about their production and prices."). 
364 But cf WALTER CHADWICK NOYES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTRACORPORATE 
RELATIONS § 420, at 796 n.2 (2d ed. 1909) ("[I]n view of later decisions of the Supreme 
Court this decision cannot be regarded as of authority."). As shown earlier, however, the 
"later decisions" were not, in fact, inconsistent with Grice. 
365 Grice, 169 U.S. at 294 ("We come to this decision irrespective of the question of 
the validity of the state statute and without passing. upon the same or expressing any opin-
ion in regard thereto."). The state courts soon did pass on the question, sustaining the 
statute against constitutional attack, without mentioning or addressing the overbreadth ar-
gument suggested in Grice. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 44 S.W. 936, 940-43 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1898). In so doing, the court relied upon Section 96 of the treatise of 
Christopher Tiedeman for the proposition that the state could exercise its police power to 
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A similar but more succinct approach was adopted in two decisions post-
dating the Joint. Traffic-Hopkins-Addyston Pipe trilogy. In Niagra Fire In-
surance Co. v. Cornel/, 366 the court addressed the constitutionality of two 
Nebraska antitrust statutes. 367 One, aimed solely at fire insurance compa-
nies, prohibited agreements by such firms relating to (1) the rates charged 
for fire insurance, (2) the commissions to be charged by agents to their com-
panies and (3) the manner of transacting the business of fire insurance. 368 A 
second statute was aimed ·at all businesses, and was similar to the Texas stat-
ute voided in In re Grice.369 
Several fire insurance companies who (1) employed a common actuary to 
set premiums and (2) agreed upon the commissions to be paid their agents, 
sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. 370 The court 
voided both statutes. "[I]n its general scope," it said, the statute relating to 
fire insurance violated the defendants' liberty of contract. 371 The court con-
ceded that the State likely had the authority to outlaw agreements that raised 
prices. However, the Act also prohibited agreements that reduced rates, 
agreements the court thought protected by liberty of contract. 372 Similarly, 
the provisions of the Act voiding agreements on agent commissions and on 
"the manner of transacting business" were broader than necessary to prevent 
any harm to the public and thus could not fall within the police power. 373 
Harm to the public, in turn, was defined as an increase in insurance premi-
ums: 
Possibly that phase of the law [preventing horizontal price fixing] is 
valid. But it is beyond my comprehension how the legislature can in-
hibit the making of contracts as to the amounts to be paid agents for se-
curing insurance. The amount paid agents does not increase the cost to 
forbid combination in restraint of trade. See id. at 941; see also TIEDEMAN, supra note 
93, § 96, at 245 ("[C]ombinations are beneficial, as well as injurious, according to the 
motives and aims with which they are formed. It is, therefore, impossible to prohibit all 
combinations. The prohibition must rest upon the objectionable character of the object of 
the combination."). The Supreme Court affirmed, without mentioning any liberty of con-
tract challenge. See 177 U.S. 28 (1900). 
366 110 F. 816 (C.C.D. Neb. 1901). 
367 See id. 
368 See id. at 821. 
369 See id. at 818 (referring to the statute providing for the suppression of trusts). 
370 See id. at 818-'19. 
371 !d. at 821. 
372 See id. ("It is possible that the legislature can prohibit an agreement fixing the pre-
miums to be charged; and yet it is difficult to believe that if, by such agreement, the rates 
were less than otherwise would be charged, such agreement would be unlawful, and yet 
such an agreement to lower the rates becomes unlawful if that statute is valid.") (emphasis 
added). 
373 See id. at 822. 
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the insured. The cost to the insured is controlled by too many other 
factors. . . . How is such a provision the exercise of the police 
power?374 
73 
These contracts certainly infringed on the "liberty" of the parties involved. 
Still, they were beyond the State's authority because they did not lead to 
higher prices. 
The other, more general statute, was also inconsistent with the Constitu-
. tion. Echoing the opinion in Grice, the court noted that, under the plain 
· terms of the statute, which prohibited any agreement to fix prices, "two men 
in the same line of business in the same town or village cannot form a part-
nership if it tends to maintain prices .... Neither can a stock company nor a 
corporation be formed by two or more if, by so doing, the price is main-
tained. "375 Such a statute, the court concluded, was "a long stride,-
hundreds of years,-backward, when monarchs, cabinet officers, and even 
parliament decreed the price to be paid for a day's labor, and the cost of all 
the necessaries of life, even to the loaf of bread. "376 As Justice Peckham had 
suggested in Joint Traffic, the mere fact that a contract, e.g., a partnership 
agreement, had the indirect effect of raising prices did not, ipso facto, place 
it outside the protection of liberty of contract. 377 
Two years later, a similar challenge was lodged to an Iowa statute nearly 
identical to the one voided in Niagra. Again, insurance companies who em-
ployed a common actuary for the purpose of determining rates and agreed on 
agent commissions sought a declaration that the statute abridged liberty of 
contract and was thus void. 378 Echoing the liberty from contract argument 
advanced by the United States in Hopkins and Addyston Pipe, Iowa claimed 
that the Act actually enhanced liberty, by preventing the companies from 
entering contracts "whereby their rights to enter into lawful contracts with 
those desiring fire insurance is [sic] abridged and restrained. "379 
Sitting now in Iowa, the same judge that had issued the decision in Niagra 
voided the Iowa statute. 380 Explicitly refusing to consider the section of the 
statute aimed at the horizontal fixing of premiums, the court focused instead 
on the prohibition of the use of a common actuary and the fixing of commis-
sions for agents.38I Both practices, it said, were necessary to the very con-
374 !d. (emphasis added). 
375 !d. at 824. 
376 !d. 
377 Cf. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (noting that a 
restraint might be deemed "indirect" even if it incidentally led to higher prices). 
378 See Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 125 F. 121, 122 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1903), rev'd, 
199 u.s. 401 (1905). 
379 M. at 128 (quoting brief of the Iowa Attorney General). 
380 See id. at 130. 
381 See id. at 127. 
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duct of the business of insurance.382 Unmoved by the State's claim that the 
statute enhanced liberty, the court held that the State had improperly de-
prived the companies of their right to "make the usual contracts that all other 
persons and corporations may make. "383 Naked agreements on premiums 
were not "usual" and thus not subject to protection. 384 As Justice Peckham 
had done in Addyston Pipe, the court rejected a liberty-based justification for 
abridging liberty of contract, instead distinguishing protected from unpro-
tected contracts on the basis of direct or immediate price effects. 
Iowa petitioned the Supreme Court, repeating its argument that regulation 
of horizontal restraints was necessary to enhance the liberty of traders by 
outlawing restrictions on the ability to contract. 385 In so doing, however, it 
repeatedly emphasized that the contracts in question also had the effect of in-
creasing the price consumers paid for insurance. 386 In response, the insur-
ance companies echoed the lower court's assertion that, as written, the stat-
ute was overbroad, prohibiting agreements as to agents' commissions, the 
use of a common actuary, and the use of a common adjuster. 387 
The Supreme Court reversed, but without questioning the lower court's 
conclusion that "usual" contracts-agreements that do not directly lead to 
higher prices-were protected by the Due Process Clause. Writing for eight 
382 See id. at 128 ("In short, the business cannot be carried on for a day without making 
contracts, not alone with the insured, but with other companies, and with persons em-
ployed by other companies."). 
383 /d. at 130. 
384 See id. ("Of course, I do not hold that insurance companies can combine, and 
thereby enter into a conspiracy to accomplish any desired purpose. But no such question 
is involved in this case. I am only holding that insurance companies may make the usual 
contracts."). 
385 See Brief for the State of Iowa at 23, Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 
(1905) (No. 5) (arguing that the statute was intended to protect the liberty of insurance 
companies); see also id. at 24 ("If the Iowa statute goes no· further than to prevent such 
corporations from entering into an agreement whereby their liberty to contract with citi-
zens of the state is restricted or abridged, the legislature has not exceeded its constitutional 
power, and the statute is valid."). 
386 See id. at 23 ("The purpose of the statute is ... to prevent fire insurance companies 
doing business therein from entering into a contract or combination whereby the right of 
such companies to enter into lawful contracts with those desiring fire insurance would be 
restricted and abridged, and whereby competition would be prevented and the cost of fire 
insurance increased within the state.") (emphasis added); see also id. ("It may be fairly 
assumed that an evil existed which was sought to be remedied by the enactment of the 
Iowa statute, and that the evil was the combination of fire insurance companies in the state 
for the purpose of increasing the cost of insurance."); id. at 24 (describing defendants as 
"an illegal combination to increase the cost of fire insurance"); id. at 42 (arguing that the 
effect of the combination "would be to compel the people of Iowa to pay an unreasonable 
cost for fire insurance"). 
387 See Appellees' Brief at 60-63. 
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members of the Court, Justice Holmes first turned to that section of the stat-
ute forbidding agreements on premiums. 388 The Court's precedents, he said, 
established that statutes forbidding combinations "between rivals in trade 
may be constitutional. .. [w]hatever may be thought of the policy of such 
attempts. "389 Construing the State's argument as a concession that the statute 
did not prevent the mere use of a common actuary or an agreement on agent 
commissions, Holmes claimed that the companies' argument to the contrary 
rested upon an "exaggerated" view of the scope of the statute. 390 The statute 
did not, Holmes said, prohibit an arrangement whereby the firms would 
"obtain and use each other's experience, or [] employ the same person to 
work up the results. "391 Ignoring the section of the Act that explicitly pre-
vented agreements on commissions, 392 Holmes claimed that the statute was 
designed only "to keep up competition" in the setting of premiums and thus 
was constitutionai.393 In a brief concurrence, Justice Harlan agreed, con-
cluding -that the State had an interest in making sure that insurance companies 
and customers bargained on terms of relative equality. 394 
Although he reversed the lower court, Holmes had not suggested that 
States could prohibit contracts simply because of their restraining effect. In-
deed, in his bid to narrow the statute so as to reach only horizontal conspira-
cies likely to increase prices, he misread the State's argument and disre-
garded one section of the statute. As in Addyston Pipe and Joint Traffic, 
then, the Supreme Court confined the permissible scope of antitrust regula-
tion, approving only regulation of those contracts that directly led to higher 
prices. 
B. Decisions Originating in State Courts 
Unlike the lower federal courts, state courts did not go out of their way to 
void antitrust legislation passed by their legislatures. Refusing to consider 
the sort of overbreadth challenges mounted in Grice, Niagra and Greenwich, 
these courts sustained antitrust statutes as applied to naked horizontal re-
straints in the face of liberty of contract challenges. Like Peckham's deci-
sion in Addyston Pipe, the outcomes of these decisions were inconsistent with 
the outcomes suggested by traditional articulations of the classical paradigm. 
Also like Addyston Pipe, however, these decisions were consistent with the 
principle underlying the classical paradigm, namely, that the state could 
abridge liberty of contract for the purpose of regulating prices above the 
competitive level. 
388 See Carroll, 199 U.S. at 407-09. 
389 /d. at 409. 
390 See id. at 411. 
391 /d. 
392 See id. at 411-13. 
393 /d. at 412. 
394 See id. at 414 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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In State ex rei. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co., 395 for instance, 
several fire insurance companies created a "social club" through which they 
monitored each other's rates, and were charged with violating Missouri's an-
titrust statute, which outlawed the formation of any "pool, trust, [or] agree-
ment . . . to regulate or fix the price or premium to be paid for insuring 
property against loss or damage. "396 The Supreme Court of Missouri found 
that the defendants had, in fact, formed a "trust" within the meaning of the 
statute, which it defined as "a contract, combination, confederation, or un-
derstanding, express or implied, between two or more persons, to control the 
price of a commodity or service for the benefit of the parties thereto, and to 
the injury of the public. "397 
Defendants argued that, even if they had formed such a "trust," the statute 
was unconstitutionally overbroad. Like the courts in Grice, Niagra, and 
Greenwich, which had construed the applicable statutes to outlaw "price fix-
ing" by partners, the defendants claimed that the Missouri statute abridged 
their liberty of contract by preventing a company's agents from agreeing 
among themselves as to rates. 398 The court rejected this argument, holding 
that it was premised upon "a total misapprehension of the Act" which, it 
said, merely prevented two or more independent competitors from agreeing 
with each other about the terms under which they would do business with the 
public.399 Such a prohibition, the court continued, did not violate the defen-
dants' liberty of contract. That liberty, it maintained, consisted simply of the 
right of a seller to bargain with a buyer over the terms of sale; liberty which 
the statute actually enhanced.400 As the court put it: "[the statute] protects 
the company against the temptations of a trust or monopoly by refusing to 
permit it to strip itself of the power to freely contract. "401 Freedom of con-
tract, the court held, could not justify the negotiation of an agreement that 
abridged another's freedom, here the freedom of a company to negotiate with 
third party customers. Moreover, unlike Addyston Pipe, Joint Traffic, and 
Hopkins, which had not relied upon the police power, the court concluded 
that such regulation was "the corner stone of the police power. "402 
395 52 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1899). 
396 /d. at 603. 
397 /d. at 607 (emphasis added). 
398 See id. at 608 (quoting defendants' brief for the proposition that "[the Act] renders it 
unlawful for defendants to contract or agree among themselves, or with the agents of other 
fire insurance companies, or for their agents to contract or agree among themselves, for 
the reasonable adjustment and maintenance of rates to be charged for insurance against 
fire, lightning, or storm within this state"). 
399 /d. 
400 See id. 
401 /d. 
402 /d. at 609. 
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Like Addyston Pipe's similar definition of "direct restraint," which had 
invoked the "right" of firms to do business "in the ordinary way," the Mis-
souri Supreme Court's invocation of freedom from contract could have been 
taken to justify the restriction of any contract that reduced the autonomy of 
contracting parties. 403 Yet, the court held that the statute did not prevent in-
dividual companies from bargaining, and presumably contracting, with indi-
vidual insureds.'104 Moreover, the court was quick to qualify its suggestion 
that the statute was constitutional simply because it enhanced the defendants' 
liberty from contract. 405 The real motivation of the statute, the court said, 
was not "tender consideration for the insurance company," but instead pro-
tection of the consumer from exploitation. 406 Such protection, the court said 
"incidentally preserves what it is here claimed it denies-the free, unre-
strained power to contract by both parties to it. "407 Concerns over liberty 
from contract, then, played no independent role in reconciling antitrust 
regulation with liberty of contract. 
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected a similar overbreadth challenge in State 
ex rei. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe-Line Co. 408 There nineteen oil companies 
charged with fixing petroleum prices above the competitive level lodged sev-
eral objections, apparently of an overbreadth variety, against Ohio's antitrust 
act. 409 The court declined, however, to consider constitutional objections 
that did not relate to the section of the statute prohibiting defendants' con-
duct, holding that that section was severable from any possibly unconstitu-
tional provisions. 410 
The Ohio court rejected defendants' assertion.that their cartel found shelter 
in liberty of contract. While conceding the existence and importance of this 
freedom, the court held that it was "limited by the public welfare or the ex-
ercise of the police power. "411 The police power, of course, was not unlim-
ited: "the legislature can prohibit only those uses of property which are hurt-
ful to the public, and the inhibited use must be hurtful in a legal sense. "41 2 
After finding that the agreement "had ·no purpose" but to raise prices above 
the competitive level, the court, relying on Trans-Missouri Freight, Joint 
Traffic and Addyston Pipe, determined that the contract was "clearly hurtful 
403 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,244-45 (1899). 
404 See Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 52 S. W. at 608. 
405 See id. (asserting that the statute actually enhanced freedom of contract). 
406 /d. 
407 /d. 
408 56 N.E. 464, 464 (Ohio 1900). 
409 See id. at 465-67 (noting the defendants' argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and refusing to consider arguments not r!!lated to defendants' conduct). 
410 See id. at 464. 
411 /d. at 467. 
412 /d. 
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in a legal sense. "41 3 There was no mention of liberty from contract. Instead, 
the existence of prices above the competitive norm supplied the harm that 
justified interference with contractual liberty. 
Finally, in State v. Smiley, the Supreme Court of Kansas entertained a 
challenge to its antitrust law by a participant in a price fixing arrangement 
among several grain dealers in Bison, Kansas. 414 Relying upon Grice and 
Niagra Insurance, the defendants argued that the Kansas Act-apparently 
similar to the Texas Act disapproved in Grice-was unconstitutional because 
it reached conduct that was protected by liberty of contract, including the 
formation of partnerships and the like. 415 The court, however, refused to 
void the statute.416 If the act reached such legitimate methods of doing busi-
ness, the court said, it would follow the lead of the Grice and Niagra courts 
and "declare it to be violative of the most fundamental principles of constitu-
tional right. "417 However, although admitting that the "general words of the 
act" might "outwardly manifest" an intent to prohibit ordinary business ar-
rangements, the court "restrained" the statute to avoid such a result. 41 8 The 
legislature, the court said, most likely only meant to outlaw those contracts 
that led to non-competitive, higher prices.419 According to Trans-Missouri 
Freight and Joint Traffic, which involved "agreements ... to fix and main-
tain non-competitive traffic rates" the court said, the State had the authority 
to prohibit such contracts. 420 At any rate, the defendant had not been con-
victed of forming a partnership, but instead of participating in a scheme to 
fix prices, and could not raise objections based upon hypothetical applica-
tions of the statute. 421 
The defendant did not, however, rely solely upon the overbreadth argu-
ment. He also claimed that Kansas only had the authority to outlaw contracts 
that produced monopoly. 422 The court disagreed, holding that an agreement 
lost the protection of liberty of contract even if it did not create a manop-
413 /d. (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n. 166 U.S. 290 (1897}, 
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898}, and United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899)); see also id. (finding that the agreement had "no 
purpose whatever except to prevent competition ... to the end that there may be received 
from the consumers of [the cartel's] products higher prices than would prevail under the 
condition of open competition") (emphasis added). 
414 See 69 P. 199, 199 (1902). 
415 See id. at 200-01. 
416 See id. at 208. 
417 /d. at 201. 
418 See id. at 204. 
419 See id. at 204-05. 
420 /d. at 205. 
421 See id. at 201. 
422 See id. at 206. 
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oly. 423 The court did not reach this conclusion because the legislature had 
the authority to outlaw any contract that infringed on the freedom of action 
of the parties to it. Instead, the court found, the legislature had the authority 
to outlaw those contracts that might lead to monopoly. 424 If, however, the 
legislature should claim that a certain type of agreement led to monopoly 
"which, the general sense of mankind perceived could not have that effect" a 
court could "disapprove the act on the constitutional grounds of interference 
with the freedom of citizen. "425 Despite its refusal to void the statute on 
overbreadth grounds, then, the court ultimately agreed with the Niagra and 
Grice courts that legislatures could not abridge contracts unless they directly 
led to higher prices. Other state courts would reach similar conclusions.426 
The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Brewer, but on 
grounds even narrower than those adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court. 427 
Like that court, the Supreme Court refused to consider the defendant's claim 
that certain applications of the statute were unconstitutional, instead focusing 
on the authority vel non of Kansas to outlaw. the sort of agreement defendant 
had entered. 428 Acknowledging that liberty of contract allowed parties to 
"further their business interests," the Court conceded that it was difficult to 
draw the line between contracts subject to the police power and those that 
were not.429 Without citing Joint Traffic, Hopkins, or Addyston Pipe, and 
without mentioning the distinction between "ordinary" and other contracts, 
the Court held that the contract at issue was within the police power because 
it was one that allowed buyers of grain to exercise market power over grain 
sellers, without any accompanying economic integration. 
[I]t may not be always easy to draw the line between those contracts 
which are beyond the reach of the police power and those which are 
subject to prohibition or restraint. But a secret arrangement, by which, 
423 See id. 
424 See id. 
425 /d. 
426 See, e.g., Walter Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co., 55 
S.E. 973, 974 (S.C. 1906) (construing antitrust statute to avoid unnecessary infringement 
on freedom of contract); Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Searles, 37 S. 939, 944 (Miss. 1905) 
(stating that a statute would invade "the inherent right of the citizen to deal with his own 
as he pleases" if it sought to control all contracts without regard to effect); State ex rei 
Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 69 S.W. 1033, 1035 (Tenn. 1900) (interpreting antitrust 
statute to apply only to agreements producing anticompetitive effects). Similarly, in Wa-
ters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 44 S.W. 936, 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898), the court rebuffed 
a liberty of contract challenge to the state's antitrust statute by relying upon the work of 
Christopher Tiedeman. As _noted earlier, Tiedeman had argued that states could only pro-
scribe unreasonable combinations. See supra note 365. 
427 See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447 (1905). 
428 See id. at 454. 
429 See id. at 456. 
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under penalties, an apparently existing competition among all dealers in 
a community in one of the necessaries of life is substantially destroyed, 
without the merging of interests through partnership or incorporation, is 
one to which the police power extends. This is as far as we need to go 
in affirming the judgment in this case. 430 
Responding to defendant's argument that there were dealers of wheat in 
towns not far from Bison, to whom farmers could turn,431 the Court es-
chewed any reliance upon the liberty-restraining effects of the arrange-
ment. 432 Instead, in a statement anticipating modern geographic market 
analysis, the Court opined that farmers nearer to Bison would find Bison a 
more attractive outlet for their grain, with the result that the presence of 
neighboring dealers would not prevent the conspiring dealers from exploiting 
sellers. 433 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN INTERPRET AT! ON OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
By the turn of the century, courts had made it plain that antitrust statutes 
implicated liberty of contract, with the result that some justification for such 
regulation was required. In several cases, advocates seeking to sustain these 
laws claimed that they actually enhanced liberty, by voiding contractual re-
straints on the "freedom" of the parties to them, as well as the opportunities 
of third parties. While some courts employed rhetoric that appeared to re-
flect acceptance of this justification, no court actually adopted it in practice. 
To the contrary, courts uniformly held that the mere fact that a contract re-
strained the freedom 'of action of the parties to it could not justify its abridg-
ment. Instead, the state could only abridge those contracts that restrained 
freedom of action in a way that led to prices above the competitive level. 
This conclusion presaged the result in Standard Oil and was consistent with 
that suggested by the classical approach to price regulation and the common 
law doctrine of trade restraints, each of which required some threat of tangi-
ble economic harm before the state could interfere with private contracts. 434 
430 /d. at 456-57. 
431 See Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 10 ("No monopoly could have been established at 
Bison for the other competitive points were in easy wagon reach, and all provided with 
elevators, grain houses, and buyers."); id. at 29-30 (complaining that "it is just as great a 
crime under the statute for two persons, each owning one dollar's worth of sugar, to agree 
that they will not sell their sugar for less than a dollar and a half, when there is plenty of 
other sugar to be had next door for ninety cents"). 
432 See Smiley, 196 U.S. at 456-57. 
433 See id. at 456; cf Tampa Elec. v. Nashville Coal, 365 U.S. 320, 339 (1961) 
(defining relevant geographic market as that area to which purchasers could reasonably 
turn for supplies). 
434 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 49-62 (1911); TAFT, supra note 
343, at 89-91 (concluding that Standard Oil was consistent with formative era precedents); 
see also supra notes 43-46, 54-56 and accompanying text (describing classical paradigm 
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It is certainly true that many of these decisions reached results different 
from those counseled by traditional articulations of the classical paradigm, 
and, for that matter, the common law .. For example, courts uniformly held 
that cartel agreements were beyond the protection of liberty of contract, even 
absent any attempt by the state or private parties to place limitations on en-
try. This expansion of the scope of permissible regulatory authority, how-
ever, did not reflect a repudiation of the classical paradigm in favor of a 
Populist, "liberty from contract" approach. Instead, decisions upholding 
state regulation of private cartels rested upon a straight-forward application 
or "translation" of that paradigm in light of changed circumstances. More 
precisely, these decisions rested upon a belief that purely private cartels 
could, in fact, drive prices above the competitive level, and were, therefore, 
subject to regulation under the classical paradigm. 
To the extent that formative era caselaw sheds light upon the original de-
sign of antitrust legislation, the analysis offered here tends to rebut the 
Populist assertion that antitrust regulation was meant as a "Magna Carta of 
Free Enterprise," outlawing private restrictions on "liberty" regardless of 
their economic consequences. Instead, formative era courts sustained only 
that interference with liberty of contract necessary to prevent prices from 
rising above the competitive level. "Liberty from contract," then, played no 
independent role during this era. 
The conclusion that concerns over liberty of contract led courts to reject 
the Populist approach may seem beside the point. Liberty of contract, after 
all, is a defunct constitutional doctrine, having been repudiated over five 
decades ago. 435 Why, one might ask, should it be relevant to our current 
understanding of antitrust law? Indeed, to the extent that formative era 
courts rejected liberty from contract as an independent statutory value be-
cause they gave credence to liberty of contract, the repudiation of Lochner 
perhaps suggests that modern courts should read "trader freedom" back into 
the Sherman Act. 
Such reasoning, however, would rest upon a misinterpretation of most of 
the cases discussed in this article. To be sure, decisions such as Grice, Nia-
gra, and Greenwich rested squarely upon determinations that legislatures had 
attempted to reach beyond their constitutional authority, by outlawing con-
tracts that did not drive prices above the competitive level. Accordingly, the 
modern repudiation of liberty of contract would require the abandonment of 
these decisions, and the concomitant conclusion that states do, in fact, have 
the authority to outlaw "ordinary contracts and combinations," like partner-
ships, if they were so inclined. 
and its conclusion that states could only regulate supra-competitive pricing); supra note 55 
and accompanying text (describing common law decisions enforcing cartel agreements). 
435 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins 
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
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Most decisions discussed in this article, however, did not rest upon con-
clusions that Congress or state legislatures overstepped their bounds. To the 
contrary, courts generally presumed that, in enacting antitrust legislation, 
legislatures intended to remain within constitutional boundaries. 436 For in-
stance, Justice Peckham's determination in Joint Traffic that "ordinary con-
tracts and combinations" were beyond the scope of the Act rested upon a 
"reasonable construction" of Congress's intent in passing the Sherman Act, a 
construction that did not purport to outlaw contracts protected by liberty of 
contract. 437 Similarly. the definition of "direct restraint" employed in Ad-
dyston Pipe, while informed by the classical paradigm underlying liberty of 
contract, was again imputed to the Congress that passed the Sherman Act. 438 
Moreover, decisions such as Dueber Watch-Case, Greene, and Nelson all 
rested upon a conclusion that Congress had meant the Sherman Act to reach 
only as far as the classical paradigm would allow. Finally, decisions such as 
Smiley and Firemen's Fund Insurance rested upon determinations that the 
legislature had not meant to outlaw contracts solely because of their liberty-
restraining effect, but instead had meant to outlaw only those contracts pro-
ducing prices above the competitive level. 439 While modern legislatures 
certainly have the authority to reach beyond the scope of regulation permis-
sible under the (now defunct) doctrine of liberty of contract, these decisions, 
reached shortly after the statutes in question were passed, concluded that 
late-nineteenth-century legislatures, jealous of constitutional guarantees, had 
chosen not to do so. 440 
The mere conclusion that "trader freedom" in the form of liberty from 
contract should play no independent role in giving content to antitrust doc-
436 Cf. Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (I 989) 
("[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous consti-
tutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils."); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("[l)t is a cardinal principle that this Court will first as-
certain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question [of its 
constitutionality] may be avoided."); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) 
("The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order 
to save a statute from unconstitutionality."). 
437 See supra notes 256-72 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Joillf 
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) and its refusal to interpret the Sherman Act to prohibit 
ordinary contracts). 
438 See supra notes 309-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Addyston 
Pipe, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)). 
439 See supra notes 395-407, 414-21 and accompanying text (analyzing Smiley and 
Firemen's Fund Insurance and their conclusion that state legislatures intended to prohibit 
only those agreements that produced supracompetitive prices). 
44° Cf. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466 (noting that decision to construe statute so as to 
avoid constitutional infirmities depends upon presumption that legislature intended to fol-
low the constitution); SKLAR, supra note 18, at 112-17 (arguing that Congress abandoned 
initial drafts of the Sherman Act due to perceived constitutional infirmities). 
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trine does not necessarily establish that the Modern "allocative efficiency" 
approach to antitrust law is the correct one. Indeed, the conclusion that 
prices above the competitive baseline justify regulation is not entirely con-
sistent with the allocative efficiency approach. That approach, as mentioned 
earlier, would shield from regulation those contracts that, on balance, en-
hanced total wealth, even those that increase prices. 441 A conclusion that 
formative era caselaw adopted a price-based standard, therefore, points away 
from the standard sought by proponents of the allocative efficiency ap-
proach.442 
Before jettisoning the allocative efficiency approach in favor of ·a price-
based standard, one must grapple with one more puzzle: a price-based stan-
dard seems inconsistent with the hostility of Lochner v. New York and its 
progeny toward redistributionist justifications for interfering with contractual 
liberty. Some scholars have made a strong case that, like the common law 
of trade restraints, as well as the scope of regulation permitted by the classi-
cal paradigm, the scope of the Lochner-era police power was determined by 
a theory of externalities.443 So, for instance, while the state ordinarily had 
no power to regulate the hours that employees worked, it could so regulate 
when long hours would threaten the physical safety of the workers involved, 
441 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (summarizing the focus of the alloca-
tive efficiency approach to antitrust); see also Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 29, at 
142-50 (describing difference between price-based and allocative efficiency approach to 
the antitrust laws). 
442 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 283 ("One con-
sequence of the neoclassical revolution in economic theory was a change in the legal defi-
nition of 'coercion' to encompass the loss of market opportunities that competition would 
have afforded. When the neoclassical revolution was complete, even the customer forced 
to pay a high price because of cartelization or monopolization was legally 'coerced.' The 
Sherman Act itself reflected this emergent neoclassicism."); see also id. at 294-95 
(arguing that the Court adopted a "neoclassical" approach to antitrust during the formative 
era); PERITZ, supra note 5, at 51-52 (arguing that Court's focus on price effects of re-
straints was consistent with Lochner-era jurisprudence) . 
. 
443 See, e.g., HqVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 200-03 
("Both [Thomas] Cooley and the Supreme Court read into substantive due process doctrine 
a theory of externalities much like Pigou's. The Court approved regulatory legislation if it 
was convinced that market exchanges produced externalities for which the bargaining par-
ties would not account."); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due 
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 442 (1988) (explaining that Lochner-era courts sustained 
regulations designed to combat externalities); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI· 
TUTIONAL LAW 570-71 (1988) (remarking that "the underlying philosophy [of the Lochner 
era] held that the only legitimate goal of government in general, and of the police power in 
particular, was to protect individual rights and otherwise enhance the to(al public good"); 
EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 107-12 (1985) ("The sole function of the police power is to 
protect individual liberty and private property against force and fraud."). 
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and thus the "strength" of the community at large. 444 Thus, the state could 
regulate hours worked by women, because they did not fully internalize the 
effects that their poor health might have on their children and thus future 
generations. 445 Moreover, workmen's compensation laws, which limited the 
ability of individuals to contract away their right to sue employers for negli-
gence, were sustained because absent such schemes, injured parties would 
become charges of the state. 446 Thus, they did not fully internalize the harms 
associated with accidents, and would, when negotiating over the standard of 
care to be used in the workplace, undervalue the appropriate standard, too 
readily contracting away their rights. Finally, land use regulation was also 
regularly sustained when it prevented hazards to neighboring property. 447 
444 See Holden v. Hardy, !69 U.S. 366, 396-97 (1898) (noting that employment in the 
mines involved exposure to "poisonous gases, dust and impalpable substances ... [with] 
morbid, noxious and often deadly effects in the human system" and that, even if an indi-
vidual might voluntarily choose to work in such conditions "[t]he state still retains an in-
terest in his welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum 
of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or ne-
glected, the State must suffer."); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1904) 
(sustaining compulsory vaccinations because "public safety [is] confessedly endangered by 
the presence of a dangerous disease"). 
445 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) ("[A woman] becomes an ob-
ject of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race ... 
[and she thus] may be placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protec-
tion may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not 
be sustained."); see also S. P. Breckinbridge, Legislative Control of Women's Work, 14 J. 
PoL. EcoN. 107, 108-09 (1906) (noting that the primary justification for regulating 
women's employment was their status as either current or eventual mothers, on whose 
well being the survival of the community ultimately depended). 
446 See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 206 (1917) ("The subject 
matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the matter of compensation 
for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course of hazardous employment, 
and the public has a direct interest in this as affecting the common welfare."). 
447 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 203-04 ("The 
Supreme Court land-use opinions are filled with citations of possible externalities justify-
ing state intrusion); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 708 (1885) (sustaining a San 
Francisco ordinance outlawing nighttime operation of laundries which required 
"continuous fires" within a certain portion of the city which was, according to the Court, 
subject "to high winds, and composed principally within the limits designated of wooden 
buildings, [such] that regulations of a strict character should be adopted to prevent the pos-
sibility of fires"). Even Justice Field, the most ardent defender of laissez-faire conceded: 
If one construct a building in a city, the State, or the municipality exercising a dele-
gated power from the State, may require its walls to be of sufficient thickness for the 
uses intended; it may forbid the employment of inflammable materials in its construc-
tion, so as not to endanger the safety of his neighbors; if designed as a theatre, 
church, or public hall, it may prescribe ample means of egress, so as to afford facility 
for escape in the case of accident; it may forbid the storage in it of powder, nitro-
glycerine, or other explosive material; it may require its occupants daily to remove 
1999] LIBERTY AND ANTITRUST IN THE FORMATIVE ERA 85 
The apparent conclusion by formative era courts that prices above the 
competitive level constituted a "harm" justifying the abridgment of contracts, 
however, is inconsistent with this externality-based view of the scope of state 
power. After all, the Lochner Court made it clear that a law designed to re-
dress inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee did 
not fall within the police power because it was simply an attempt to redis-
tribute wealth. 448 How then, one might ask, could an increase in prices be 
deemed an "externality," any more than a low wage?; the first merely alters 
the allocation of wealth among firms and consumers, and the second alters 
the allocation among employees and employers. 449 Was the Lochner-era 
Court drawing arbitrary distinctions between redistributive legislation that it 
approved, and that which it disdained? 
If the distributive consequences of prices above the natural level do not 
themselves constitute externalities subject to police power regulation, what 
justified the conclusion that the state could abridge price fixing agreements? 
This question provides an opening for devotees of the allocative efficiency 
approach to antitrust. The real "harm" from high prices, they say, is not 
any "transfer" of wealth from consumers to producers, but, instead, the re-
duction in society's total welfare that results when cartels reduce ?utput and 
decayed vegetable and animal matter, which would otherwise accumulate and engen-
der disease; it may exclude from it all occupations and businesses calculated to dis-
turb the neighborhood or infect the air. 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 146 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting); see also In re Jacobs, 98 
N.Y. 98, 113 (1885) ("It was proved in this case that the odor of the tobacco did not ex-
tend to any of the other rooms of the tenement, house."). 
448 See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 201-02 (noting 
that, under liberty of contract doctrine, the presence of "unequal bargaining power" did 
not ordinarily justify a regulation of wages or prices because "[i]nequality of bargaining 
power between capitalists and laborers affected the distribution of wealth between the bar-
gaining parties, but [had] no effect on anyone else"); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION 46 (1993); TRIBE, supra note 443, at 571 ("[L]aws aimed at redistributing 
resources would by their very nature fall outside of the legislative function."). Professor 
Hovenkamp does not recognize the apparent tension between this conclusion and his asser-
tion that the Supreme Court gave the Sherman Act a "neoclassical interpretation." See 
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 285-95 (discussing for-
mative era Sherman Act decisions and concluding that the Court ultimately settled on a 
"neoclassical" antitrust policy). Such an interpretation, of course, outlaws horizontal 
price fixing and thus protects a certain distribution of the fruits of economic activity. 
449 Compare Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (holding that Con-
gress cannot redress unequal bargaining power between employer and employee); Coppage 
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1915) (same); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 
(1905) (same) with Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 456 (1905) (finding that Kansas could 
act to protect farmers from collusion by dealers); State ex ret Crow v. Firemen's Fund 
Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595, 608 (Mo. 1899) (holding that Missouri could act to protect the 
"helpless insured" from colluding insurance companies). 
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distort the allocation of resources. 45° Congress, they continue, could not 
have intended to outlaw restraints simply because of their distributional ef-
fects, but instead intended to regulate a different externality, the allocative 
losses produced by the output limitations associated with higher prices. 451 
Such losses, of course, constitute externalities in the sense that they would 
not occur absent bargaining and information costs. 452 While these scholars 
have not said so explicitly, elimination of such externalities would fall within 
the Lochner-era conception of the police power. 453 
The suggestion that allocative losses constitute the "harm" that placed 
price fixing contracts outside the protection of liberty of contract, while theo-
retically appealing, poses problems of its own. According to several schol-
ars, at least, the concept of "allocative efficiency" that leads to the conclu-
sion that cartels reduce total wealth was foreign to the lawyers and judges of 
the nineteenth century, and thus could not have informed a conclusion that 
supra-competitive prices create externalities in the modern sense.454 If this is 
the case, there is still no satisfactory way to distinguish the state's authority 
to prevent high prices from its inability to prevent low wages. 
There are, it seems, two possible ways to reconcile price regulation with 
the anti-redistributional character of liberty of contract doctrine. First, one 
450 See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 110-12 (highlighting a consumer 
welfare model addressing only the total welfare of consumers as a class); POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 24, at 10-13 (describing the inefficient allocation of resources 
associated with monopoly). 
451 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 22, at passim (arguing that the legislative 
history of the Sherman Act demonstrates that Congress was predominantly concerned with 
consumer welfare); see also BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 22, at 110-12 
(arguing that the antitrust laws should not be concerned with income distribution, only to-
tal consumer welfare); Ginsburg, supra note 141, at 331 (arguing that antitrust is best 
characterized as externality regulation). 
452 See ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 141, at 6 (arguing that antitrust regulation is nec-
essary to prevent deadweight losses in light of high transaction costs); Calabresi, supra 
note 28, at 70 ("Assuming no transaction costs, those who lose from the relative under-
production of monopolies could bribe monopolists to produce more."); George Stigler, 
The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 
(1972). 
453 Cf. TRIBE, supra note 443, at 571 (contending that the Lochner-era police power 
consisted only of the authority to enhance the general welfare). 
454 These scholars emphasize that Alfred Marshall's PRINCIPLES OF EcoNOMICS, which 
first popularized the sort of marginalism necessary to an appreciation of the concept of 
deadweight loss, was not published until 1890. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected 
Classes, supra note 31, at 21 n.55; see also PERITZ, supra note 5, at 243 (asserting that, in 
1890, neither economists nor legislators understood the concept of allocative efficiency); 
Frederick Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 
974, 977 n.20 (1977) (book review); cf Millon, supra note 10, at 1233-34 (rejecting 
Bork's conclusion that the Sherman Act was driven primarily by a desire to enhance eco-
nomic efficiency). 
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could begin by recognizing that a conclusion that an act (or failure to act) 
constitutes a "harm" depends critically upon the "baseline" of the analy-
sis. 455 A punch in the nose or "theft" of an automobile is not an externality 
unless one believes that the nose or the car "belongs" to someone other than 
the invader. 456 Similarly, A's broadcast of radio waves on a frequency over 
which B would also like to broadcast is only an "externality" if that fre-
quency has, through the common law or otherwise, been assigned to B. "All 
property is theft:," the adage goes; no one owns anything unless the law says 
they do. 
Against this background, it is easier to understand why formative era 
courts could have viewed prices above the "natural," competitive level as an 
externality and thus a public harm, without doing violence to the classical 
paradigm and liberty of contract doctrine. After all, that paradigm rested 
upon a purely descriptive belief that, absent intervention by the state, mar-
kets would be populated by several small sellers, surrounded by negligible 
barriers to entry. 457 Moreover, this state of affairs was more than empiri-
cally verifiable: it was natural and inevitable, indeed, some said, ordained by 
the Creator himself. 458 State attempts to create monopoly or otherwise 
abridge liberty of entry were suspect precisely because they departed from 
this natural state of affairs, interfering with the "ordinary laws of trade" or 
the "general laws of competition. "459 
As shown earlier, the determination that antitrust regulation did not neces-
sarily interfere with liberty of contract rested upon the realization that private 
contracts could, in some cases, interfere with the operation of the "ordinary 
laws of trade" as much as any state enactment. 460 Thus, the market out-
comes produced by the operation of such contracts were as distorted as those 
455 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 448, at 46 (emphasizing the importance of a baseline in 
determining whether a statute deprives one of liberty); Frank Michaelman, Property, Util-
ity, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1967) (noting the necessity of constructing a baseline before 
analyzing takings issues); Joseph Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 
YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971) (rejecting the traditional view of property rights in favor of one 
which recognizes the interconnectedness of property); Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) (developing such a framework in defining property). 
456 Cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 448, at 46 ("We do not say that someone who is forced to 
return [stolen] property is being forced to 'subsidize' the person from whom the property 
was taken."). 
457 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also FINE, supra note 44, at 52-56 
(noting link in classical mind between competitive system, resulting prices, and the Deity). 
459 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
460 See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text (discussing Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,226 (1889), and its conclusion that exclusively private 
conduct could produce direct restraints that fell outside of the protections of liberty of 
contract). 
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produced by a state grant of special privilege. Perhaps, then, cartel-
generated prices were deemed "harms" as a distributional matter because 
they departed from the prices that would have been produced by the 
"natural" workings of the market. 461 Such a conclusion, while not logically 
compelled, could be consistent with the more general determination that the 
state could not act to, for instance, upset wage bargains. Bargains between 
employer and employee were usually the result of the protection and distri-
bution of entitlements associated with the "natural" common law baseline, in 
which the "ordinary laws of trade" would function well. Mr. Lochner's 
bakery, for instance, had no power in the employment market. 462 
Indeed, where the labor markets in question were not competitive, the 
Lochner-era court did allow regulation of employment conditions. In Holden 
v. Hardy, 463 which post-dated Allgeyer, the Court sustained a maximum hour 
law for miners because, among other things, employers and employees "do 
not stand upon an equality and .... proprietors lay down the rules and the 
laborers are practically constrained to obey them. "464 Similarly, the bargains 
between cartel and consumer voided by antitrust statutes were distorted by 
departures from the market process associated with the classical model. Un-
der the classical market paradigm, it could be argued, the prevention of price 
fixing merely restored the status quo ante, and was no more "redistributive" 
than are laws preventing theft. 
The conclusion that high prices were harms because they differed from 
those generated by the "natural" workings of the market, however, does not 
necessarily establish that the "harm" was a distributional one. After all, the 
assumption that a highly competitive market and the price that it generated 
was "natural" ultimately had to rest on some normative justification for this 
competitive process of production and exchange. While classicists assumed 
that the natural competitive process had certain distributional consequences, 
they also believed that it would ensure that capital flowed to its highest val-
ued use. 465 Then-Judge Peckham found that laws mandating prices below the 
natural level were unjust as a distributional matter-"communistic in their 
461 See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. 
462 See Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and 
the Mistranslation of Liberty, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (arguing that 
labor markets that produced bargains protected in Lochner era were generally highly com-
petitive); S!EGAN, supra note 70, at 116 (reporting that, in 1905, there were over three 
thousand bakeries in New York State). 
463 169 u.s. 366 (1898). 
464 /d. at 396-97; TRIBE, supra note 443, at 572 (asserting that the Supreme Court ap-
parently believed the miners in Holden were a captive labor force). 
465 See SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 46, at 365-66 (contending that 
departures from the competitive price led labor and capital into the wrong sectors and 
"overturned the natural balance of industry"). 
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tendency. "466 He also deemed them harmful insofar as they would drive 
capital out of the regulated business. 467 Indeed, four years later, the New 
York Court of Appeals would unanimously echo the same concern, reluc-
tantly holding that price fixing agreements were per se unlawful, while at the 
same time opining that the "general interests" of society required that pro-
ducers receive a fair price. 468 There is no reason, a priori, to assume that 
one (distributional) or the other (allocational) of these two attributes of the 
"natural" competitive process was dominant in the mind of those courts that 
viewed prices that departed from the "natural" level to be harmful. Indeed, 
even Holden v. Hardy did not depend solely upon the presence of unequal 
bargaining power, but also upon the fact that long workdays resulted in more 
injuries to miners and thus ultimately harmed the state. 469 
Some basis for choosing between the allocational and distributional con-
ception of harm that justified abridgment of cartel agreements can be found 
in those cases that did not rely upon the police power in sustaining such 
regulation. As noted earlier, in Joint Traffic, Hopkins and Addyston Pipe, 
for instance, the Court did not mention the police power. 470 Instead, Justice 
Peckham held that Congress could abridge contracts not deemed ordinary, 
defining as ordinary those agreements that did not directly interfere with lib-
erty and thus market processes in a way that led to higher prices. 471 Al-
though this approach produced the same result in cartel cases as those state 
court decisions that did invoke the police· power, none of the opinions 
adopting it stated that prices above the natural level "harmed" consumers. 
Thus, it seems possible that the standard adopted was premised upon a defi-
nition of "ordinary" or "natural" decoupled from purely distributional con-
cerns. 
To say that the second approach did not necessarily depend upon distribu-
tive concerns does not establish that it did not. Still, several considerations 
point toward a conclusion that the line between "ordinary" and other con-
tracts was not to be drawn solely or even primarily based upon distributional 
concerns. First, as just noted, none of the cases that adopted this approach 
466 People ex rei Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 695 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dis-
senting). 
467 See id. 
468 See People v. Sheldon, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (N.Y. 1893). 
469 See 169 U.S. at 397; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1905) 
(distinguishing Holden on the ground that the occupation of mining presented true threats 
to health); David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Eco-
nomic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 380 n.334 (1985) (speculating that 
Justice Peckham was able to distinguish Lochner from Holden because he regarded mining 
as a more dangerous industry than baking). 
470 See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
471 See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text (discussing distinction drawn by Jus-
tice Peckham in Addyston Pipe between ordinary contracts and direct restraints). 
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suggested that it was necessary to protect consumers from the "harm" asso-
ciated with high prices. Second, these decisions made it clear that contracts 
could be "ordinary," and thus within the protection of liberty of contract, 
even if they increased prices. Partnerships and ancillary restraints, for in-
stance, were deemed ordinary, even if they had the incidental effect of elimi-
nating competition and increasing prices.472 By implication, then, the state 
did not have the authority, in the face of liberty of contract, to outlaw a con-
tract simply because it led to higher prices. Third, consistent with the classi-
cal paradigm, decisions preceding Joint Traffic, Hopkins, and Addyston Pipe 
held that practices that could be explained on grounds other than interference 
with the price mechanism were protected, apparently even if they tended to-
ward monopoly in the case at hand. 473 Whether consciously or uncon-
sciously, then, the Sherman Act decisions recognized that the mere charac-
terization of high prices as a harm could not, by itself, provide the basis for 
interfering with contractual freedom. A contract or practice could be 
"natural" or "ordinary" and still lead to prices above the status quo ante. 
In the end, however, these two approaches to defining the scope of liberty 
of contract as against antitrust regul~tion may have been complementary. 
After all, those courts that invoked the police power, and the concomitant 
conclusion that high prices constituted harms subject to regulation, did so 
while scrutinizing cartel agreements which, given the existence of barriers to 
entry, could only be explained as attempts to produce a market result differ-
ent from one governed by the "ordinary laws of trade." Indeed, none of 
these courts suggested that "legitimate" practices, such as the formation of a 
partnership, could be abridged simply because they led to higher prices than 
had previously obtained.474 
Thus, whether courts relied upon the police power or the distinction be-
tween "ordinary" contracts and direct restraints, the ultimate result seemed 
to be the same. The mere fact that a contract led to higher prices did not, 
ipso facto, place it outside the protection of liberty of contract. Instead, only 
those contracts that could only be explained as designed to achieve this ef-
fect, i.e., those contracts that had an "immediate" and "direct" effect on 
prices, were beyond the shelter of liberty of contract. Contracts that could 
be explained as "legitimate" methods of competition were consistent with the 
472 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). 
473 See Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch Co., 66 F. 637, 646 (2d Cir. 
1895); In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892); see also People ex ref Annan v. 
Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting); Cooley, Limits to State 
Control of Private Business, supra note 48, at 268-69 (concluding that the state could not 
regulate a monopoly achieved through superior diligence and industry). 
474 See, e.g., Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 125 F. 121. 130 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1903) 
(recognizing that a state could not abridge the formation of ordinary contracts); State v. 
Smiley, 69 P. 199, 204 (Kan. 1902) (reading the challenged statute to avoid prohibition of 
ordinary contracts). 
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natural workings of the competitive process and thus found shelter within 
liberty of contract. The results, flowing as they did from operation of the 
"ordinary laws of trade," were "natural" even if prices were higher, and 
thus did not constitute "harms" subject to regulation. 
At bottom, the conclusion that contracts that could be explained absent any 
expectation of higher prices are "ordinary" rests upon a normative judgment 
that consumers are not always "entitled" to prices at the current level. By 
associating contracts that might "indirectly" lead to higher prices with the 
"natural" or "ordinary" workings of the market, formative era courts appar-
ently allowed some standard other than the distribution of income to drive 
the permissible scope of interference with private contract and thus antitrust 
regulation. These judges may never had read Alfred Marshall or explicitly 
understood the nature of "allocative efficiency." They did, it seems, act as 
though they did. 
CONCLUSION 
One cannot fully appreciate the meaning of formative era caselaw without 
viewing those decisions through the lens of liberty of contract. Such a con-
sideration demonstrates that courts rejected a "liberty from contract" justifi-
cation for the interference with private contract worked by antitrust laws. 
Instead, state and federal courts held that the state could only abridge those 
trade restraints that "directly" or immediately produced prices above the 
competitive level. Thus, formative era caselaw does not support the propo-
sition that the antitrust laws were designed to outlaw those agreements that 
"infringed" on liberty for contract, without regard to their effect on prices. 
The adoption by formative era courts of a price-based justification for 
abridging contractual freedom suggests that courts viewed prices above the 
competitive level as a distributional harm, a harm redressable by antitrust 
regulation. Although such a conclusion seems at odds with the anti-
redistributional character of Lochner-era jurisprudence, it is explicable in 
light of the powerful influence that the classical paradigm's model of a highly 
competitive economy had on the minds of formative era judges. Within this 
model, the competitive process, and the price that it produced, were deemed 
"natural," even ordained by God. It is thus not difficult to understand how 
the lawyers and judges of the formative era could have viewed prices above 
the competitive level· as an illegitimate transfer of wealth from producers to 
consumers. 
There is, however, an alternate explanation for the formative era conclu-
sion that supracompetitive prices were a "harm," an explanation more con-
sistent with the allocative efficiency approach to antitrust. The competitive 
process associated with the classical paradigm did more than simply assure a 
"natural" price; it also ensured that all firms earned the "natural" return, and 
that capital was allocated properly. Thus, formative era courts may well 
have treated high prices as a harm for reasons unrelated to their distributional 
consequences. Indeed, some formative era courts, including the Supreme 
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Court itself, stated that an agreement did not lose the protection of liberty of 
contract simply because it led to higher prices. Such an approach, which 
countenanced various forms of integration that might "indirectly" lead to 
higher prices, was consistent with an approach to antitrust that emphasized 
the creation of wealth, and not its distribution. Robert Bork may have been 
right after all. 
